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2Abstract
This thesis analyses the link that the establishment of European citizenship creates 
between citizenship, nationality, and immigration policies. To be a European citizen, 
one needs to be a national of a member state. According to this criterion, nationality 
and citizenship are bound to each other. There is no possibility of access for those 
who do not have the status of national citizenship. European citizenship legitimised a 
privileged position to which not all individuals are entitled, and conditions of access 
are under the jurisdiction of each member state. It is argued that normatively 
European citizenship reinforces the ideology of nationality while empirically it has 
been used to forge a sort of European identity. In other words, the underlying 
argument is that European citizenship functions to define European identity and 
nationality functions towards the establishment of national immigration policies. 
This process leads to the formation of a binary typology of ‘us and them’, 
strengthened by legislation and political debates. The formation of the category of 
‘us’ as Europeans does not find a response at the empirical level as the public does 
not fully identify with the Euro-polity. What emerges instead is that the public 
regards ‘compatibility’ between a European and national identity as more optimal. 
The principal benefit of Euro-citizenship is to re-prioritise the means of citizenship 
from political rights to social and economic rights. This ‘opportunity structure’, 
nevertheless, remains in a void as long as Community membership relies on the 
condition of nationality. The thesis proposes the introduction of a ‘legal subjectivity’ 
based on the redefinition of the concept of legality detached from nationality and 
grounded in the active exercise of civil, political, and social rights. Such a 
redefinition is necessary to sidestep the difficulties entailed in any attempt to separate 
citizenship from nationality in theory and practice. This would deprive citizenship of 
its regulative functions in terms of inclusion and exclusion, and it would reduce the 
importance attached to the inherent link between citizenship and nationality.
3Acknowledgements
Immigration and citizenship in Europe quite obviously constitute a subject in which the 
terms of discussion are changing on an almost daily basis. It has been impossible, 
therefore, to incorporate into this thesis some of the most recent developments, 
especially those that transpire subsequent to submission.
This thesis would not have been conceivable without the support o f many 
people. First of all, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Chris Husbands who supervised and 
encouraged my work. His invaluable advice has helped to shape this thesis. I would like 
to thank Dr. Leslie Sklair and Prof. Anthony D. Smith for their initial encouragement 
and support. Dr. Erika Szyszczak read and commented upon some legal aspects of the 
thesis. Amani Siyam assisted me in some of the statistical operations used in the thesis.
The University of Bari (Universita degli Studi di Bari) granted me an award to 
pursue a year of research abroad that initiated my work on this thesis. I am much 
obliged to Prof. Eligio Resta who supervised my Tesi di Laurea at the University of 
Bari and who gave me the confidence to pursue postgraduate work. I would also like to 
thank Prof. Franco Chiarello who provided me with valuable research experience. A 
research grant from the Centre of National Research in Rome, Italy (CNR- Centro 
Nazionale di Ricerca) helped to finance part of the research towards this thesis.
Dr. Edward Black gave me the opportunity to teach Italian in the Language 
Study Centre at The London School of Economics and Political Science for two years 
and thereby indirectly helped to finance my research. Even more enriching in so far as 
my own research is concerned are the two years that I have spent teaching in the 
Government Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
under the direction of Dr. Robert Leonardi.
In the spring of 1996 I received a grant from the European University Institute in 
Florence that enabled me to work at the Institute for four months and also afforded me 
the opportunity to attend the European Forum on Citizenship.
Finally, I would like to express my extreme gratitude to William R. Day for his 
constant moral support.
This thesis is entirely dedicated to my parents and their persistent understanding.
4Table of Contents Page
Abstract 2
Acknowledgements 3
List of Tables and Figures 8-10
List of Abbreviations 11
Introduction
1.1 Main argument 12-14
1.2 Theoretical framework 14
1.2.1 Formal and substantive functions of citizenship 15-18
1.2.2 Understanding citizenship between liberalism and republicanism 18-21
1.2.3 Normative undertaking and social reality 21-24
1.2.4 Citizenship and nationality 24-27
1.2.5 Citizenship and immigration 28-30
1.2.6 The problem of identification 30-32
1.3 Outline of the thesis 32-34
Chapter 1: Societal needs and the symbolism behind citizenship practice 35
Introduction 36-37
1.1 Community models 37-40
1.1.1 From citizens to subj ects 40-44
1.1.2 The epilogue of the political community 45-47
1.2 Communitarism, political and civil rights 47-50
1.2.1 Social rights and universalism 50-56
1.2.2 Citizens, legal subjects and non-citizens 56-59
Conclusion 59-60
5Chapter 2: Immigration and citizenship policies: the redefinition of the
concept of nationality in the United Kingdom and Italy
Introduction
2.1 Citizenship in the United Kingdom: an atypical case
2.1.1 The shift from ‘subjecthood’ to citizenship between 1948 and 1981
2.1.2 The definition of British nationality for ‘Community and national 
purposes
2.1.3 Rights, nationality and new immigration measures in the UK
2.2 The Italian citizenship: between adversity and social integration
2.2.1 Immigration in Italy: some features
2.2.2 Alignment with European requirements
2.2.3 Discriminatory effects
2.2.4 The Italian immigration law between restrictive and progressive 
measures
Conclusion: through a comparative approach
Chapter 3: Forms and Functions of the Euro-citizenship 
Introduction
3.1 The transformation of Euro-citizenship within the acquis 
Communautaire
3.1.1 The fundamental changes on policy-making: the historical setting
3.1.2 The political achievement of the citizenship ‘acquis ’
3.2 The outer and inner circle: participation or exclusion
3.2.1 From the political to the market citizen
3.2.2 The direct impact of Euro-citizenship on third-country nationals
3.3 The foundation of a European public sphere: the problem of
legitimacy and fundamental rights
3.3.1 The public legitimisation in the development of the European 
Union democracy
3.3.2 The protection of fundamental rights 
Conclusion
61
62
62-64
64-70
70-74
74-77
78-80
80-82
82-86
86-88
88-92
92-95
97
98-99
99-101
101-104
104-106
106-109
109-112
112-118
118
119-122
123-125
125-126
6Chapter 4: The conceptualization of Euro-citizenship in the European and 127
national political debate
Introduction 128-129
4.1 The relationship between Europe and people 129-134
4.1.1 Citizenship in the political debate and its 135-137
impact on public opinion
4.1.2 Europe’ citizens: more than a constitutional matter 137-142
4.2 Two case studies 143
4.2.1 Voting rights 143-148
4.2.2 Euro-citizenship in the frontier regions 148-150
4.3 The definition of Euro-citizenship in the British parliamentary 150-151
debate
4.3.1 The politics of assurance in the redifinition of rights and obligations 151-157
4.3.2 Two paradigms of denial 157-163
4.3.3 In addition to the politics of assurance 164-166
Conclusion 166-167
Chapter 5: The social mechanism of integration and the political 168
Representation of immigrants’ rights at European and national level
Introduction 169
5.1 The integration practices: a general approach 169-174
5.1.1 Representation and integration practices 174-179
5.1.2 The communitizing project and exclusion 179-181
5.1.3 The significance of public opinion for the political debate 181-184
5.2 The representation of immigrants’ rights at national level: the case 184-187
of the United Kingdom
5.2.1 The politics of ethno-national exclusion in the United Kingdom 187-196
5.2.2 ‘Fairer, Faster and Firmer’: the new approach to immigration and 196-198
Asylum in the United Kingdom
5.2.3 The European example. 198-203
Conclusion 203-205
7Chapter 6: Opinion Polls and dominant factors in the process of European 206
self-definition
Introduction 207-208
6.1 The deficiency of a public sphere in Europe 208-211
6.1.1 Measuring public opinion convergence at the cross-national level 211-215
6.1.2 The definition of European identity between identification and 217-220
acceptance
6.1.3 The ‘affective’ orientation 220-230
6.1.4 The ‘utilitarian’ orientation 232-236
6.2 ‘Cognitive mobilization’ and the process of Europeanization 236-240
6.2.1 Supra-national values 240-242
6.2.2 The impact of the European identification on the perception of 243-252
‘otherness’
Conclusion 252-253
Chapter 7: The significance of supra-national legal conditions for the 254
determination of social rights
Introduction 255
7.1 The rationale for supra-national undertakings in the social sphere 255-257
7.1.1 The significance of residence in determining social rights 258-263
7.1.2 Workers and the European social dimension 263-267
7.2 Supra-national aims and the impasse of nationality 267-271
7.2.1 Exceptional measures of membership 271-274
7.3 Public services: some contradictions 274-276
7.3.1 Social security rights: a probable route for Euro-citizenship 276-281
Conclusion 281-282
Conclusions 283-292
Bibliography 293-319
Main laws and secondary legislation cited in the text 320-331
Appendix 1: Members of the European Parliament 1993-1996 332-343
Appendix 2: Members of the British Parliament 1993-1996
List of tables and figures
Tab. 1 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 2 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 2a/2b (Chapter 6)
Tab. 3 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 4 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 5 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 5al/5a2 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 5bl/5b2 (Chapter6)
Tab. 5cl/5c2 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 6a/6b (Chapter 6) 
Tab. 7a (Chapter 6)
Tab. 7b (Chapter 6)
Tab. 7c (Chapter 6)
Common Policy: Unemployment and 
Immigration.
Cross-Tabulation between Education and 
European Support Typology
European Support Typology by Education 
controlling for value orientation 
(Materialist/Post-Materialist) in UK and Italy.
European Support Typology (Attachment).
Attitude towards Euro-citizenship (Affect).
Cross-Tabulation between Euro-citizenship and 
European Support Typology 1994.
European Support Typology by Euro- 
citizenship controlling for Age. UK and Italy.
European Support Typology by Euro- 
citizenship controlling for Education. UK and 
Italy.
European Support Typology by Euro- 
citizenship controlling for gender: UK and 
Italy.
Cross-Tabulation between National Pride and 
Euro-citizenship. UK and Italy.
‘Utilitarian Orientation’ (Membership country 
benefit).
‘Utilitarian Orientation’ (Membership ‘good or 
bad thing)’.
‘Utilitarian Orientation’ (EU dissolution 
regret).
Tab. 8a (Chapter 6)
Tab. 8b (Chapter 6)
Tab. 8c (Chapter 6)
Tab. 9 (Chapter 6) 
Tab. 10a (Chapter 6)
Tab. 10b (Chapter 6)
Tab. 11 (Chapter 6) 
Tab. 12 (Chapter 6) 
Tab. 13 (Chapter 6)
Tab. 14 (Chapter 6)
Cross-Tabulation between ‘Utilitarian 
Orientation’ (Membership country benefit) and 
European Support Typology.
Cross-Tabultaion between ‘Utilitarian 
‘Orientation’ (Membership good/bad thing) and 
European Support Typology.
Cross-Tabulation between ‘Utilitarian 
Orientation’ (EU dissolution regret) and 
European support Typology.
Value Orientation (Materialist/Post-materialist).
Cross-Tabulation between Value Orientation 
(Materialist/Post-Materialist) and Euro- 
citizenship.
Cross-Tabulation between Value Orientation 
(Materialist/ Post-Materialist) and European 
Support Typology.
When do you hear about people of another 
nationality, whom do you think of?
Attitude Towards Immigrants from other EU 
countries.
Cross-Tabulation between Value Orientation 
(Materialist/ Post-Materialist) and attitude 
towards foreigners.
Cross-Tabulation between attitude towards 
foreigners and Euro-citizenship.
Tab.l4a/14b (Chapter 6)
Fig. 1 (Chapter 1)
Fig.l (Chapter 2)
Fig. 1 (Chapter 4)
Fig.2 (Chapter 4)
Fig. 1 (Chapter 6)
Fig. 2 (Chapter 6)
Fig. 3 (Chapter 6)
Fig. 3a/3b (Chapter 6)
Attitude towards foreigners by Euro-citizenship 
controlling for Values Orientations (Materialist/ 
Post-Materialist) UK and Italy.
Models of citizenship.
Summary.
General Approach in each European political 
coalition about institutional change, consensus 
and Euro-citizenship.
Summary of the Supportive and the Sceptical 
approach.
Affective Orientation Towards Attachment.
Value Orientation and Public Attitudes in UK 
and Italy.
Value Orientation and the level of tolerance 
towards foreigners.
Value Orientation and the level of tolerance 
towards foreigners by Euro-citizenship.
List of Abbreviations
Bull. EC Bulletin of the European Community
EC European Community
EC Treaty Treaty Establishing the European Community
EEC European Economic Community
EU European Union
ECJ European Court of Justice
Euro-citizenship European Citizenship
EP European Parliament
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IT Italy
O.J. Official Journal
TEU Treaty on European Union
UK United Kingdom
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
Introduction 12
1 .1 Main argument
This study examines the inherent link that the establishment of Euro-citizenship 
creates between citizenship and nationality on the one hand, and between citizenship 
practice and immigration on the other. It follows two different lines of analysis, one 
institutional and the other empirical or attitudinal. The institutional analysis 
addresses legal and political aspects of citizenship and immigration, and the 
empirical analysis assesses public attitudes as revealed by opinion polls.
I argue that the establishment of European citizenship embodies the 
‘opportunity structure’ for an effective change in what I call citizenship’s means, 
which is to say civil, political, and social rights. The re-prioritisation of social and 
economic rights over political rights not only offers an escape from the original 
functions of citizenship, which is to say exclusion and inclusion, but it also redefines 
the idea of political community and membership in the community. There are both 
normative and empirical impediments to this. In normative terms, Euro-citizenship 
reinforces the ideology of nationality and empirically, Euro-citizenship functions 
towards the formation of a European identity. This is largely because nationality has 
become the primary criterion used to determine eligibility for European citizenship, 
leading to a ‘binary typology’ of ‘us’ and ‘them’1.
If Euro-citizenship functions to define European identity, nationality 
functions towards the establishment of national immigration policies. These policies,
1 This typology is widely used in the literature. See in particular Delanty (1995), Garcia (1993), Mouffe 
(1992), Weiler (1996b).
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in turn, serve as a legitimate means for the exclusion of those who do not belong to 
the Euro-polity. This is best illustrated through a comparative analysis that considers 
the impact of European citizenship upon two different models of national citizenship. 
Italy and the United Kingdom are interesting models because they reveal dissimilar 
practices and traditions in terms of both the process of granting citizenship rights and 
in the attitude towards immigration. Moreover, these two states fall within two 
different philosophical categories. Citizenship practices in the UK have been mainly 
based upon a liberal-individualistic approach and rights take precedence over status, 
which is to say that the rights held by an individual determine his/her status. Italian 
republicanism, on the other hand, has conceived citizenship as a civic value of 
political participation in which rights are derived from status and citizenship is a 
conditio sine qua non for obtaining citizenship rights. The analysis of European 
citizenship highlights the limits of these two models in shaping the idea of a new 
Community that has to deal with both liberal pluralism and new forms of political 
participation.
The thesis focuses on the formation of the typology of ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
through two categories: (a) the normative undertaking, comprising the legal and 
political dimension of European citizenship, and (b) social reality, concerned with 
the process of public identification with the new polity. At the level of the European 
Union, the connection between normative models arid social reality is weak because 
the normative undertaking that is intended to shape a European identity does not 
involve a process of identification with the Euro-polity. Empirical analysis of public 
attitudes provides a means by which to reconsider the value of a supra-national 
citizenship. Greater consideration of public attitudes could enable governments to
Introduction 14
promote a more inclusive regime through normatively created supra-national 
institutions.
The rise of post-materialist orientations and the decline of traditional social 
barriers such as class and religion already suggest a considerable level of adaptation 
towards supra-national institutions. Adaptation does not necessarily mean 
identification, but the creation of a European identity is really beside the point, and 
governments would be better advised to devote more attention to the dynamics of 
change at the empirical level.
The establishment of Euro-citizenship re-prioritises the means of citizenship 
from political rights to economic and social rights but community membership at the 
supranational level still relies on the condition of nationality. This creates an unequal 
distribution of social rights between citizens and non-citizens, and it impedes the 
independent operation of economic and social rights afforded on bases other than 
nationality.
1.2 Theoretical Framework
The thesis does not follow a specific theoretical model, but its use of particular 
concepts sometimes differs from current usage. It is therefore necessary to delineate 
the definitions intended in the use of concepts such as citizenship, national identity, 
universalism, legal subjectivity, republicanism, and liberalism, comparing the 
definitions applied here with those used by other authors.
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I. 2.1 Formal and substantive functions of citizenship
The concept of citizenship is neither purely legal nor exclusively sociological. 
Citizenship is an ‘idea’ that finds its expression in law. As a legal concept, it creates 
a ‘community’, or Rechtsgemeinschaft, which includes and protects those who 
belong to the same system of rules. Citizenship therefore may be considered as a set 
of rules that defines citizens as components of a polity. The creation of the 
community per se embodies an anthitetical mechanism that defines a class of 
outsiders.
Another aspect of citizenship concerns its sociological or empirical 
underpinnings, wherein identity plays an important role. In certain communities 
identity is established by the practice of citizens who actively exercise their rights, 
which is to say that rights precede citizenship. This is a characteristic of the British 
tradition of citizenship, in contrast to the Italian tradition. In Italy identity is 
established by citizenship that is to say that rights stem from identity and that 
citizenship status precedes the allocation of rights.
Rawls addresses the problem by distinguishing between institutional and non- 
institutional identity, and he formulates a liberal democratic theory of citizenship in 
which members have a double identity, with two kinds of commitments and 
attachments (1996: 30-2). The distinction is founded on the notion that we 
understand ourselves as citizens within the political system differently from the 
manner in which we understand ourselves in our personal affairs. In this approach, it 
is argued that the institutional identity should take precedence over the non- 
institutional one. Citizenship is seen here as based on a universalist liberal principle 
while identity is based on democratic constitutional principles rooted in the political
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culture. Similarly, Bottomore’s criticism of Marshall also attempts to distinguish 
formal from substantive citizenship, and substantive citizenship from nationality 
(Marshall and Bottomore, 1992: 83)2. As Bottomore observed, formal citizenship 
raises issues ‘concerning national identity and the historical role of nation-states as 
the pre-eminent modem form of organisation of a political community’. Substantive 
citizenship, on the other hand, addresses the social rights of individuals living in a 
community (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992: 85). Brubaker’s book (1989) gathers 
several contributions on this theme. One of the more important contribution is that of 
Hammar which focuses on the concept of ‘dual citizenship’ (1989: 81). It does not 
answer the question concerning the universalisation of citizenship but it does offer a 
theoretical approach to the separation of functions between formal and substantive 
citizenship.
Following these approaches we have a dichotomy: substantive-citizenship- 
universal and formal-identity-particular. Citizenship is susceptible of universalisation 
only through its substantive functions. The question here is whether or not 
citizenship can be universal. For Turner, the process of modernisation provides a 
social context in which it is possible to develop a theory of universalistic citizenship. 
The autonomy of the market creates a space in which citizenship is susceptible of 
universalisation (1986; 1992). On the contrary, according to Weber, citizenship is not 
susceptible of universalisation as it refers to particular structural condition which 
may be peculiar of the West (1966). Barbalet’s approach is even more narrow when 
he considers the dichotomy between formal and substantive citizenship. The
2 Bottomore’s criticism stresses the impact of the historical development of classes on new conceptions of 
citizenship.
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substantiation of citizenship is necessary because formal citizenship per se has no 
value, but the process of substantiation precludes the possibility of citizenship 
becoming universal (1988)3.
In my view, citizenship per se could never embrace a universal essence. The 
absolute preclusion of a universal approach to the concept of citizenship would 
nevertheless fail to take into account the changing structural conditions occurring in 
Europe. In Bottomore’s view, citizenship is susceptible of universalisation only if 
civil, social, and political rights are based on a conceptual framework that 
emphasises human rights rather than citizenship4. Within such a framework, the 
rights of citizenship are in a continuous process of development which is profoundly 
affected by changing conditions and by the emergence of new problems and the 
search for new solutions (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992: 89). In this approach, of 
human rights are not conceived as separate from the set of civic, political, and social 
rights but are seen as an integral part them. Moreover, the dynamic change of 
citizenship is conditioned by external factors. The two problems that arise from this 
approach concern the value of ‘legality’ and the legitimisation of the political 
community. In other words, does ‘legality’ have a universal application, and is 
formal citizenship alone sufficient to establish and preserve the political community?
3 The particular structural conditions in Barbalet’s discourse are narrower than in Weber since they 
concern particular administrative and professional infrastructures with which individuals interact. In 
this approach, the argument between substantive/active and formal/passive cuts across the classical 
differentiation between citizens and non-citizens. This is because the capacity o f individuals to 
participate in practice in the same community where they hold a legal status can be granted or denied 
to both these two categories.
4 Bottomore seeks to discover elements of universal validity in the concept of Euro-citizenship and he 
correctly discerns the link between citizenship and immigration. For Bottomore, the European 
scenario adds a fundamentally new dimension to the concept o f citizenship. EU citizens have a kind 
of dual citizenship, which implies detachment between substantive citizenship and nationality. It also 
grants civil and social rights, and to some extent political rights, to all citizens who live and work in 
another EU country.
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An appropriate response to the questions would perhaps be oriented more towards 
the redefinition of legality within the conceptual framework of citizenship rather than 
collapsing citizenship within the category of human rights.
I. 2.2 Understanding citizenship between liberalism and republicanism
Citizenship is generally understood to mean membership in the republic but the 
meaning of the term republic is itself very broad and ill-defined. The conventional 
philosophical categorisation of citizenship between the republican and liberal- 
individualistic traditions can be re-formulated as a universalist and a communitarian 
understanding of citizenship (Preuss, 1995a). Civic Republicanism places the ideal of 
a ‘common good’ above all considerations of individual advantage. The defensive 
attitude towards the ‘community’ is pervaded by a strong sense of civic virtue 
(Skinner, 1992). In the republican view, civic duties have priorities over individual 
rights and civic bonds are emphasised (Beiner, 1995: 12). In the liberal view, by 
contrast, citizenship rights help to promote individual self-interested definitions of 
good. The most propitious means by which to resolve the dilemma between 
universalism and particularism would be to uphold the principle of state neutrality 
against the communitarian argument (Lehning, 1997: 113). Skinner argues against 
the liberal view, refusing in particular the claim that individual liberty and political 
participation can never be reconciled5. Among those who try to reconcile civic 
republicanism and liberalism, Mouffe argues that while liberalism contributed to the 
formation of a universal citizenship, it also reduced citizenship to a mere legal status
5 Other variations on the republican theme can be found in Arendt (1958), Walzer (1983), Oldfield 
(1990), Miller (1995).
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(1992). Civic republicanism, on the other hand, emphasises the value of political 
participation and the citizen ‘plays an active role in shaping the future direction of 
his or her society through political debate and decision-making’ (Miller, 1995: 443). 
Mouffe importantly questions the necessity to conceive the political community as 
compatible with liberal pluralism and democracy. She attempts to harmonise the two 
approaches by rejecting both the concept of the common good and the definition of 
citizenship simply as a legal status (1992).
What emerges from Mouffe’s analysis is a minimalist approach in line with 
that of Oakeshott (1975). It combines both liberal and communitarian elements in 
that it upholds the principles of freedom and equality for all while understanding 
citizenship as a form of political identification with a wider community It conceives 
citizenship not as a given but as something to be constructed. The community, 
however, is ‘without a definite shape or a definite identity and in a continuous re­
enactment’ (Mouffe, 1992: 233). People are bound together by their common 
recognition of a set of ethico-political values, though Mouffe fails to specify the 
nature of these values and whether or not they are universal. At the same time, she 
rejects the idea of an abstract universalism stating that the exercise of citizenship 
consists in identifying ethico-political principles of modem democracy and that there 
can be as many forms of citizenship as there are interpretations of those principles 
(1992: 237). Importantly, she claims that though politics aims at constructing a 
political community and creating a unity of we/us, such a community can never be 
realised since there will be permanently a ‘constitutive outside’ that will always 
redefine the construction of a we/us (1992: 233).
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Delanty and Lehning both claim that neither republicanism nor liberalism is 
sufficient to address problems surrounding citizenship beyond the level of the nation­
state and that the two traditions jeopardise the very idea of political community 
(Delanty, 1998: 353; Lehning, 1997: 109). Lehning stresses that the revision of 
citizenship in modem societies should address the question concerning the 
compatibility of national unity with increasing social and cultural pluralism, and he 
suggests that Euro-citizenship embodies a more universal concept of citizenship. 
Lehning says that ‘the same citizenship that copes with the problem of pluralism in 
the nation-state should be also applicable across borders’, following a federalist 
approach as already envisaged by Meehan (Meehan, 1993: 21-22). To support this 
aspect of his argument, Lehning applies Rawls’ concept of ‘double identity’ (Rawls, 
1996: 30-36)6 to a federal Europe. The idea is that in a federal Europe, a shared 
citizenship/identity will supersede rival identities based on nationality. An intrinsic 
element of the Federal model is that its ‘federal partners [and their citizens] do not 
have to or wish to accept deep, monolithic, conceptions of citizenship and identity as 
the basis of their union’ (Lehning, 1997: 118). According to Lehning, Euro- 
citizenship would be conceivable only in a federal state that emerges out of an 
‘overlapping consensus’7. (Lehning and Weale, 1997: 9). Both the idea of 
overlapping consensus and double identity should lead ‘not only to the idea of “ 
belonging” that comes with the concept of national identity, but also to “belonging”
6 Rawls’ concept of ‘double identity’ stems from his own formulation of a democratic theory of 
citizenship, wherein citizens’ self perceptions are shared between their political and their personal 
associations. In other words, citizens o f liberal democracies have double identities, with political and non­
political commitments.
7 For citizens of a federal union, the idea of ‘overlapping consensus’ refers to the compatibility between 
national identity and various forms of social association. Lehning here refers to Norman (1994) and Rawls 
(1987).
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that goes with a number of different levels of social organisation: the neighbourhood, 
the town, the country, and the region, in addition to the nation’ (Lehning, 1997: 119).
A comparison of citizenship policy between Italy and the United Kingdom 
serves to emphasise the limits of these two philosophical approaches in shaping the 
idea of a new community. In my view, the European Union context conceives 
citizenship as a civic value in which rights are derived from status, which is also one 
of the idiosyncrasies of civic republicanism. Identity, therefore, is not derived from 
the practice of citizens who actively exercise their rights, and as a consequence, 
rights and identity are not adequately experienced in the context of the EU. This is 
the reason why ‘it is a mirage to speak of European citizenship’ (Lehning, 1997: 
157).
I. 2.3 Normative undertaking and social reality
One might say that citizenship is evolutionary in that it is constantly adapted to 
regulate social changes and conflicts, as Turner noted in his criticism of Marshall 
(1950). For Turner, citizenship is indeed ‘the outcome of struggles bringing the state 
into the social arena as a stabiliser of the social system’ (1992: 38). These processes 
of change also affect what I call citizenship’s means rather than citizenship as an 
institution per se. The means of citizenship are simply the civil, political, and social 
rights that citizenship entails. The functions of citizenship are affected by its 
evolving regulatory aspect but only in relation to each means of citizenship. The 
means of citizenship, in other words, are distinct from the functions of citizenship, 
which refer to the exclusive and inclusive power that citizenship embodies in relation 
to each of citizenship’s means.
Introduction 22
The establishment of new priorities for the means of citizenship requires a 
redefinition of the concept of legal status. While Turner argues that the evolution of 
citizenship is driven by social conflicts, Mann claims that this process is driven by 
‘dominant powers that impose their strategies on lesser powers’ (1987: 351). The 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive but find common ground in Turner’s 
claim that citizenship evolves through its regulative power towards always new and 
changing social conflict in a sort of dialectical process. Turner and Mann are 
referring not to different processes but to different levels of analysis. Mann’s 
analysis is institutional and normative while Turner’s approach is social and 
empirical. The normative process involves the institutionalisation of citizenship with 
political and administrative practices that are detached from the social phenomena 
from which institutional change derives. As a consequence, there is a disjuncture 
between the normative undertaking and the social/empirical reality. The thesis 
examines this dichotomy foremost in the formation of the typology within the 
European Union in which the attempt to establish a link between the normative 
undertaking and the social reality ends in failure. The main difference between Mann 
and Turner is that the former focuses on the normative undertaking the latter on the 
social reality. In Turner’s view, Mann’s analytical framework appears to preclude the 
impact of new social movements on the expansion of citizenship from below. This 
also implies a conception of the citizen as a mere subject rather than as ‘an active 
bearer of effective claims against society via the state’ (Mann, 1987).
In analysing citizenship within the European Union system, it is clear that 
there exists a conspicuous gap between the Euro-polity and individual citizen. The 
problem here is twofold: (1) Euro-citizenship like national citizenship has become
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regulative in terms of its inclusive and exclusive functions; and (2) social needs now 
concern more the sphere of practical necessities than the need to identify with the 
new polity. The transformation of social needs affects the priority of citizenship’s 
means, which is to say that social rather than political rights constitute a more 
important means of social inclusion. What emerges at EU level, however, is that 
Euro-citizenship has become again regulative without developing new priorities for 
the means of citizenship. This, in my view, exacerbates the gap between the 
normative undertaking and social reality.
The line of reasoning pursued in this thesis follows that of Mann to the extent 
that it conceives Euro-citizenship not as the outcome of social movements but as a 
political strategy for the regulation of social conflicts in favour of vested interests. 
Without denying the importance of social movements in expanding citizenship 
rights, it is also important to bear in mind that the relationship between citizenship 
rights and social movements is no longer simply causal. On the other hand, 
modifying Turner’s criticism of Mann, the influence of social movements on the 
expansion of citizenship from below consists of a greater direct relationship between 
the normative undertaking and social reality. From above, it occurs through a sharper 
analysis of public attitudes.
Social conflicts and social needs, by nature, have become more de- 
territorialised and more cross-national, reflecting more sectoral interests than 
community interests. Many claims, such as the right to work and the right to reside 
anywhere, occur in the name of legal subjectivity and humanity rather than 
citizenship. In this study, the categorisation of legal subjectivity is neither 
diametrically opposed to citizenship nor intended to displace citizenship, but refers
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instead to a redefinition of the concept of legality detached from nationality and 
based on the active exercise of civil, political, and social rights. Such a redefinition 
is necessary to side-step the difficulties entailed in any attempt to separate citizenship 
from nationality in theory and practice. The introduction of a legal subjectivity 
would deprive citizenship of its regulative functions in terms of inclusion and 
exclusion, and it would reduce the importance attached to the inherent link between 
citizenship and nationality.
1.2.4 Citizenship and Nationality
In analysing citizenship within the European Union system one of the main problem 
consist of separating Euro-citizenship from national citizenship (Kostakopoulou, 
1998). In doing that the main obstacle is to separate citizenship from nationality. At 
the supra-national level, at least in theory, citizenship and nationality are no longer 
interchangeable but in practice the interchangeability persists. The idea of liberating 
Euro-citizenship from nationality is among the themes discussed in this thesis, and it 
relates to Preuss’s conceptualisation of the ‘status path’ (1996: 135). This idea 
conceives the basis of residence within the physical boundaries of the Community as 
entirely independent of whether a person is a national of a member state. It would 
thus be possible to be a Union citizen without being a national of any of the member 
states. Perhaps the designation of ‘Union subject’ would be more appropriate than 
‘Union citizen’. This acknowledges the link between citizenship and nationality, but 
it also gives citizenship a more ethno-cultural connotation, and Union subjecthood 
would be relevant at both the national and European level.
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Lehning sceptically argues that, in practice, Euro-citizenship entails no departure 
from the traditional link between nationality and citizenship (1997: 183). Meehan
(1993), along with Heater (1990) and Leca (1990) suggest that the link between 
nationality and citizenship is not always indispensable, inevitable, or necessary. 
Meehan describes citizenship as a ‘legal nationality’, while national identities are 
subject to change since individuals’ interests ‘do not always coincide with dominant 
conceptions of the national interest’ (1993: 151). She has a positive slant towards the 
Community as already offering the opportunity for citizens to act on the basis of 
identities other than the one linked specifically to nationality. This is in line with 
Kaldor’s concept of collective identities in which the link between citizenship and 
nationality collapses in the formation of a trans-national civil society (1996: 27). 
What makes Kaldor’s and Meehan’s analyses similar is that they both believe the 
process of transferring sovereignty from a national to a supra-national entity 
functions to detach citizenship from nationality.
Meehan’s approach is satisfactory as long as it is restricted to EU citizens and 
their relationship with the EU as a new ‘opportunity structure’ in which they can 
transcend national identities. I identify this process with the concept of 
‘compatibility’. Soysal even goes so far as to proclaim in this process the end of 
citizenship (1994). In the formulation of European citizenship, as already noted, 
Lehning questions whether there is a departure from the traditional link between 
nationality and citizenship. He regards certain aspects of Euro-citizenship to be in 
line with the liberal democratic conception of citizenship and it is precisely in these 
aspects that EU citizenship is most able to overcome differences based on ethnic and
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cultural traits and to cope with pluralism (1997: 182). He nevertheless denies that 
these aspects are met in practice.
I do not entirely agree that the detachment of nationality from citizenship 
occurs in the process of ‘transferring sovereignty’. I argue instead that the 
establishment of Euro-citizenship enhances national citizenship rather than 
precipitating its demise. The new supra-national legal order is based on the 
prerogative of nationality as the determining factor for access to citizenship rights, 
which means that nationality and citizenship are interchangeable once again. This 
study considers the case of third country nationals not merely as a dimension in 
which European citizenship risks a continuation of the traditional, exclusive aspect of 
citizenship (Meehan, 1997: 77). Rather, it is considered as the exception that 
confirms the rule.
Following Weber, Parsons argues that the modem citizen requires the 
constitution of an abstract political subject no longer formally confined by the 
particularities of birth and ethnicity (1966). Until now, according to Preuss, 
democratic revolution has produced two different phases in the development of 
citizenship. The first phase was characterised by the passage of citizenship rights to 
passive legal subjects which implied passivity and submissiveness. In the second 
phase, the nation became the criterion for an individual’s belonging to the 
democratic community. ‘It is from this point’, stated Preuss, ‘that statehood and 
nationhood engage in a very closed relationship and from here nationality and 
citizenship are linked’ (1996: 128).
Weale has put forward a definition of citizenship in which he distinguishes 
between its identity aspect and its normative aspect (1990: 156). In his approach, the
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link between nationality and citizenship is due merely to the link between identity 
and norms. Supra-national norms are incorporated into national legislation and they 
are effective for individuals because of their membership within one of the member 
states. Who you are determines your rights and duties. Weale states that citizenship 
remains constant while the community changes in terms of membership. This is, in 
my view, the main problem with Euro-citizenship which does not affect citizenship’s 
function and government have retained for themselves the right to confer nationality. 
States are still the main repository of citizenship’s rights and obligations (Weale, 
1990: 158). The emergence of the EU is not necessarily at the expense of the nation­
state and Mann has indeed noted that the ‘European nation-states are neither dying 
nor retiring [but that] they have merely shifted functions’ (1993: 133). The link 
between citizenship and nationality is the outcome of the legal system and in 
particular of two different legal practices for the acquisition of citizenship, which are 
based respectively on of jus soli and jus sanguinis (Closa, 1995; Brubaker, 1992) 
These practices, or more precisely the extent to which the legal system relies upon 
one or the other determine the extent of the relationship between citizenship and 
nationality (Brubaker, 1992: 179).
The major problem at the supra-national level consists not only of liberating 
citizenship from nationality (Closa, 1995; Brubaker, 1992; Meehan, 1993, 1997; 
Kaldor, 1996; Weale 1990), or of understanding citizenship as a normative concept 
and nationality as an ethno-cultural idea (Delanty, 1995) but rather in re-defining the 
concept of legality in which civil, political, and social rights are afforded on bases 
other than nationality or citizenship.
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1.2.5 Citizenship and immigration
The relevance of Preuss’s argument to this study lies in the fact that Preuss 
considered the impact of the European Union and immigration on the inner balance 
of the nation state. Other scholars have stated that the complementary nature of the 
physical and symbolic criteria of belonging to the modem state make migration 
particularly difficult (Spencer, 1994; Close, 1995) and I argue that the establishment 
of the European citizenship exacerbates this difficulty. Subjecthood and citizenship 
are once again set apart in order to distinguish new comers from citizens. In 
communities in which physical association with a territory is insufficient to establish 
an individual’s belonging, non-physical boundaries tend to emerge (Preuss, 1996: 
134). Delanty and Mann suggest that the connection between national identity and 
citizenship is growing stronger today in the face of the threat of mass immigration 
(Delanty, 1995: 162; Mann, 1993: 132). Delanty argues that ‘immigration laws are 
the crux of European identity for these are the instruments Europe uses to restrict 
democracy and civil rights’ (1995: 163). Nationality functions towards the 
establishment of national immigration policies, which in turn serve as a legitimate 
means for the exclusion of those who do not belong to the Euro-polity. This is the 
binary typology of ‘us and ‘them’. In other words, Euro-citizenship functions to 
define European identity as long as it is linked to protectionist policies against the 
‘other’ (Einhom, et al., 1996).
The ideological redefinition of immigration as a Taw and order’ problem 
affects third-country nationals negatively and reinforces their inequitable position in 
the emerging Euro-polity. This creates an unequal distribution of social rights 
between citizens and non-citizens, or between ‘us’ and ‘them’, impeding the
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operation of economic and social rights afforded on bases other than nationality and 
placing constraints on any attempt to encourage the growth and persistence of a 
pluralistic society in Europe. Unlike Preuss, who differentiates between the ‘active 
status’ of national citizens and ‘the passive submission’ of permanent resident aliens 
(1995a: 109), this study envisages a more complex differentiation of status at the 
national and European levels. The citizens of the nation-state now become the active 
legal subjects of other member states. These are European Union citizens who do not 
hold full political and social rights in another member state. The other categorisation 
refers to the passive legal subjects who are permanent resident aliens with a limited 
set of rights in the host country. There are then three main categories of citizens: (1) 
national citizens (active/passive citizens); (2) active legal subjects (European 
citizens); (3) passive legal subjects (legal immigrants). The status of legal 
subjectivity would eliminate the substantive difference between these categories in 
terms of an individual’s access to resources but it would not affect national identity 
and cultural affiliation.
Many believe, however, that European integration holds out the possibility of 
a citizenship of inclusion (Schmidtke, et. al, 1996). Inclusive social policies normally 
apply to individuals who reside permanently within the territorial boundaries of a 
given country, irrespective of their nationality. In this way, Preuss argues that it is 
possible to escape from the exclusive communitarian view of social citizenship in 
which national citizenship becomes a moral justification to exclude (1995a: 115). 
Considering the significance of Euro-citizenship for the formation of a European 
identity, in practice there are no bases to believe that this process would be inclusive.
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The process of ‘Europeanisation’, indeed, remains selective and exclusive 
(Kostakopoulou, 1998).
Kostakopoulou proposes the principle of ‘domicile’ in opposition to 
nationality as a legal criterion for membership in the EU (1998). This is a possible 
way to escape the criteria of admission modelled upon those required by national 
laws. She indirectly criticises scholars who propose a foundation for EU citizenship 
which is not detached from nationality (e.g., O’Keeffe, et al., 1994; Evans, 1994; 
O’Leary, 1992). She agrees with Meehan in arguing that Euro-citizenship is a 
citizenship that involves multiple, overlapping, and strategically interacting publics 
(Meehan 1993: 185). She also sees immigration and citizenship as strictly linked and 
she believes that opportunities to attain EU citizenship depend upon a re-examination 
of immigration policy since ‘immigration shapes the boundaries and the content of 
citizenship’ (Kostakopoulou, 1998: 167).
1.2.6 The problem of identification
There is a broad consensus that citizenship will be released from the boundaries of 
the nation to become a force of contention in a new politics of identity (Cesarani et. 
al, 1996; Close, 1995; Einhom et. al, 1996; Lehning et.al., 1997). This thesis 
disputes the assumption that Euro-citizenship should function towards the formation 
of a European identity. As long as Euro-citizenship is related to the idea of European 
identity, nationality will continue to function towards the establishment of national 
immigration policies, and nationality and citizenship will remain interchangeable. 
This constitutes the main problem of rescuing citizenship from nationality. The 
problem of identification is thus not only an empirical difficulty but it is also
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normatively questionable when there is a lack of consensus in a supra-national 
normative setting. In contrast, I argue that the problem of identification can be 
confronted by adaptation and that ‘compatibility’ is achievable when governments 
devote more attention to the dynamics of change at the empirical level. As Holmes 
has noted, the ‘Maastricht Treaty did not create a project that people could identify 
with’. Holmes suggested that, at least until now, the modus operandi of the elite has 
been ‘to act first and convince public opinion afterwards’ (1996: 66).
For Garcia, the challenge with which the EU is faced is ‘to construct a 
Europe in which public opinion is left behind by national and European elite’ (1993: 
3). Though she stresses the importance of the development of an identity linked to 
citizenship (1993: 4), she relates the formation of identity to social relations rather 
than kinship (1993: 13). A European identity, in other words, should permeate 
people’s lives and daily existence (1993: 15). Closing the gap between normative 
undertakings and social reality would require a high degree of adaptation and 
interaction with supra-national institutions.
In his analysis of the problem of identification at the supra-national level, 
Closa puts fundamental empirical practice in the context of a democratic discussion 
(1998). Like many others, Closa believes that citizenship is a normative necessity 
with respect to the debate concerning universalism versus particularism. EU 
citizenship is established on universalistic elements fixed in a normative 
particularistic setting (Closa, 1998: 181; Weiler, 1995; Delanty, 1995). According to 
Closa, the democratic process is suffering from a rupture between private autonomy 
and public self-determination. On the one hand, public regulation of individual 
activity is removed from the traditional framework of the nation-state, while on the
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other, Euro-citizenship is not sufficient to create public self-determination (Dahl, 
1994; Habermas, 1995). It is questionable as to whether citizenship requires 
identification at all. The problem is not so much that Euro-citizenship per se is 
unable to create a reconciliation between private autonomy and public self- 
determination. On the contrary, the entire process of public self-determination should 
be detached from the effort to create a European identity. This would shift the focus 
of normative and institutional undertakings towards residence rather than nationality 
(Welsh: 1993) or towards ‘legal subjectivity’ rather than citizenship.
1.3 Outline of the thesis
Chapter 1 briefly illustrates the development of citizenship throughout history. It 
explains the manner in which changes in societal circumstances enable citizenship’s 
means to be re-prioritised. The chapter also analyses which rights constitute the 
essential condition of citizenship in a transition from a national to a supra-national 
community. It stresses that the re-prioritisation of social rights over political rights 
engenders the need to redefine individuals’ legal status and to detach citizenship’s 
means from national citizenship.
Chapter 2 discusses the relationship between citizenship and immigration 
policies in Italy and the UK. It deals mainly with the definition of citizenship and 
immigration policies in a comparative perspective before and after the Maastricht 
Treaty. After the establishment of Euro-citizenship at Maastricht, immigration 
policies have become a filter used to define EU citizens in both Italy and the UK. 
This process also entailed the redefinition of the concepts of membership and
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citizenship, strengthening the principle of nationality as the primary criterion of EU 
citizenship and giving rise to the typology of ‘us’ and ‘them’.
Chapter 3 investigates the mechanisms that facilitate the formation of the 
binary typology ‘us’ and ‘them’. One of these involves the expansion of what I call 
the ‘inner circle’ of citizenship rights. It shows that the establishment of Euro- 
citizenship expands the rights attached to national citizenship while defining the 
category of ‘us’. The chapter also discusses the extent to which this expansion of 
rights embodies an opportunity structure for mobilising resources that could 
positively affect the nature of Euro-citizenship.
Chapter 4 focuses on political debates on Euro-citizenship both at the 
European and national levels. It identifies the manner in which the idea of Euro- 
citizenship is supported, neglected, and challenged in the political arena. The 
political debate have been most concerned with just how far Euro-citizenship should 
encroach on national citizenship and with the extent to which the political discourse 
has fostered a connection between European identity and the establishment of Euro- 
citizenship.
Chapter 5 examines political debates on the integration of immigrants and 
border control policies. The aim is to determine the manner in which the category of 
‘them’ is conceptualised at both the European and national levels, and to identify any 
common political positions within the political discourse. The chapter also focuses 
on suggestions for encouraging the integration of immigrants by means other than 
the formal acquisition of citizenship. This permits the contextualisation of the 
relationship between immigration and citizenship.
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Chapter 6 is an empirical exercise that analyses the attitude of the public 
towards the EU and Euro-citizenship. It examines the relationship between political 
and legal undertakings on the one hand and public orientations on the other. The 
chapter first considers the degree to which Euro-citizenship encourages the 
development of a European identity and the degree to which identity constitutes a 
determining factor in the formation of supra-national values. The analysis focuses 
on the nature of the category of ‘us’ and the ways in which the category diverges 
from the political aim to homogenise the public sphere through the development of 
European identity.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by demonstrating that the establishment of 
Euro-citizenship re-prioritises the means of citizenship. Social rights have become 
more functional than political rights to the process of integration but community 
membership at the supranational level still relies on the condition of nationality. This 
creates an unequal distribution of social rights between citizens and non-citizens, but 
it also reveals that social rights in practice are still an important component of 
citizenship. This reinforces the construction of the categories of ‘us and ‘them’ in 
that social rights cannot be carried across national borders as far as non-EU nationals 
are concerned.
35
Chapter 1
Societal needs and the symbolism behind citizenship practice
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Citizenship is considered the oldest institution in Western political thought. The multi­
layered character of citizenship practices that has emerged through the history of city- 
states, nation-states and the latest formation of the European Union renders it 
impossible to contain its meaning in a single comprehensive definition (Riesenberg, 
1992, xvi). The various models of citizenship throughout history have had different 
defining goals and powers. Hence, the concept of citizenship has remained much 
contested in a manner in which a ‘complete or elaborate theory of citizenship does not 
exist’ (Turner 1993: VIII). In my view, this assumption mirrors the inner nature of 
citizenship, which finds its rationale and its intrinsic value within the logic of changing 
societal circumstances. One needs to consider not merely the coherence of the modem 
development of citizenship with the nostalgic idea that delineates what the good 
person’s conduct should be (Aristotle), but rather the evolution of the concept within 
the context of society’s needs. Once the dynamic nature of citizenship is identified as 
such, any comparative approach will serve to identify the factors that constitute its 
active nature.
In this chapter, I shall distinguish between four different models of citizenship 
(Fig.l) that illustrate the development of the concept through different historical 
periods in order to discern the different symbolic practices of citizenship within 
different societal systems’ Each of these models will study citizenship’s means (which
1 My historical classification builds upon the work of Peter Riesenberg but differs in arguing that there 
have been only two forms of citizenship. ‘The first lasted from the time o f the Greek city-state until the 
French Revolution, the second has been in existence since then’ (1992: xviii).
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is to say the three main set of rights: civil, political and social) in relation to both 
citizens and non-citizens. I shall attempt to demonstrate the degree to which societal 
circumstances transform the priority of citizenship’s means. It is important to 
understand whether or not this mechanism influences the symbolic function of 
citizenship.
If one understands the real symbolism behind citizenship practices it is then 
possible to interpret the manner in which the re-prioritisation of citizenship’s means 
can occur. Those who are able to discern this mechanism can thus exert civil, political 
or social pressure in order to satisfy their needs and at the same time those of the 
society. This can help to explain, for example, the formation of ‘Guilds’ in the ‘Middle 
Ages’ and ‘NGOs’ or interest groups in current times. Any change in the categorisation 
of legal status within a given societal context would either require to redefine the 
concept of citizenship or to detach citizenship’s means from citizenship itself. In this 
respect I shall describe the different conceptualisation of citizenship in the four 
community models emphasising the shift from the nation-state to the European Union 
model.
1.1 Community models
Throughout history, citizenship has been compatible with many forms of political 
organisation. Democratic (Athens) and non-democratic forms of regimes (Sparta) have 
served as citizenship models. In antiquity the control of government by the few and the 
ideas of patriotism and military service were very closely linked. Aristotle reminds us 
that ‘the good citizen should know and have the capacity both to rule and be ruled, and
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this very thing is the virtue of a citizen’ (Aristotle: Politics bk.3). From the Greek city- 
state throughout the Roman Empire one can detect the first form of citizenship: small- 
scale, monolithic, discriminatory and also moral, spiritual, active, participatory and 
communitarian. During the Roman Empire, in particular, citizenship evolved into a 
body of legal expectations and powers. This was opposed to the ethical relationship 
between the individual and the community that was a distinctive element of the Greek 
city-state. In this first phase, the citizen is an active political person who through active 
participation in government has a real possibility to gain virtue as defined in 
Aristotelian terms.
The second model of citizenship appears in the late Middle Ages and continues 
up to the French Revolution. During this period, a progressive assimilation of the 
‘citizen’ into the ‘subject’ takes place. This process entailed the transformation of the 
active political person into the passive political person2. Entrepreneurial success and 
personality enhancement tended to prevail over community values, particularly in the 
development of some southern European city-states such as Florence. I shall deal with 
this aspect more in depth in the next section.
The third period is marked by the French Revolution up to the formation of the 
nation-state in which the subject becomes citizen again, but of the second citizenship 
that is a passive citizen3. From this point, it cannot be denied that the notion of the 
passive citizen, as opposed to the active citizen becomes the new norm of political 
reality. Today we live under the third citizenship, which has received a strong impact
2 The term ‘subject’ here confines generally to the meaning of ‘passivity’.
3 See Mann’s discussion of the historical background of the European nation-states (1993). Kaldor 
argues that citizens replaced subjects with the birth o f the nation-state, but she does not emphasise the
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from the first two, but there are important differences. Civic virtues appear to have been 
dissipating in the first citizenship but they are also re-articulated for larger societies in 
terms of changing forms of community behaviour, particularly with respect to such 
things as voluntarism and dissent. Finally, the fourth model is the European citizenship 
model, which could entail the possibility for a further change in the status of persons 
from citizens to ‘subjects’4, or perhaps better to ‘European subjects’.
The first two models refer to a limited environment and citizens were usually a 
minority, in the context of regime in which citizenship can be defined as partial, as only 
a part of the population is eligible. The third and fourth models refer to a citizenship 
that is invariably universal within a given set of parameters. It is based upon birth or 
specified residence in a large territorial space whose size makes direct participation in 
politics impossible. The passivity of citizenship in these two models is given by 
changes in the political regimes. Governments of large states are based on 
constitutions, treaties and/or legislative acts acceptable to its people. These are 
institutions that decide the distribution of civil, political, and social rights. In the first 
model (Ancient Greek), politics was frequently intense and personal participation in it 
often entailed ‘heroic’ action. One was not really considered a citizen until he was seen 
to participate actively in politics. Under the third model (nation-state), personal heroism 
was not necessarily expected, but any good action is a sign of an appropriate obligation. 
As Riesenberg has noted ‘the fierce devotion of the few has been replaced with the 
slack association of the many’ (1992: xix).
role o f citizens in the nation. She defines them as members of the nation’ (1996: 10-13, esp.10).
4 The term ‘subject’ here confines with my definition o f legal subjectivity and does not necessarily 
imply a passive nature.
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All of these models have as a common factor the notion that the primary function of 
citizenship concerns privilege and exclusion. Systems in which the function of 
citizenship serves to distinguish citizens from non-citizens, and in which the role of the 
citizen is well defined, tend to enhance the principle of discrimination. On the other 
hand, history is a witness of times where the difference between citizens and non­
citizens is less perceivable. This is because ‘subjectivity’ of individuals, in my view, 
did not only mean passivity but also a more accessible society. This becomes a 
distinctive fact during the Middle Ages and introduces the second model of citizenship.
Fig.l Models of citizenship
I II
Ancient Greek-Roman Empire Middle Ages
Citizen (Active) Subject (Passive)
III IV
French Rev.-Nation-State European Union
Citizen (Passive) Subject (Passive/Active)
1.1.1 From citizens to subjects
The persistence of elements from earlier manifestations of citizenship in later periods 
affords the prospect of a comparative approach. In the medieval urban world, 
particularly in Italy and on the northern shore of the western Mediterranean regions, 
one finds early traces of modem aspects of citizenship. First citizenship was considered
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as a set of rules that define a person as a component of the polity. Secondly, it came to 
be regarded as a status that conferred to a person virtuous capacity (Barbalet, 1988).
It is argued that medieval citizenship had never become the intense political 
issue it had been in the Ancient Greek world. In the Roman Empire, administration was 
divided into many local units. Governance in the core of the empire followed the 
precepts of Roman law, but the Germanic inheritance also, had a relevant impact. The 
disintegration of the Roman world led to further fragmentation, and citizenship in the 
middle ages thus became even more local and confined but it was also more flexible 
and it reflected different values. The juristic language of this period was affected by 
changes in the political reality.
Small political units often governed themselves in terms of the qualifications 
for citizenship and the details of reciprocation, but of greater interest here is the 
appearance in the middle ages of traces of a sort of universal constitutionalism. Specific 
obligations varied from city to city, but not basic principles, and similarities in the 
process of naturalisation in particular reflect the need of many local societies for such 
procedures (Riesenberg, 1972). There are two main variables to be considered, first the 
need of society and secondly the flexibility of system, the latter being a consequence of 
the former.
In terms of societal needs, a clear appreciation of self-interest facilitates an 
understanding of why cities encouraged immigration. There was movement of citizens 
between cities, which indicates that citizens were searching material improvement 
through inter-urban and inter-regional trade, and through migration. Each man sought 
what he needed. What made these movements possible and desirable was a basic
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uniformity throughout the Mediterranean regions, were institutions, laws, and values 
were relatively homogeneous. An ethic of work and material success was more or less 
universal, and we find as a consequence beside the figure of citizen that of ‘habitator’, 
which refers to a resident who is not a citizen. Residency of course entailed the 
assumption of some local responsibility and the enjoyment of some privileges of 
citizenship, and the ‘habitator’ was very much like a citizen. The effective junction of 
‘civis’ and ‘habitator’ was intended to fulfil the city’s real need and in fact, a new 
unified citizenry emerged, including citizens and residents. The importance given to 
resident status contributed to the city’s strength while new avenues to acceptance and 
membership were kept open (Visconti, 1940; Violante, 1953; Cortese, 1960; 
Riesenberg, 1972).
The important thing to notice is that immigration and naturalisation were 
institutionalised. This was also due to the fact that the value of ‘competence’ in this 
period was functional to the market. The community benefited by having a large 
number of competent and effective people who served the town. All this meant 
economic advantage. Individuals also benefited since they were able to attain full 
citizenship through their ‘competence’. The significant factor here is that within this 
kind of society there was the potentiality for a material improvement, even in the 
absence of full political integration. The requirement of ‘competence’ for the society 
was sufficiently intense, in other words, to permit the integration of immigrants into the 
new community. The function of citizenship, in this context thus served more to 
delineate societal boundaries. Citizenship itself was less discriminatory and exclusive 
but it served as a device with which to reduce tensions by making expectations explicit.
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Men were most in demand as merchants, or soldiers, and everywhere common needs 
generated a potential for citizenship and an acceptance of immigration that prevailed 
over the xenophobia and suspicion.
There are two important points to be made, the first of which concerns the fact 
that immigration in this period did not challenge the order of values and rules within 
cities. This is because citizenship was not the only means by which to be integrated into 
society. Secondly, there was no need to establish in these societies a common 
citizenship. Europe was divided into many local units, but the systems were sufficiently 
alike in the structure of their laws and society. All of them were organised to receive 
outsiders, which effectively provided outsiders with a quasi-legal status. As noted 
above, this system was prevalent to the Western Mediterranean regions and above all in 
Italy. The emphasis on Italy, in fact, is justified by the precocious institutional 
development of the Italian cities, and above all by their actual function as independent 
political units in which citizenship existed at both formal and substantive levels 
(Bowsky, 1981).
What of English citizenship during the Middle Ages? In the north, cities were 
less independent and participated to a much greater degree in a feudal regime, at the top 
of which lay emperors or kings. Although the economic bases for urbanism were more 
or less the same as in the south of Europe, the cities were much less free to determine 
their own political and economic policies. In Italy, on the other hand, the merchants 
were often in fact the legitimate executives of the community and made policy in 
accord with the city’s needs. The so-called ‘burgers’ of northern Europe were people of
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a ‘special law’5. Citizenship in the north was very limited and not so coherent. This 
citizenship was closer to that of the Roman Empire than to that of the Republic or the 
ideal of the democratic Greek polis. By the end of the thirteenth century, parts of 
England, in particular the city of London, and a few other regions in northern Europe 
were beginning to change. In London and in other English cities the ‘Guilds’ began to 
develop and to exercise their control over the town corporation. Membership in the 
‘Guilds’ became a prerequisite for citizenship, and by the middle of the thirteenth 
century, citizenship became a political issue owing more to the legal and economic 
benefits that it entailed than to the political rights that it afforded. Because citizenship 
meant privilege and benefit, it was to be protected and restricted, and thus it became 
highly politicised. Given the economic uncertainty of the period, it is not surprising that 
Guild members tried to protect the privileges of citizenship against dilution through any 
further extension of citizenship rights. This was still far from being the world of 
traditional Mediterranean civic morality but enough to pull northern Europe into the 
main course of citizenship (Reynolds, 1977, 1984).
Not all citizens in the Middle Ages were active participants in the formation of 
a general will but rather they participated passively as individuals required to follow the 
general will. The distinction is explained more fully below in this chapter, but suffice it 
to say for the moment that citizens who participated passively therefore can be defined 
as ‘subjects’. In sum, citizenship in this period served to mark social functions but it did 
not necessarily imply a closed system.
5 Burgers were a distinct class simply by virtue of the fact that a large proportion o f urban population 
in northern Europe were excluded from their ranks. The criteria that admitted some to the burgers 
class while excluding others are still hotly debated by institutional historians o f the Middle Ages.
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1.1.2 The epilogue of the political community
During the revolutionary period, in the 18th century the affirmation of citizenship 
aimed at freeing citizens from their status as faithful subjects in relation to the 
established authority, by stressing, once again, the aspect of active participation in the 
political life of the State. Significantly, this period was characterised by the 
establishment of the mechanisms of political representation and social contract, and by 
the development of the concept of public opinion as a significant impulse in the 
shaping of political life. Citizenship took on a marked unitary value, and it supplied all 
individuals, at least theoretically, with a political dignity by which they were able to 
express a need for both collective identity and for individual autonomy. In other words, 
individuals once again had become citizens rather than subjects, but citizenship itself 
had assumed a more passive aspect. Walzer argued that the period of the French 
Revolution marks the moment in which citizenship corresponds to identity6 (1990).
On the one hand, this passage indicates that political activity became less 
attached to the direct practice of citizens, which is to say that the citizen no longer 
created the law directly in the Aristotelian sense but was protected by the law. On the 
other hand, the crystallisation of democratic values in the function of citizenship rights 
remains invariably associated with the notions of individual participation in self- 
government through the exercise of the right to vote.
The transition from an active to a passive citizenship in the modem age is 
perceptible in the process that obliges citizens to perform their rights, for instance when
6 According to the Jacobin ideology, citizenship was a universal function. Everyone was required to serve 
the ‘Community’, even though it was not yet a nation but still a country, or patria, which constituted the 
legal basis for the conscription o f the masses into the army.
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citizens are called upon to exercise their voting rights. This can be seen also as the 
change from the politics of participation to the politics of power (Pranger, 1968). The 
politics of power creates a political culture that directs the citizen’s attention towards 
certain political aspects of the reality and at the same time diverts attention away from 
others. This political culture, on the one hand, accords citizens the responsibility of 
political participation, and on the other, it accords government the responsibility to take 
decisions on behalf of its citizens.
This can be defined the decay of ‘civic virtue’ which is the result of the 
dichotomy between power and participation. Private interests and individual choices 
make citizens more private in their attitude towards participation and consequently the 
‘community’ function is eroded. The liberty of private life is, in fact, the liberalism of 
the modem age. The classical liberal view of politics insisted on diversity and freedom 
of private opinions against the threat of uniformity of beliefs. John Stuart Mill, in his 
1859 essay ‘On Liberty’, accordingly expressed the fear that the spread of mass opinion 
would mean that Europe was ‘decidedly advancing towards the Chinese ideal of 
making all people alike’ (1962: 203). The citizen becomes a passive citizen when he 
approves the legitimate function of representative institutions, courts and welfare 
systems. Mann’s argument likewise considers citizenship as a strategy for the 
regulation and institutionalisation of class conflicts by public or governmental agencies 
rather than a set of practices which articulate popular demands for participation7 (Mann, 
1987).
The main criticism advanced by communitarians against liberalism takes issue
7 See the introductory chapter above.
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with the conceptualisation of citizenship as the ‘enjoyment of laws’, a notion that 
dominates contemporary law, and they assert instead the necessity of activist practices 
that citizens should promote. In other words, it is the sense of responsibility, and not 
just the enjoyment of the protection provided by authority, produces a passive 
citizenship (Walzer, 1990). In narrow political terms, the ‘communitarian’ tradition 
focuses upon the relationship that links a citizen to the state during the formation of the 
nation-state. ‘A citizen [...] is a man whose largest or most inclusive group is the state’ 
(Walzer, 1970: 218). The linkage reveals more than a mere relationship. It tells us 
about the world of common values or meanings that political citizenship has been 
shaping. Among these, the value of the self-determination and, consequently, the 
preservation of the community are considered the most relevant. Citizens will be 
concerned to sustain their particular set of meanings and are entitled to exclude those 
who might interfere with their designs. The stronger the value of self-determination the 
more negative will be the perception that citizens have towards the presence of aliens 
(Delanty, 1995; Einhom, 1996). One of the means by which citizens distinguish 
themselves from foreigners is through their degree of access to legal protection (Garcia, 
1993). In the following chapters it will be argued that the so-called communitising 
project of the European Union risks moving in the direction of greater self- 
determination thereby enhancing the negative image of aliens8.
1.2 Communitarism, political and civil rights
There are three objections to the communitarian approach that need to be stressed.
8 In particular see Chapter 4 below.
Chapter 1: Societal needs and citizenship practice 48
Firstly, citizenship per se does not create identity but it is politically employed to 
function in this manner9. For instance, the British communitarian approach emerges as 
a consequence of policies intended to control immigration, this aspect will be analysed 
in more details in chapter 2. Secondly, the mere awareness of the necessity of a 
community does not provide a strong basis for the maintenance of such a community or 
for belonging to it. Finally, communities place restrictions on freedom. As a 
consequence, the nation-state is to be the sole political unit in which it is possible to 
achieve citizenship rights. This is also Marshall’s assumption (1950), which reveals the 
autonomous aspect of nation-states in which governments are immune from pressures 
within the world-system of capitalist nations (Giddens, 1985).
Citizenship in the nation-state is politicised to fulfil the need to protect and to 
restrict the benefits that citizenship entails. This protective mechanism produces the 
symbolic construction of a given community’s values, and political rights symbolise 
that function. The emphasis given to political rights within a community can be 
summarised in the three elements of political citizenship, which are intended (a) to 
confer upon citizens the power to influence the political process; (b) to provide a 
central condition of citizenship including the ability to defend rights; and (c) to control 
the access to resources. It will be argued that with the establishment of supra-national 
institutions political rights become dysfunctional since they increase the difference 
between citizens and non-citizens, both EU nationals and non-EU nationals. This is 
evident in the restrictions on political participation place on those who are not 
nationals.
9 See Chapter 4, 6 below.
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Rather than advancing the process of integration, the political rights of citizenship are 
exclusive and serve as a means by which to control access to resources. Political rights 
at the local level facilitate a degree of integration but immigrants from non-EU states 
are treated differently with respect to local political rights than immigrants from states 
within the European Community (Welsh, 1993: 29). Third country nationals, for 
example, cannot vote for the European Parliament even though decisions taken at the 
European Union level have ramification at the local level. Third-country nationals may 
possess local rights, but they cannot influence the political process10. Many scholars 
argue that political participation at the national level is more important than 
participation at the local level, since decisions of more direct relevance to the work of 
the community are taken at the national level (Kostakopoulou, 1998: 166; Evans 
1991: 210; Meehan, 1997: 72). Political rights thus fulfil a traditional condition of 
citizenship, but they are not functional to the establishment of a new community in 
which the legal status of nationals of member states is changing.
Can one say that civil rights constitute the essential condition of citizenship? 
Through the ‘minimalist approach’, the civil association in which citizens are involved 
has no substantive purpose and the legitimisation of a community occurs not through a 
political association but rather via civil association (Oakeshott, 1975). Citizens are 
concerned with those rules that make the achievement of a variety of objectives 
practical. In this sense, politics carries little weight, and any person consenting to legal 
authority satisfies the conditions of citizenship (Parry, 1972). According to this 
approach the subscription by citizens to the rules at this minimal level does not
10 See Chapter 5 below.
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necessarily require an element of active participation. The circumstances of guest- 
workers nevertheless provide an example of a category of individuals bound merely to 
acknowledge the authority’s rules. The kind of subscription required of citizens 
certainly involves more than a mere acknowledgement or tacit consent of these rules 
(Layton-Henry, 1990; Meehan, 1993). This implies that civil rights through the civil 
association do not always satisfy the condition of citizenship to defend and assert one’s 
rights on terms of equality with others.
1.2.1 Social rights and universalism
At this point, one may ask whether or not social rights represent an essential condition 
of citizenship. Social rights become a fundamental element of citizenship when they 
can only be claimed through citizenship. In order to be effective, social rights must 
protect the conditions of life necessary to offer a material basis to civil and political 
rights. The right to work, security, education and health need to be safeguarded, but the 
safeguarding of these more universal values clashes with the legal and political 
restrictions taking place within the European Union. In the transition from the third to 
the fourth model of citizenship, social rights are becoming fundamental in influencing 
the political process and more bound to the process. They represent the means by 
which individuals articulate their aspirations and influence the evolution of citizenship.
Marshall’s scheme outlines a development of citizenship that involves a 
transition from societies based upon ascriptive criteria to societies based upon 
achievement criteria (1950). The shift also involves a transition from particularistic to 
universalistic values (Parsons, 1966). In criticising Marshall’s approach, Bottomore
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argues that a general theory of citizenship should pursue a comparative and historical 
approach since the character of citizenship varies systematically between different 
societies and over time (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992). According to Bottomore, the 
political community and historical role of the nation-state refer to the concept of formal 
citizenship and national identity. Substantive citizenship on the other hand concerns 
rights and particularly social rights, but it is constantly challenged by social struggles 
(Marshall and Bottomore, 1992: 85). Bottomore indeed emphasises the role that social 
groups have played in developing substantive citizenship (Marshall and Bottomore, 
1992: 83). The expansion of substantive citizenship, for example, recently has been 
driven by certain social groups involved in trans-national struggles, which further 
illustrates the universal element in substantive citizenship. Social rights are political 
instruments through which various political movements seek compensation for their 
circumstances and the legitimisation of their claims against society. Social rights are 
strictly related to human rights, but this is where the contradiction begins. Restricted 
access to the community is justified neither in political nor in legal terms.
Barbalet has suggested that the institutionalisation of social rights requires new 
political, legal and administrative practices (Barbalet, 1988). He argues against the 
universalism of social rights because social rights must be analysed in conjunction with 
social services. Differences between individual needs are such that access to social 
services is far from being universal. The universality of social rights remains 
impossible to grasp except as an ideal. This is because access to most social services 
must be considered in terms of particular needs, and these needs are influenced by 
specific structural conditions (Weber, 1966). By the same line of reasoning, however,
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social rights undeniably contain a trace of universalism since one can discern the same 
societal needs across different political cultures. The negative approach is based on the 
following reasoning: the substantive element of social rights relies on the capacity of 
citizenship rights to allow participation in the social context.
The difference between substantive and formal citizenship occurs when citizens 
are unable to exercise rights that confer upon them a particular virtuous capacity. If  the 
formal capacity of citizens cannot become substantive, citizenship is without value. 
The system of common values that protects the community decays since the practical 
ability to employ rights and legal capacities associated with citizenship are not equally 
available to all residents. The integration of a particular society by means of the 
cultivation of a system of common values cannot be reached in a community in which 
the conditions and social opportunities are unequally distributed. This emphasises the 
fact that the expansion of substantive citizenship needs to be explained in relation to 
specific social groups who are involved in the struggle for access to rights (Marshall 
and Bottomore, 1992: 73).
Neither Barbalet nor Marshall, by contrast, consider social conflict to be an 
important element in the expansion of citizenship rights. They both argue that the 
integrating function of citizenship derives from the status of equality. Marshall argues 
that the development of citizenship provides a ‘status’ that reduces the class 
inequalities and thereby decreases conflict and tension between classes. Dahrendorf 
challenges Marshall’s exclusion of social conflict from discussions concerning the 
structural conditions of citizenship. For Dahrendorf, the status of equality is a symbolic 
ideal of citizenship that continuous social conflicts aim to achieve (Dahrendorf, 1974).
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Ultimately, as Turner has so eloquently argued, social equality is linked to and limited 
by the logic of ‘need’, ‘profit’ and the ‘accumulation’ of capital, which is to say the 
logic of the market. The result is a new universalistic culture that undermines religious 
values (Turner, 1986). The hierarchical state is replaced by contractual relationships. 
Contemporary politics is characterised by the struggles of new movements for social 
membership. The central idea is that citizenship is the outcome of class conflicts, 
migrations, and egalitarian ideologies. The mobilisation of the working class and its 
power has been an essential condition for the expansion of citizenship rights. The 
unification of the proletariat tends to produce a class awareness in which the citizen 
begins to recognise his relationship not only to the state but also to other citizens. As 
noted above, these relationships are essentially contractual and political, regulated not 
only by the State but also by the market through supra-national agreements.
The development of modem citizenship corresponds to the constitution of the 
nation-state within the economic system. The contradiction is that social rights function 
through a market that is increasingly global while political systems still mirror a 
national nature. When people move from one nation-state to the another, their political 
rights lose either significance or efficacy. A citizen of one member state moving into 
another member state may retain his/her political rights as far as local and European 
elections are concerned, but individuals cannot enjoy national political rights in the 
member states into which they move. This alters the significance of rights, because 
local political rights are insufficient to give individuals a tangible sense of influence at 
the level where the most important political decisions are made.
The right to participate in politics at the national level nevertheless remains
Chapter 1: Societal needs and citizenship practice 54
attached to the concept of nationality and citizenship, and it is thus incompatible with 
the principle of free movement across nations. Social rights, on the other hand, can be 
transferred across the frontiers of member states unhindered by nationality, as long as 
the bearer of those rights is a citizen of a member state. What we are left with is a 
national system of citizenship in a social context that requires a more pluralistic 
approach (Turner, 1992; Mouffe, 1992; Rawls, 1996; Meehan, 1997; Lehning 1997).
Turner formulates a theory contrary to that of Marshall. Whereas Marshall 
(1950) claimed that citizenship should erode the negative effect of capitalism on class 
relationships, Turner (1986) argues that citizenship could be a support for the 
continuity of capitalism. There are two main assumptions in Turner’s theory: (1) 
citizenship supports the continuity of the capitalist practice of production giving an 
adequate expression to the needs of the bourgeois in the market; and (2) citizenship 
supports capitalism providing for the elimination of some forms of social conflict. 
Turner gravitates closer to Marshall’s line of reasoning on the latter point. Capitalism is 
violent and abusive, he acknowledges, but it creates a confluence of progressive forces 
that can create the potential for the enlargement of citizenship rights. The ideological 
defence of the market by the bourgeois in support of property rights against feudal 
power ultimately turned against the bourgeois as the working class mobilised in the 
quest for equal social rights and welfare benefits. The needs of the industrial nation­
state helped to turn the citizen-soldiers into an organisation of working men and 
women. Whereas military service was once regarded as an opportunity to contribute to 
the national strength, the opportunity to work is now considered in these terms. By the 
twentieth century, the good citizen had become a figure in a grey flannel suit (Shklar,
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1991). To achieve greater participation in society nevertheless demands a wider 
distribution of wealth and a broader concept of citizenship. As a consequence, 
traditional practices and attitudes will change. This reveals: (1) the intrinsic value of 
citizenship in relation to changing societal circumstances and (2) the degree to which 
societal needs transform the priority of citizenship’s means.
The expansion of citizenship rights is the effect of collective struggles to 
preserve and to reinforce membership in a community. While this process tends to 
improve access, citizenship per se still associates the question of access with the 
availability of resources in the society. If it is true that citizenship is strictly identifiable 
through the potential participatory nature that it guarantees what is the meaning of 
participation in the new social system? This is why one needs to analyse the confines of 
the society to which citizenship refers.
The fourth model of citizenship, Euro-citizenship, occurs with the formation of 
a new community. Conceptually, citizenship now becomes detached from the nation­
state in that the rights associated with citizenship can be also regulated and guaranteed 
by supra-national institutions. It has been argued, for example, that the ECJ has 
developed mechanisms for social protection, and it has pushed the decision-making 
process through case-law to overcome social inequalities and discrimination (Meehan, 
1997: 74). In contrast to Aron’s argument that socio-economic rights are not citizenship 
rights (1974), it may be stated that while the political rights associated with citizenship 
remain strictly national in character, socio-economic rights assume a supra-national 
validity".
11 Aron’s nationality-based conception of citizenship distinguishes between political rights and socio-
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It is now obvious that many old assumptions regarding citizenship are untenable. The 
problem of social advancement is at the forefront of our political problems. There are 
many fundamental disagreements about the nature and function of citizenship in a post­
industrial or post-modem society. If the problems of social integration are to be 
adequately addressed in a world where nation-state sovereignty and civil solidarity are 
profoundly challenged by globalisation, Europeanisation and immigration, then further 
consideration must be given to social rights.
1.2.2 Citizens, legal subjects and non-citizens
As noted above, the condition of citizens has changed over the course of centuries from 
active to passive and from citizen to subject. Throughout much of history, foreigners 
and non-citizens have been granted a certain degree of legal status contingent only 
upon being free men and not feudal subject. The deepest division line was not so much 
the one between citizens and foreigners, but the other between free human beings and 
slaves. In the passage from subject to citizen I argued that the citizen in the nation-state 
is both citizen and subject at the same time. As an active party, the citizen is a 
participant in the formation of a general will, and as a passive one, the citizens is an 
individual requested to follow the national will. Because citizenship is something into 
which people are bom, it indicates a condition of ‘subject’ that devolves upon the 
individual by virtue of external forces. However, citizenship represents neither the 
entire ‘human subjectivity’ nor the entire ‘legal personality’ of the individual (Ferrajoli,
economic rights, associating with citizenship only the former. He recognises a universalistic element 
in social rights since they can be regulated by other than national governments, but he denies the 
universalistic element of citizenship. See also Meehan’s criticism Aron (1997:70-73).
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1993). This confers to citizenship an ‘exclusive’ function. The possession of this 
status implies that there is some human being that does not possess such a status.
In this study the distinction between legal subjectivity and citizenship is not 
gratuitous. The categorisation of legal subjectivity is neither diametrically opposed to 
citizenship nor intended as a substitute for citizenship. It follows from the redefinition 
of the concept of legality in which access to rights hinges on criteria other than 
nationality.
This approach differs from the theory articulated by Habermas claiming that a 
continuum exists between the two notions and the conditions of legal subject and 
citizen (1994). On the contrary, there is a distinct tension between the two. History and 
literature reveal that it is incongruous to conceive an open and inclusive idea of 
citizenship. A fundamental tension, thus, emerges between the universal inclusive 
concept of legal subjectivity and the particular exclusive notion of citizenship. We 
could say, therefore, that citizenship, in whatever form is exclusive with regard to legal 
subjectivity as long as citizenship is ascribed only to nationals.
The common element between legal subjectivity and citizenship is that they 
both refer to a legal status which consists of being a holder of rights. It is possible to 
draw the following distinction between civil, political, and social rights. Civil rights 
protect a space of individual autonomy, political rights guarantee some form of 
participation, and social rights protect conditions of life held as socially relevant. In 
other words, civil rights would defend the value of individual freedom, political rights 
the value of participation, and social rights the value of justice. One could then ask if 
the value of individual freedom, participation, and justice are more consistent with the
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‘exclusive’ definition of citizenship/nationality or a more universal categorisation of 
legal subjectivity?
Unmistakably, as we move towards the European Union level of analysis, a 
nominal categorisation of the legal status from citizenship to legal subjectivity occurs. 
The active/passive citizens of the individual nation-states (nationals) now become the 
active legal subjects of other member states. These are called European citizens who 
possess full political and social rights in the member state in which they are considered 
‘nationals’ but not in other member states. The other categorisation refers to the passive 
legal subjects who are permanent residents-aliens with limited set of rights in the host 
country. It follows that there are three main categories: (1) national citizens 
(active/passive citizens); (2) active legal subjects (European citizens); (3) passive legal 
subjects (legal immigrants). The normative establishment of European citizenship 
reformulates the dichotomy between active and passive legal status into a broader 
political unit and citizenship is exclusive once again. To avoid this, legal subjectivity 
should ascribe civil, political, and social rights to another definition of legality based on 
a criterion other than nationality. The principle of ‘domicile’ (Kostakopoulou, 1998) or 
‘residence’ (Welsh, 1993) would suit this substantive change. In consequence, 
citizenship and nationality will remain interchangeable without impinging upon an 
individual’s access to resources. On the other hand, legal subjectivity would eliminate 
the substantive difference between passive and active without impinging upon national 
identity and cultural affiliation.
Under the present political circumstances in Western European countries, there 
are no very strong reasons for withholding all civil and social rights from all men and
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women resident in a particular country whatever their actual citizenship might be. Even 
political rights could be conceded to non-citizens if they are de facto members of the 
political community as a consequence of residence. These observations draw attention 
to the decision-making process and particularly to the criteria by which legal status is 
awarded to non-citizens. Here lies the main contradiction in the conceptualisation of 
European citizenship. The difficulty is whether or not one should still confer relevance 
to citizenship if  such relevance does not become inclusive of the values that guarantee 
the full integration of those who are legally persons in the ‘community’. This thesis 
argues that the European model merely re-formulates the communitarian function of 
citizenship.
Conclusion
This chapter has emphasised the distinct manner in which civil, political, and social 
rights throughout history have served societal needs and have influenced the symbolic 
function of citizenship. Citizenship thus finds its rationale and its intrinsic value within 
the logic of changing societal needs and circumstances. Active participation in politics 
was a prerequisite for the citizenship status in the Greek city-state while the medieval 
citizen was more detached from the political process. In particular, the self-interest of 
society during the Middle Ages and the need for ‘competence’ in trading led to the 
wholesale emancipation of ordinary citizens. This conferred upon citizenship a major 
social function but it did not necessarily imply a closed system
The necessity to forge a political identity during the formation of the nation­
state bestowed upon citizenship a unitary value, which is to say that it gave individuals
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political dignity through which they were able to express a need for both collective and 
individual identity. In the fourth model of citizenship, Euro-citizenship, certain rights 
are guaranteed by supra-national institutions. This means that certain rights are 
detached from the status of national citizenship and a substantive redefinition of legal 
status becomes essential. With legal subjectivity as a legal status equally extended to 
residents rather than simply to nationals, the status of citizen becomes somehow 
residual and less significant than it customarily is. Only a system that easily recognises 
the legal status of non-citizens would be able to accomplish this objective. The 
following chapter will focus on the evolution of new restrictive legal measures at the 
national level that make this objective very difficult to achieve.
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Chapter 2
Immigration and citizenship policies: the redefinition of the concept of 
nationality in the United Kingdom and Italy
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Introduction
This chapter focuses on the link between citizenship and nationality on the one hand 
and between citizenship and immigration on the other. I shall describe first the rights 
that have most defined citizenship at the national level in Europe prior to the 
formulation of Euro-citizenship. Secondly, I will argue that immigration policies at the 
national level, after the Maastricht Treaty and with the establishment of new citizenship 
rights, have become a filter used to define EU citizens. I will do this through an 
examination of citizenship in the United Kingdom and Italy, emphasising the 
redefinition in these two countries of the concept of membership and citizenship.
Though the definition of non-EU citizens varies throughout the member states, a 
common element is that of defining the class of outsiders (the category of ‘them’) to 
serve an exclusion function of Euro-citizenship. It will be argued that the presence at 
the national level of an increasingly diverse population -  some as temporary residents, 
others with the intention to stay -  has significant implications internally for the re­
definition of national citizenship and for the rights and responsibility attached to it. The 
concept of nationality, is thus not only the primary criterion for European citizenship 
but it is also fundamental for immigration purposes. As this process develops, it 
engenders the typology of we/us and them/others.
2.1 Citizenship in the UK: an atypical case
The approach towards citizenship in the United Kingdom is peculiar in that rights take 
precedence over citizenship status, which means that rights can be granted to anyone 
without the necessary condition of being a citizen. Rights held by an individual
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determine his/her status1. This peculiarity has distinguished British practices from those 
of other member of the European Union in granting citizenship rights. In the UK, 
citizenship does not denote any specific right, but the citizen status and that of 
membership are quite close.
The vast literature on the history of British nationality stresses the lack of a 
central character in the definition of British citizenship (Jones, 1956; Holmes, 1978; 
Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Parry, 1957; Dummett and Nicol, 1990). Nicol and 
Dummett try to show that the deficiency of a single document constitution or basic law 
listing rights and duties causes what is called British constitutional formalism in which 
the national identity has been shaped by laws and ‘policies on entry into the United 
Kingdom’ (Dummett and Nicol, 1990). This theory implies that British nationality 
became established on the basis of immigration, unlike arrangements in most other 
states, though sometimes these policies have not been integrated into the main body of 
legal tradition (Dummett, 1986).
It is worth mentioning that through its ‘formality’ British society has been in 
some aspects more generous than other European countries in granting rights to some 
non-citizens (Spencer, 1995). From 1948 to 1962, Britain operated one of the most 
liberal migration regimes in the world, granting citizenship to hundreds of millions of 
colonial subjects (Hansen, 2000: 16). Hansen argues that this was the result of a policy 
aimed to support ‘the ties between Britain and the Old Dominions’ (2000: 19). An 
important factor, however, is missing in this analysis. It was the lack of a constitutional
1 According to the General Provisions regarding leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom 
Article 12 states that: ‘A  person claiming to be a British citizen must prove that he has the right of 
abode in the United Kingdom by producing either: (I) a United Kingdom passport describing him/her 
as a British citizen or as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies having the right o f abode in the 
United Kingdom; or (ii) a certificate of entitlement duly issued by or on behalf o f the Government of 
the United Kingdom certifying that he has the right o f abode’.
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definition of citizenship that permitted a more flexible redefinition of nationality and 
immigration as stated in the 1948 British Nationality Act and the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act. This point is further substantiated by the fact that as soon as a British 
citizenship was established in 1981, ‘the UK find itself broadly convergent with the rest 
of Europe in that it combines relatively easy access to nationality with strict 
immigration control’ (Hansen, 2000: 207). Importantly, this process created a 
dissociation between nationality law and immigration. In other words, before 1981, 
Britain lacked the obstacle of an exclusive citizenship mechanism that characterised 
other European countries. The policies of other states make it difficult for some 
residents without national citizenship to attain certain rights. The aim here is not to 
reconsider the history of the British nationality and immigration but rather to delineate 
the rights attached to citizenship in the UK before and after the establishment of the 
Euro-citizenship, and to consider to what extent citizenship in this case has been 
functional in shaping British nationality.
2.1.1 The shift from ‘subjecthood’ to citizenship between 1948 and 1981
The term of ‘citizenship’ was introduced into British law in the British Nationality Act 
of 1948, which created a citizenship of the United Kingdom and its Colonies. The 
legislation was intended mainly to reinforce an alliance with the colonies and to 
symbolise a ‘common loyalty and equal status’ . Until this time nationality was rooted 
in the concept of ‘subjecthood’ with the connotation of domination and without 
substantive rights attached to citizenship. The 1948 Nationality Act aimed to replace
2 Changes in British Nationality Law: Position o f  the Colonies. 1946. CAB 130/13. Cabinet 
Committee on British Nationality, Memorandum by the Secretary o f State for the Colonies.
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‘subjecthood’ with ‘citizenship’, although this ambition was not actually realised before 
the introduction of the Nationality Act of 1981. A combined citizenship of the United 
Kingdom and colonies was seen nevertheless as a ‘gateway through which the common 
status of a British subject should be conferred upon the inhabitants of the United 
Kingdom and the Colonies’3.
At this stage, British citizenship remains rather formal in its essence. This is 
because both the Commonwealth concept of citizenship and British ‘subjecthood’ were 
still bound together by a common allegiance to the Crown. In this phase, the connection 
between citizens and the state is still very weak. Traditionally, any person bom in the 
UK or in territories linked to the Crown possessed British nationality. As former 
colonial territories gained their independence the 1948 Act aimed to consolidate British 
citizenship alongside the original nationality: thus a Canadian was a Canadian citizen 
and a Commonwealth citizen with the right to vote and to move freely in the UK. The 
situation changed during the 1960s, when it was considered to have been a mistake ever 
to have included colonial citizens in the same citizenship as people from the United 
Kingdom. Attention increasingly centred on the effort to restrict citizenship to people 
with a United Kingdom connection (Dummett and Nicol, 1990: 216-217).
A report of the European Commission on Human Rights of East African Asians 
versus UK is a fascinating reminder of immigration and race politics of the late 1960s. 
The 31 applicants were UK citizens of Asian origin who had settled in Kenya, Uganda, 
and pre-independence Tanzania (then named Tanganyika). Not qualifying for the 
citizenship of those countries on independence, they retained their UK citizenship. In"" 
the late 1960s, the governments of East Africa began imposing restrictions on their
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Asian populations as a part of their policy of Africanisation. These restrictions 
culminated in the destruction of livelihoods, the confiscation of homes, and expulsion4.
In February 1968, the Labour government responded to the increasing number 
of British Asians fleeing East Africa with the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, which 
came into force just seven days after it was introduced on 1 March. The Act removed 
residence rights from UK citizens with no ancestral connection with the UK, replacing 
these rights with a special voucher system (Hansen, 2000: 153-178). The argument used 
then by Labour Home Secretaiy James Callaghan resembled those used in the late 
1990s by the Conservative government against refugees: fewer make for better race 
relations. The argument rendered racism respectable and gave a stimulus to 
‘Powellism’5 and to the open manifestation of hostility towards black people. Political 
parties were cautious about introducing contentious legislation while Britain was not yet 
a member of the EEC (Layton-Henry, 1984). At that time, certain patriotic discourses 
occurred especially in the field of immigration. Importantly, the impact of Powellism on 
the younger generation of Conservatives gave rise to nationalist concerns (Foot, 1969).
Despite the Commission’s condemnation of the 1968 Act as racist, it was not 
until 1998/99 that residence rights were restored to the UK citizens originally excluded 
by the Act, who for 30 years were obliged to wait their turn in the queue for a ‘special 
voucher’. The 1968 Act instead was followed by the ‘patriality’6 clauses of the 
Conservative government's 1971 Immigration Act, and then in 1981, citizenship was 
brought into line with residence rights and the British Asians excluded by the 1968 Act
4 European Commission of Human Rights. 1994.
5 Powell’s impact on the debate on British national identity is discussed in Rich (1986).
6 Patriality referred to those who had special ties o f blood and kinship including most, but not all 
citizens o f the UK and its Colonies, and several million Commonwealth country citizens. Everyone 
else British Commonwealth or Alien was non-patrial and subject to control.
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were no longer British. New immigration rules came into effect introducing new limits 
on the acquisition of citizenship. Non-patrials and Commonwealth country citizens who 
became settled in the UK after the commencement of the Act would be required to go 
through a process similar to the naturalisation procedure. The Nationality Act of 1981 
was a response to problems concerning immigration and the need to place nationality 
law on a clear foundation.
The 1981 Nationality Act distinguished between three categories of citizenship: 
(a) British Citizenship, (b) citizenship of the British Dependent Territories7, and (c) 
British Overseas citizenship. The former Citizenship of the United Kingdom and its 
Colonies ceased to exist. The measure was intended to end the confusion between 
citizenship rights and immigration created by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 
1962. A person of the second or third category had neither the right of entry into the 
United Kingdom nor an enforceable right of travel between one British dependent 
territory and another. The act does not, however, affect the position under the 
immigration law of anyone lawfully settled in Britain, although it introduced some 
amendments to the immigration law so as to allow the ‘right of abode’ in Britain in 
terms of citizenship. The ‘right of abode’ conferred a status free from conditions, and it 
defined the category of citizen. Only British citizens had the right of abode, which thus 
excluded other British subjects and citizens of Dependent Territories (now called 
British Overseas Territories)8.
7 A 1999 White Paper officially renamed what were previously called Dependent Territories as British 
Overseas Territories without following the French example of formally absorbing them into the 
metropolitan territory and granting them representation in parliament. See The Guardian, 17 March 
1999 on the grant o f full citizenship to 150,000 members o f the old empire. The Foreign Minister 
Robin Cook had already declared a year earlier that the term ‘Overseas Territories’ would be a more 
politically correct definition than Dependent Territories. See The Guardian, 16 July 1998.
8 Citizens o f the Republic o f Ireland had also the right o f abode.
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The problem of new Commonwealth immigration was not the main reason to 
introduce new nationality legislation in the United Kingdom. The entry of Britain into 
the EEC also fostered the need to direct attention towards a new nationality act (Rich, 
1990). The main innovation in the citizenship condition was the acceptance of ius 
sanguinis. The new condition did not abolish ius soli entirely, but it established that 
birth on UK territory no longer gave automatic right to British Nationality9. Only 
individuals bom in the UK to someone legally resident in the country are British at the 
birth (Hansen, 2000: 215). In accordance with the ius sanguinis practice, applicants 
should have been able to demonstrate a kin connection with the United Kingdom10. This 
was also a traditional practice among other member states such as Germany, Italy and 
Greece.
Before the introduction of the British Nationality Act 1981, the status of British 
‘subject’ applied to both British and Commonwealth citizens, but the Act abolished this 
status. The term ‘subject’ now applies to British subjects without citizenship, which is 
to say stateless individuals within the Commonwealth and Irish citizens bom before 1 
January 1949 who have expressed the desire to remain British subjects (Hansen, 2000: 
214). Shifting the ascription of rights form ‘subjecthood’ to citizenship represented not 
only the nominal shift from one status to the other, but it also implied the association of
9 British Nationality Law: Outline o f  Proposed Legislation. 1982. Cmnd 7987.
10 British Nationality is granted to all persons bom in the UK if  either the father or the mother is a 
British citizen or settled in the UK. A child bom outside the UK has the right to British nationality if, 
at the time o f birth, one of the parents had British citizenship or had worked as a servant o f the Crown. 
The practices o f ‘registration’ and ‘naturalisation’ are still in force but they are left to the discretion of  
the Home Secretary if  the candidate is over 18 years of age, resident on British territory for five years 
according to immigration laws and residence conditions, good reputation, intention to stay in the 
United Kingdom, and good knowledge o f the English language. Moreover, the spouse o f a British 
citizen can apply for naturalisation through a simplified procedure: proof of uninterrupted residence 
on UK territory for three years is required.
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civil, political, and social rights with the concept of nationality. In this respect, 
citizenship and nationality have become interchangeable.
The Irish case constitutes a relevant example. Irish citizens have always held a 
special status in the UK and they have never been considered as ‘aliens’, but the 
redefinition of citizenship in the UK has also affected the rights of Irish citizens. 
According to section 51(4) of the British Nationality Act 1981, the term ‘alien’ 
designates a person who is neither a Commonwealth citizen nor a British protected 
person nor a citizen of the Republic of Ireland. This does not mean, however, that 
these categories of people are entitled to all the benefits of UK nationality. The 
redefinition of citizenship in the UK has homogenised these three categories into a 
single group of as ‘non-British citizens’, but Irish citizens also benefit from their 
status as citizens of the European Union.
In the O’ Boyle and Plunkett11 cases, in which lower court decisions were 
appealed under the heading of ‘domestic and law challenge’, the appellants’ 
argument was based on two propositions that challenged UK domestic law. The first 
stated that since Irish citizens are excluded from the definition of aliens, they must be 
treated as UK nationals and entitled to all the benefits of UK nationality. The Court’s 
opinion on this proposition was that Irish citizens have a special status and therefore 
they are neither aliens nor UK nationals. The Court also stated that the definition of
11 Michael O’Boyle and Suzanne Plunkett are two Irish citizens who applied for employment in the 
UK, the first with the Fire Authority for Northern Ireland and the second with the Inland Revenue. 
Both employers rejected their applications on the ground that the applicants were not nationals o f the 
United Kingdom and therefore could not be considered for employment. Both applicants disputed the 
lawfulness of these decisions, arguing that the denial o f employment constituted infringement on their 
right to freedom o f movement under Article 48 o f the EC Treaty. This ground of appeal will be 
discussed in chapter 7. The discussion here concerns only the second ground o f appeal made under the 
head o f ‘domestic and law challenge’ See O ’ Boyle and other applications fo r judicial review. 1998. 
Northern Ireland Judgments Bulletin, pp. 242-255 and, O’Boyle and Plunkett (Applications for 
Judicial review) Court o f Appeal CARC 2763. Hearing-dates: 19 February 1999. Judgment by 
Carswell LCJ.
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the category of UK nationals and the definition of aliens were not exhaustive, which 
implies that the UK Government has discretionary power in the definition of these 
categories. The second proposition stated that because ‘no alien’ may be appointed to 
the Civil Service, anyone who is not an alien must be eligible for appointment. The 
Court opinion on this proposition was that this did not mean that every other 
category of nationality must be eligible for appointment. Again, the Court stated that 
it is up to the Government to decide that other ‘classes of persons’ as well as aliens 
may be barred from appointment.
2.1.2 The definition of British nationality for ‘Community’ and national 
purposes
Since 1962, British nationality law has been based upon the law of immigration, and it 
continued to follow immigration law until the period of harmonisation of frontier- 
control in the European Union, which demanded the clarification of concepts such as 
nationality, individual rights, and state sovereignty. In the British case, immigration 
control has been not only a means by which to define the external border, but it has also 
been used to define internal political priorities. Unlike many other countries in Western 
Europe, Britain also saw immigration as an area of political controversy and partisan 
conflict (Layton-Henry, 1990). With the entrance into the EU, certain political priorities 
had to change. The definition of who would be British nationals for Community 
purposes was amended in 1982 just before the British Nationality Act came into force. 
The definition included only British passport holders with the ‘right of abode’ under 
domestic law. The rights of all other British nationals have been curtailed. As a
Chapter 2: Immigration and citizenship policies 71
consequence, there are within Britain some instances in which an EU national from 
another state has rights superior to those of British citizens.
The historical differentiation between subjects and aliens and the lack of a 
general right of entry illustrate quite clearly the fact that the UK did not really have 
individual citizenship on its own (Holmes, 1988). The juxtaposition of citizenship and 
immigration law was therefore an artificial attempt to link together in an unnatural 
connection an immense variety of people by denying a unitary meaning of citizenship. 
This pattern is partially evident within the idea of Euro-citizenship, which creates a 
stronger link between nationality, immigration and citizenship for European Union 
purposes.
The establishment of Euro-citizenship guarantees the validity of national 
citizenship. The European Council declared that giving nationals of member states 
additional rights and protection would not in any way take the place of national 
citizenship12. This declaration underlines the dependence of Euro-citizenship on 
national citizenship and also the link between an individual and his respective state of 
nationality rather than with the Union itself as the basis for his enjoyment of Euro- 
citizenship. Although each member state is competent to formulate its own definition of 
nationality, and even to define its nationality for EC law purposes differently from the 
definitions it employs for other purposes13, each state must meet the reciprocity demands 
made by other member states. Changing conditions may therefore require the 
occasional redefinition of nationality in order to satisfy reciprocity demands (Bohning,
12 Bull. EC, Supplement 12/1992.
13 The current definition of UK nationality for Community law purposes was applied as a basis for 
holding that a British Overseas Citizen was not rendered ineligible for a Union-financed research 
fellowship in the UK by virtue o f possessing the nationality o f that Member State (Case T-230/94, 
Frederick Farrugia v. EC Commission). As noted above, such an application of the definition was 
consistent with the functional requirements o f the Union scheme.
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1 9 7 2 )14 where a member state makes an alteration to its conditions of nationality, it 
might be said that discrimination would be involved against former nationals of this 
State who had exercised freedom of movement prior to the alteration. In such instances, 
individuals whose residence rights are affected by changes in the nationality law of the 
State to which they ‘belong’ may enjoy some protection under the human rights 
provisions of international law. Individuals who have exercised their rights of free 
movement and have chosen to move, however, may not necessarily be afforded the 
same protection in other states.
The link between nationality conditions and the exercise of additional rights of 
Euro-citizenship that derive from nationality can be problematic when nationality law is 
employed as an instrument of immigration control having effects so incompatible with 
free movement requirements at the European level. Unilateral changes in nationality 
law by a member state may be regarded as inconsistent with the spirit of Euro- 
citizenship. The employment of a different definition of nationality for Community law 
purposes implies that persons having both a right of entry and a right of residence in the 
member state concerned nevertheless may be subject to control elsewhere in the Union. 
In other words, legal status granted in one member state may be denied by other states. 
Legal status in this case is limited to a single nation-state and the same definition will 
not necessarily be recognised by other member states. In the case of the UK, the status 
of legal subject15 now affords only limited access to rights, with the result that rights no 
longer take precedence over status, at least as far as the relationship between the UK 
and the European Union is concerned. For an individual to whom British citizenship
14 The original definition o f UK nationality for Community purposes was affected by demands o f  
existing Member States.
15 The term legal subject here refers to those individuals who reside legally in UK without being 
citizens.
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has conferred a right of abode in the UK access to rights at the European Union hinges 
entirely upon that status16.
A good example of the way in which a member state can make an independent 
decision regarding nationality is the British Government’s review of nearly 150,000 
residents of former colonial territories17 who are to be granted full British citizenship 
rights. This includes the right to live and work in Britain and to travel without visas in 
the European Union18 This review excludes citizens of the British Indian Ocean 
Territory and the Sovereign Areas in Cyprus ‘all of whom have alternative 
nationality’19. The Falkland Islands and Gibraltar, claimed respectively by Argentina 
and Spain, are also excluded form this review because their residents already hold full 
British citizenship.
The UK case shows that immigration law serves Union citizenship purposes in 
terms of defining EU citizens, but the harmonisation of nationality at European level 
fails because immigration and nationality in the UK are strictly linked. For the UK, 
immigration controls at the national level compensate for the decrease of sovereign 
power at the national level. The limits of judicial law in this area are underlined in calls 
by the European Parliament for the harmonisation of nationality laws20. More
16 Citizenship and rights o f  abode. Second Report o f the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs 
discussing the issue o f citizenship and rights o f abode for the overseas territories. 3 February 1998.
17 The British overseas territories affected by the decision, with their respective populations in 
parenthesis, include Anguilla (10,000), Bermuda (61,000), The Cayman Islands (33,600), The Pitcairn 
Islands (58), The British Virgin Islands (19,300), Montserrat (12,000), St Helena (6,000), Turks and 
Caicos Islands (13,500).The total population of the affected territories is 155,458.
18 The 1999 White Paper announces that 150,000 will be eligible to live and work in Britain and travel 
without visas in the European Union. This provision overcomes the limit imposed by the British 
Nationality Act of 1981 to right of entry and abode in the United Kingdom for British Dependent 
Territories Citizens (now called British Overseas Territories). See The Guardian, 17 March 1999.
19 Britain and the overseas Territories. Statement by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, House of 
Commons, 16 March 1999. Foreign Commonwealth Office.
20 In connection with the need to reduce Statelessness, see the European Parliament Resolution on the 
British Nationality Bill, Official Journal no. C. 260/100, 12 January 1981.
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particularly, the Parliament considered that free movement and the extension of Euro- 
citizenship call for the replacement of the principle of ius sanguinis by the principle of 
ius soli as a basis for citizenship21.
The absence of a written Constitution setting out the rights and duties of British 
citizens led the all-party Citizenship Commission in 1990 to call for a review and 
codification of the law relating to the legal rights, duties and entitlements of the citizen 
in the UK and for the dissemination of this information in a clear way to all citizens22. 
This recommendation was not accepted, however, and the UK has been left to scour 
through numerous pieces of legislation and regulations where one finds, in fact, no clear 
distinction between the rights of citizens and those of various categories of non-citizens. 
British citizens enjoy full voting privileges and right of entry in the UK. 
Commonwealth citizens are allowed to vote and to stand as candidates in both local and 
national elections, and also in European Elections despite the fact that they are not 
being nationals of a member state. Other foreigners can live in the UK for a lifetime 
without ever acquiring voting rights. This explains why the reliance on a nationality 
condition in the case of the United Kingdom as the basis for enjoyment of Euro- 
citizenship, though necessary as a step towards the fulfilment of Euro-citizenship, may 
actually prejudice its realisation for some residents.
2.1.3 Rights, nationality and new immigration measures in the UK
Nationality status has never been a criterion for the enjoyment of social rights. The 
condition of access to social rights and economic benefits, such as the right to work and
21 See the Resolution on respect fo r human rights in the European Community, O J. No. C. 115/178, 26 
April 1993.
22 See Encouraging Citizenship, Report of the Commission on Citizenship, 1990.
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housing benefits, are dictated more by immigration procedures than by nationality acts. 
In fact, changes in legislation concerning immigration over the last two decades have 
affected access to rights and benefits more than the promulgation of nationality acts, 
which highlights another peculiarity of the relationship between rights and nationality. 
Non-citizens who are habitually resident in UK are entitled to treatment under the 
National Health Service and, for instance, to social security benefit such as income 
support, or public housing. British citizens who are not habitually resident, on the other 
hand, cannot claim these rights, even though they are able to claim these rights as 
European citizens in another member state. The status of being ‘habitually resident’ 
therefore confers access to benefits and services, while citizens living lawfully in 
another country for example, -  au pairs, overseas students and even the foreign spouses 
of recently married British citizens -  are not entitled to benefits such as income support 
or public housing.
In the case of residence rights, the effect is that European citizens (including 
British) may be obliged to prove that they possess the right to live in the UK, instead of 
presuming not only that they have the right to live there but also that such a right is 
sufficient to afford access to other rights and services enjoyed by those habitually 
resident in the UK. Section 8 of the Asylum Immigration Act of 1996 illustrates this 
point declaring that those people who are subject to immigration control and do not 
have permission to reside in the UK cannot undertake any type of work24. Under this
23 Current Law Statutes. 1996. Asylum and Immigration Act 1996.
24 There are other main provisions introduced by the Asylum and Immigration Bill which are: (1) the 
drafting a ‘white list’ o f designated countries of origin for asylum-seekers that are deemed safe which 
require asylum claimants from these countries to overcome a legal presumption o f safety. With 
respect to the first provision noted about, the white listed safe countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ghana, 
India, Pakistan, Poland, and Romania, though Amnesty International at the time expressed serious 
concerns about all o f these countries; (2) the extension of ‘fast-track’ appeals, currently used for
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measure citizens and non-citizens are equally subject to immigration control when they 
search an employment. They are required to provide documentation to attest to their 
position25.
There are two important points to be made. First, the status of being a citizen is neither 
a sufficient condition nor the only condition of access to economic and social benefits 
in the UK. Secondly, some citizens -  such as employers and landlords -  are often 
considered possible transgressors as they might shelter illegal immigrants. They are 
therefore subject to immigration control. In the European Union, the conditions of 
access to social rights are dictated at the national level and are based upon a new 
definition of nationality. Access to social rights changes from one state to the other only 
for non-EU citizens, but access to social and economic rights in the UK differs from 
other member states. Residence rights in the UK also have different implications than 
residence rights in other EU countries.
The High Court confirmed in August 1997 that foreign husbands and wives of 
British citizens are in a worse position than spouses of other European Union citizens 
when it comes to deportation. European Community law grants EU workers, students 
and others the right to move freely within the EU and come and live in Britain, if they 
so desire, and it also guarantees the right of family members to join them regardless of
asylum-seekers who have traveled through safe countries o f transit; (3) up to seven years’ 
imprisonment for anyone who helps an asylum-seeker to get into the country (except those who work 
for bona fide  refugee assistance organizations); (4) no local authority housing for immigrants o f a 
class to be specified by the minister; (5) no child benefit for immigrants (including permanent 
residents).
25 The document may be one of the following: (a) National Insurance Number; (b) a passport which 
describes a person as a British Citizen or having the right to live in or be re-admitted to Britain; (c) a 
passport of British Dependent Territories Citizenship arising from a connection with Gibraltar; (d) a letter 
from the Home Office confirming naturalisation as a British Citizen; (e) a birth certificate from the UK or 
the Republic of Ireland; (f) a passport from a state which signed the European Economic Area Agreement, 
or EEAA, confirming that a person is a national of such a state; (g) a passport which confirms that a 
person has the right to abode in the UK as a member of a named EEAA national who is resident in the 
UK.
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whether the family members in question are EU citizens of another member state. 
Someone married to an EU citizen even if he/she is not an EU citizen, can only be 
deported as a matter of public policy and on very serious grounds involving, for 
example, a serious criminal offence; but marriage to a British citizen confers no such a 
rights, and it does not prevent deportation for ‘overstaying’.
This was the case of Kullwinder Phull, an Indian citizen married to a British 
man, who asked the High Court to prevent the Home Office from deporting her for 
overstaying. Mrs Phull had an unhappy first marriage and when she left her violent 
husband she forfeited her right to stay in Britain. She had since remarried to another 
British man and she had given birth to a British child, but the Home Office insisted on 
deporting her. Her lawyers argued that her British husband was a European citizen by 
virtue of the Maastricht Treaty and that he therefore had the same rights to family unity 
as other EU citizens. The Court disagreed, saying that Maastricht added nothing to the 
pre-existing rights and that EC law did not apply in a purely domestic situation. Their 
ruling leaves several hundred couples and families in danger of forcible separation26. 
This case illustrates that EC law cannot influence the national order imposed by 
immigration measures that are subject to modification only at the national level. In this 
way, an undefined nationality does not per se influence the effectiveness of Euro- 
citizenship that instead is rather vulnerable to changes in immigration control (Evans, 
1984)27. In addition, the definition of a class of outsiders serves an exclusive function of 
Euro-citizenship.
26 See The Independent, 18 August 1995.
27 In relation to this aspect Evans considers the kind of integration entitled by Union membership as 
threat for maintaining a multiple definitions of nationality within each member state.
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2.2 The Italian citizenship: between adversity and social integration
In contrast with the British case, Italian practices towards the allocation of rights are 
intimately related to the acquisition of citizenship. This occurs at least up to the moment 
in which immigration in Italy has acquired particular characteristics compared to other 
European countries. Italian citizenship has been predicated by law n.555 (13 June 1912) 
and the few revisions made since its first promulgation have not brought relevant 
changes to the original text (Casali and Semprini, 1995). It is worth mentioning that 
nationality in this case is neither a status nor a condition of the juridical capacity of 
citizenship. This is because citizenship and nationality are interchangeable.
The juridical capacity in particular embodies some important functions of 
citizenship's status. Aramburo considers juridical capacity as entitlement with a dual 
function. It is an independent and private capacity for access to rights that does not 
require the condition of nationality, and it is required to be in a state of equity 
(Aramburo, 1931). Moreover, the state of equity does not require the condition of 
nationality but the same juridical entitlement. In such a way, citizenship becomes a 
precondition for participating in the allocation of rights. Among the prerequisites for 
obtaining Italian citizenship, none of the five principles described below require 
nationality status, but rights have always been derived from the status of being a citizen 
and, therefore, nationality has become an intrinsic element of citizenship.
The prerequisites for obtaining Italian citizenship are based on the following 
criteria: (1) ius soli (territorial rights), (2) ius sanguinis (ancestral rights), (3) ‘election’, 
(4) naturalisation, and (5) marriage. According to the first and third criteria (ius soli and 
‘election’) a citizen is any person bom in Italy regardless of the nationality of his of her 
family. Moreover, those over eighteen years of age whose parents have been resident in
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Italy for ten years at the time of their birth can declare to ‘elect’ for citizenship. The 
criterion of ius sanguinis was revised28 because previous legislation declared that only 
descendants with an Italian father could obtain the Italian citizenship.
The new legislation has overturned the distinction between patrilineal and 
matrilineal ancestry, so that direct descendants of any Italian are now eligible for Italian 
citizenship. As far as naturalisation is concerned, any immigrant who has been resident 
in Italy for at least five years is eligible. The naturalisation process is based on a 
discretionary power similar to the British case. Marriage is another means through 
which it is possible to become an Italian citizen. As a result of legislation introduced in 
1983, the foreign spouse of an Italian citizen is eligible for citizenship after being 
resident in Italy for six months or after three years of his/her marriage29.
Citizenship in Italy case has never been shaped by immigration policies. This is 
because there has never been a need to differentiate nationals from non-nationals. 
Citizenship has always been synonymous with nationality and vice versa and rights and 
obligations that citizens hold derive from this institution and are stipulated in the Italian 
constitution. This probably explains Italy was unprepared to handle the dramatic 
increase in the foreign presence in the country in the 1970s and in the 1980s. 
Immigration measures merely offered a formal possibility of integration without 
creating real conditions for integration that took into account social exigencies.
In the first two pieces of relevant immigration legislation30 introduced as a result 
of this new wave of immigration, the issue of citizenship is not even mentioned; 
immigrants remain excluded from the citizenship system but with a new status that
28 The revision was introduced by law 123/83 (Art.5).
29 Ibid., art.l.
30 The two pieces o f legislation in question, Laws 943/86 and 39/90, regulated the position o f many 
clandestines for the first time, in particular those who by the end o f the 80s were illegal in Italy.
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differs from the status afforded to immigrants under the original system (d‘Harmant 
Francis, 1990; Pugliese, 1993). They are now severely limited in terms of access to 
social provisions and partially excluded from civil and political rights. Only in 1997, 
after the introduction of new immigration legislation, were immigrants granted ‘semi­
citizenship rights’31. The way to Italian citizenship is comparable to an obstacle course 
in which distinctive barriers define the different levels of membership and rights, 
extending in a continuum from illegal presence to full and legal membership. The most 
important mechanisms of integration are nevertheless strongly linked to the acquisition 
of citizenship.
2.2.1 Immigration in Italy: some features
Over the past few years, largely as a consequence of its geographical position, Italy has 
been compelled to face the arrival of thousands of refugees from nearby countries 
alongside regular migration flows. Refugees from Somalia were the first to arrive, 
followed by Albanians, Rwandans, Serbs and Croats, Albanians for a second time, and 
finally and most recently the Kurds. No arrangement had been made for this sort of 
immigration in either the 1986 or 1990 laws on immigration and political asylum. 
Italian officials treated each case separately by means of ad hoc provisions of limited 
effectiveness over time. These cases clearly cannot be considered alongside classic 
migratory phenomena, and they have illustrated the inadequacy of ordinary restrictive 
instruments of immigration control to deal with exceptional circumstances. In these 
instances, the standard instruments of immigration control clearly undermine the 
fundamental principles of human rights (Monticelli, 1992).
31 The 1997 immigration legislation is discussed at greater length below.
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In Italy immigrants from outside the EU for the calendar year 1997 amounted to 
1,072,596, of which about 800,000 were eligible to seek employment (Monticelli, 
1992). The official figure for the total number of new immigrants, constituting 1.9 per 
cent of the Italian population, does not take into account the full impact of the illegal 
immigration. Before the 1970s, migration flows in Italy were negative, which is to say 
that emigration from Italy outweighed immigration into the country. It was during the 
same decade, however, that most northern European countries decided to reduce the 
flow of immigration into their own countries. Within a space of a few years, Italy 
became a country of immigration rather than of emigration. Immigrants came to Italy 
from over 200 non-EU countries. The composition and distribution of non-EU 
immigrants also in Italy possesses characteristics different from those in the rest of the 
EU. The structure of immigration in Italy differs even with respect to gender, owing 
partly to the fact that the Italian government adopted a policy to facilitate the reuniting 
of families. The policy enabled wives and children of non-EU citizens working in Italy 
to immigrate into the country especially during the initial years after immigration began 
to outweigh emigration in Italy. The entry of non-EU citizens to reunite with their 
families indeed still represents a third of new entries, and the presence of children of 
non-EU nationals entering into Italy or bom in the country is growing constantly. Italian 
schools are populated by about 50,000 foreign students, comprising about 0.55 per cent 
of the total student population32.
In the 1980s and 1990s, immigrants have contributed positively to the national 
economy by occupying a central position in the tertiary sectors, and in services by 
providing a new vitality to otherwise declining activities and by satisfying the labour
321bid.
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demand in the agricultural and service sectors. Over the last 20 years 44 per cent of 
non-EU workers in Italy are employed in the service sector, mostly involved in 
satisfying the need for domestic work and in providing assistance to the elderly. The 
percentage of non-EU workers employed in agriculture and fishing is smaller but still 
significant, resting at about 20 per cent, while smaller proportions are engaged in 
industry, especially in construction, and in a variety of other small-sized industrial 
activities for which qualifications are typically low33.
2.2.2 Alignment with European requirements
The extremely fragmentary and incoherent policies of European countries leaves some 
doubts about a suitable model of integration for third country nationals. Bringing Italian 
legislation into line with that of other European countries meant, first and foremost, to 
discourage and to inhibit the immigration of non-EU citizens into Italy. If the problem 
for the United Kingdom is its definition of nationality for European purposes through 
immigration policies, the problem for Italy is instead to design a coherent policy that 
takes into account both regular and exceptional migration flows. The necessary change 
in immigration and citizenship policy throughout Europe concerns mainly to the 
redefinition of rights.
On several occasions, Italian ministers have appealed to member states to 
consider a solution to a problem not only in the interest of Italy but also in the interest 
of all member states, but these appeals have been unanswered. In March 1997, 
following the collapse of the pyramid investment schemes in Albania, for instance, the 
Italian government reinforced coastal vigilance and, in November of the same year
33ISTAT. 1991. (Istituto Statistico Italiano). La presenza straniera in Italia.
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repatriated those who did not have a right to stay in Italian territory. Viewed in the 
context of the lack of co-operation from other countries and of the problems related to 
the emergency itself such as the causes of the exodus and the criminal elements 
exploiting the situation, the decision of the Italian government effectively denied 
victims to basic human rights (Turco, 1998).
The recent arrival of Kurdish immigration and refugees in Italy has once again 
illustrated the need for co-operation between member states to address problems of this 
sort that touch upon a number of issues at the same time, such as human rights, the 
sovereignty of states, and the security of citizens. The position of the new Italian 
government was to confirm the need to accept and to grant asylum to people who are 
without a state homeland and persecuted or threatened with persecution, while 
recognising the responsibility to fight every form of exploitation and illegal trafficking 
of clandestine immigrants. There have been meetings of police forces of the EU 
concerning the Kurdish problem, to which Turkey was also invited. On the 30th and 
31st of January 1998, at an EU meeting in Birmingham, the ministers of Justice and of 
the Interior agreed on the need to approve a Council proposal on several measures 
related to the recent influx of Kurdish refugees. These measures were designed to 
facilitate the acceptance of refugees from Iraq and neighbouring countries, to help 
populations at risk, to monitor human rights violations, and to establish control 
measures on the demands for political asylum and temporary protection to curb what in 
Germany is called ‘shopping for asylum’.
The difficulties involving immigrants in Italian society are related not only to 
these specific regulations but they depend also upon the general uncertainty that 
characterises the Italian response to this new problem. The Italian immigration
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legislation has been marked by a contradictory mix of increasingly restrictive measures 
on new entries, and liberal provisions for regularisation. The 1986 legislation34 was 
aimed at those immigrants lacking convincing evidence of entry, while the 1990 
legislation35 called ‘legge Martelli’, attempted to promote an equalising system granting 
social rights to foreigners through the imperfect mechanisms of the labour market. 
Based upon the regularisation process implemented in November 199536 243,000 
undocumented immigrants have applied for a residence permit in Italy, and all but 9000 
of these have managed to obtain one. A watchdog agency on migration based in Milan 
has estimated that at least another 150,000 have been excluded by the conditions 
required for the regularisation37.
These two pieces of legislation, and particularly the latter, have followed the 
logic of the labour market, whereby immigration flows are regulated in response to 
market demand. The effect of these policies, instead of guaranteeing easy access to the 
labour market and social rights, was to tighten the controls on extra-communitarians 
who wished to apply for a work permit. The regulatory attitude, in other words, turned 
more towards a policy that was concerned with acceptance than to one preoccupied 
with social integration. Both of the laws noted above completely exclude some civil 
rights, such as freedom of movement, and neither law mentions political rights. 
Moreover, the principles on which entry permits are granted often depend on 
immigrants’ moral behaviour (Melotti, 1993; Lazzarini, 1993).
In general, the immigration policies in Italy reflected more or less the European ‘stop 
policy’. This policy was characterised by (a) the stop and control of extra­
34 Law 943/86
35 Law 39/90
36 Law 489/95
37Ministero deU’Intemo (Italiano), 1996.
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communitarian entry, (b) the introduction of acceptance conditions, and (c) the strict 
control of immigration flows. The outcome of previous policies had been unsatisfactory 
and contrary to expectations. The earlier policies functioned to distinguish non-EU 
citizenship from EU citizenship, and emphasised the relevance of citizenship at the 
national level. Even in the Italian case, the definition o f ‘outsiders’ through immigration 
control was subordinated to the ‘exclusive’ logic of the Union, and diplomatic pressure 
from other European partners was indeed evident in the formulation of the most recent 
legislation on immigration (14 February 1998)38.
The 1998 legislation agrees with the main points of a European Commission 
proposal39 under discussion at the time. The proposal aimed first to guarantee common 
regulations for the immigration of salaried and self-employed workers, students, and the 
relatives of non-EU nationals resident in the EU. With regard to entries for reuniting 
families, there are international duties and rights of individuals to which all member 
states have subscribed. The proposal also aimed to ensure a status of certainty regarding 
the rights and duties of the membership towards non-EU nationals who have legally 
entered the Union and who have been living there in order to guarantee the continuity 
of their permanence and participation in the social and political life in their place of 
residence.
The Treaty of Amsterdam concluded in June1997 indeed points in this 
direction. Incorporated into the First Pillar40 of the Treaty is a new chapter on freedom 
of movement of people, immigration and asylum and it also contains a clause of non­
discrimination. The Treaty establishes an area of inter-governmental co-operation in
38 Particular aspect o f this recent legislation are discussed below in this chapter (2.2.4).
39 COM (97)387 final).
40 First Pillar is the so-called Community Pillar which is under the jurisdiction o f the European Court 
o f Justice. Further discussion on this aspect is given in chapter 3and 7 below.
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regard to these matters, and it grants the Community’s institutions the power to adopt 
binding regulations for all member states41. Although the Amsterdam Treaty legitimises 
a more conservative approach regarding immigration policy at the national level, it also 
establishes the foundation for a potentially more liberal approach to those immigrants 
granted entry.
The exigencies of Union policy thus have indirectly promoted restrictive 
legislation at the national level, which legitimises a more conservative approach to 
immigration. The effect of Union policy is that progressive elements in national 
governments are denied the avenues through which to introduce any distinctive 
programme of reform.
2.2.3 Discriminatory effects
The marked differentiation between citizens and non-citizens has had discriminatory 
effects entirely legitimated by public or even private statute. As one example of its 
effects in the private sector, a Bengali worker named Gola Mowla was sacked because 
he was not an Italian. The cleaning firm in which he worked for four years, called 
Pulitecnica, was taken over by a new company. The head of the firm denied 
discrimination against people of colour but claimed that he was merely applying article 
3 of the firm’s statute, which states that ‘the co-operative consists only of Italian 
citizens’. A petition was organised by workers at the firm in support of Gola Mowla, 
and the Sapienza University in Rome promised to give him a job if the firm did not take 
him back.42
41 See Title IV o f the Amsterdam Treaty and in particular Article 61 (ex Article 73i); Article 62 (ex 
Article 73j); Article 63 (ex Article 73k) and Article 65 (ex Article 73m).
42II Manifesto, 23 June 1994.
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Even certain Italian political propaganda focused on the importance of limiting 
the number of immigrants to contain racist reactions. In his election manifesto during 
the 1995 campaign Silvio Berlusconi pledged that ‘Our country must welcome as many 
immigrants as it can maintain with dignity’43. At the same time, a council on the 
outskirts of Florence had threatened to bulldoze a squatters' camp, home to over 1,000 
Bosnian and Romanians refugees and immigrants. At the camp, babies and children had 
been attacked by hungry rats, and poisonous chemical waste was found on a rubbish 
tip.44 On another occasion in Mentena almost one hundred police officers were 
deployed to clear immigrants out of a former hospital. Twelve of the immigrants living 
there were found to be without documents and, as of the summer 1994, were to be 
deported (II Manifesto, 6/8/94).
The treatment of an Ethiopian refugee by the police has been dubbed by the 
press as the ‘Italian Rodney King episode’. Film showed a footage male police officer 
standing over a black man. The man had been drinking and was now lying on the 
ground moaning, presumably because he had been pushed over by the officer. The 
officer proceeded to stamp his boot in the man’s face. When the refugee tried to evade 
it, the officer pressed his boot down, grinding it still further into the refugee’s face. 
Many viewers who have seen the video have said that this is the kind of behaviour that 
drunks, regardless of their colour, can expect. A Roman police chief, commenting on 
the police behaviour, said that, although it was unorthodox, it was not particularly 
brutal. He denied that racism was involved45.
43 Berlusconi was candidate for Forza Italia centre-right political party in 1995 and became PM.
44II Manifesto, 2 July 1994.
45II Manifesto 24 November 1992.
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The 1998 legislation on immigration has made the possession of a work permit 
a prerequisite for obtaining a residence permit. In order to qualify for any legal job, 
immigrants first must be registered as unemployed, but in so doing, they expose 
themselves to heightened risk of deportation. Without residence permits, they are forced 
to work in the underground economy, thereby escaping the complicated bureaucratic 
procedures but remaining without a residence permit and therefore effectively illegal. In 
this way, illegality is a synonym of marginalisation.
The press campaign against immigrants46 and police officers’ overreaction 
towards unusual cases certainly have had an impact on public opinion, though Italian 
citizens have tended to hold ambiguous attitudes towards immigration as is shown more 
clearly in chapter 6. While they demand greater severity from government, they 
dissociate themselves from government when they observe the severe application of 
measures against immigration, first through the news media and then in televised docu- 
dramas. When the regular instruments of control and expulsion have been applied to 
mass immigration phenomena, the backlash has been particularly strong, as the reaction 
to the expulsion of around 20,000 Albanians in the space of a few days in 1991 indeed 
illustrated. The images of those expulsions are still vivid in the memory of many 
Italians.
2.2.4 The Italian immigration law between restrictive and progressive measures
The 1998 legislation contains both restrictive and progressive measures. On the one 
hand, the law makes provisions for the establishment of a temporary camp for
46 It has been reported that the ‘Indipendente’ called for more measures to make entry more difficult 
and ‘La Stampa’ argued for more deportation (II Manifesto, 20 Novemberl992).
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undocumented immigrants waiting the implementation of the expulsion orders47. On the 
other hand, it increases the sphere of social rights for legal immigrants. The more 
progressive aspects of the law establish the provision of granting to immigrants some 
political rights in municipal elections for the first time. A progressive element can also 
be discerned in the phrase of un percorso di cittadinanza which is to say ‘a path to 
citizenship’. For the first time, citizenship is conceptualised within the problem of 
immigration. While the restrictive measures of the law will actually make legal entries 
more difficult and weaken guarantees for the protection of human rights, the sections 
concerning the provision of more rights to legal immigrants remains vague and its 
scope questionable.
The general objectives of the law can likewise be divided into two categories. 
The first concerns entry modalities on the basis of an annual quotas and provision for 
frontier control. The arrangement is strongly linked to market dynamics. The second 
aims to guarantee social rights and to establish the conditions of semi-citizenship, which 
entitles its holders to health care, education, social services and political representation.
In the field of labour migration, the law introduces a system of quotas for an 
entry policy that is co-ordinated with the demands of the market. The quota has to be set 
every three years by the government under a ‘migration flows plan’ in accordance with 
the general conditions of the economy48. In other words, the system of quotas should 
establish the numbers of immigrants and the countries of origin for skilled and unskilled
47 This refers to the establishment o f common space were individuals whose expulsion orders cannot 
be immediately implemented, are to be gathered. In a display o f perhaps extreme hyperbole it has 
been suggested that these temporary camps are ‘the modem version o f concentration camps’. NGOs 
such as the Lega Anti-razzismo, the Green party, and the left wing o f the ruling coalition have 
strongly criticised these measures, doubting their constitutionality.
48 This measure is in contrast with Article 4 o f the EU regulation, which declares that a member state 
must not restrict by number or percentage the employment o f foreign nationals in any undertaking or 
activity.
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workers and for seasonal labourers to be allowed to enter Italy. This measure excludes 
the direct relationship between the demand and the supply of labour in as much as it 
places limits on all entries of workers from abroad. As now it is envisioned, the system 
will also give preference to countries that have signed bilateral agreements with Italy.
In any event, the actual number of entry permits will be very small owing to the 
persistent high level of unemployment in Italy and variable demand in the labour 
market. It remains to be seen, therefore, how this system will actually work and which 
agencies in the labour exporting countries will regulate the selection of workers to be 
sent to Italy. It is reasonable to suppose that such a system will make the market for 
immigrant labour more rigid and also susceptible to bureaucratic abuses. It also fails to 
address the matter of undocumented immigrant workers already present in Italy.
The measures concerning integration processes in Italy have also laid the 
groundwork for the introduction of a system of rights and duties of semi-citizenship and 
of the routes of access to semi-citizenship. The qualifying points of the integration 
policy are strictly related to the introduction of the residence card (carta di soggiomo). 
It entitles the holder to almost all the rights of citizenship49, excluding those rights and 
obligations that are specific to nationality, such as the defence of the state. In this 
respect, nationality and citizenship are partially detached in that access to most 
citizenship rights does not require the condition of nationality. Beginning with the 1999 
administrative elections, however, the provision for local political rights allows only 
Italian citizens to be elected mayor or vice-mayor, thereby excluding immigrants from 
serving in these offices. By contrast, the European Convention on the Participation of
49 Other rights include the possibility to undertake any legitimate activity; re-entry without visa 
requirements into national territory; equal access to government subsidized housing; full access to free 
education, and equal access to public health services.
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Foreigners to Public Life at the Local Level suggested a requirement of five years of 
continuous residence before immigrants become eligible for enfranchisement.
Although most of these measures appears quite progressive and would certainly 
contribute to making the presence of many immigrants less informal and more secure, 
there are certain limits to these measures that deserve consideration. The residence card 
can be issued only to those who have resided legally in Italy for at least five years. 
Immigrants therefore must wait five years before attaining a status that does not even 
grant them full citizenship rights. This measure may also discourage immigrants from 
seeking naturalisation, which would grant Union citizenship rights.
The lengthy process by which immigrants obtain semi-citizenship and 
bureaucratic inefficiencies inherent in the process will also exclude many applicants. 
The requirement of a minimum income for immigrants on the basis of the number of 
persons in his/her family, excludes other applicants on criteria related to family 
composition, placing large families at a disadvantage. In practice, the minimum income 
requirement actually weakens the right to family reunion. Finally, the residence card 
can be withdrawn if the holder is charged with certain categories of crimes. It is 
conceivable, for instance, that someone can be accused and brought to trial simply on 
the basis of allegations brought by another individual. An immigrant therefore would 
face the possible loss of the residence card simply because of what might in the end turn 
out to be a mere defamation.
The progressive measures contained in the law are thus limited in scope, and 
there are two areas in the law which remain open: namely, (1) the right to vote, and (2) 
the law on citizenship. Extending the right to vote would require a revision of the Italian 
Constitution, while any broadening of the law on citizenship necessitate more ‘liberal’
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concept of citizenship. If immigration both in the UK and in Italy has contributed to a 
crisis in national identity (Husbands, 1994), the situation is even more complex when 
one considers also the criteria for Euro-citizenship to which both countries belong. The 
condition of semi-citizenship is comparable with that of denizenship a concept 
proposed by Hammar for the British case (1990). New measures underline the 
discrepancy between the fundamental principles of citizenship and nationality, and 
especially concerning the manner in which nationality rights function as exclusive 
mechanisms for the purpose Euro-citizenship50.
Conclusion: through a comparative approach
Since immigration analysis cannot be separated from the study of social contexts, 
discussion about the integration and assimilation of immigrants also entails discussion 
about society as a whole. Dubet as noted the same in relation to the French case (1989: 
7). Integration involves the host society and the immigration community in a process of 
relationship and integration that changes both. The complex relation between society 
and immigrant populations is reflected in legislation.
The concept of ‘legality’ does more than merely distinguish between citizens 
and non-citizens. It also involves other intermediary and sometimes ambiguous 
positions such as the ‘denizen’ status in Britain and ‘semi-citizenship’ status in Italy. 
These intermediary positions are internally differentiated and determined at the national 
level. Both Italy and the United Kingdom embrace in their legal practices a sort of a 
second class citizenship. The passage from this status (denizen or semi-citizen) to the 
condition of active citizen illustrates the dichotomy between national citizenship and
50 The precondition o f Union citizenship is to hold the nationality o f a member state. Article 8 TEU.
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citizenship rights. When the transition from local participation to national citizenship is 
poorly negotiated, citizenship and nationality remain detached.
British ethnocentrism sometimes considers that immigrants, even those coming 
from countries traditionally closer for historical and cultural reasons, will never become 
‘good Britons’. Britain therefore accepts minorities taking for granted their significant 
diversity, but the logic of the British position insists that immigrants remain in a state 
that will not prejudice the nation. This was also evidently a major issue in Italian 
debates on whether immigrants should be allowed to vote in local elections. This has 
been the Italian case so far where rights were granted only to Italian citizens. Voting 
rights were denied to foreigners because this entitlement could endanger the nation. 
Although the British and the Italian models of citizenship have evolved independently 
from distinctive histories, full citizenship in both cases hinges upon the precondition of 
nationality, which conceals conditions of deep inequality. The establishment Euro- 
citizenship illustrates the limits of both liberalism and civic republicanism upon which 
the patterns of citizenship in these two countries have respectively been based.
The British model fell into the liberal-individualist tradition in which citizenship 
is reduced to a mere legal status. Rights are inherent in the individual and the individual 
is free from hindrance by the state. Citizenship sets out the rights that individuals hold 
in their relationship with the state (Mouffe, 1992). Rules govern society rather than a 
shared belief in the common good. Before the introduction of Euro-citizenship British 
rights, took precedence over citizenship status. It was the right of residence that 
conferred political rights rather than citizenship. Now, conversely, only those who have 
British or European citizenship are afforded voting rights whether frill or partial. The 
fact that citizenship is no longer a matter of choice, moreover, makes it impossible to
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opt-out of national or Euro-citizenship without loosing one or the other. This is one of 
the main criticisms levelled against the new paradigm by sceptical political groups at 
the parliamentary level.51 In short, immigration and nationality in the United Kingdom 
have always been linked and citizenship is formal. The establishment of Euro- 
citizenship has bome upon immigrants’ rights, leading to. the redefinition of the status 
of citizen, and tying together even more firmly citizenship and nationality52.
The Italian tradition, on the other hand, has always reflected the civic 
republicanism in which citizenship is a shared experience of participation in the 
political community. In contrast with the British tradition, citizenship status takes 
precedence over the allocation of rights. This means that the Italian attitude towards the 
allocation of rights is intimately related to the acquisition of citizenship. Citizenship and 
nationality are interchangeable but immigration and citizenship have always been 
detached. However, the impact of Euro-citizenship rights in the Italian case affects 
immigration policies rather than the sphere of citizenship per se which renders the 
relationship between citizenship and immigration stronger53.
The inherent link between citizenship, nationality, and immigration is the result 
of process of homogenisation, but neither the liberal nor the civic republican tradition 
provides the necessary framework to deal with pluralism and new forms of political 
participation. In re-defining the categories o f ‘us’ and ‘them’ the establishment of Euro- 
citizenship has intensified the relationship between citizenship and immigration within 
the Italian tradition, while it has reinforced the link between nationality and citizenship 
within the British tradition. At the European Union level, however, the problem of
51 See Chapter 4 below.
52 See Fig. 1 below.
53 Ibid.
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immigration constantly challenges this re-definition and threatens to undermine the 
communitarian ideal of unity.
The concept of ‘legality’ or legal status needs to be detached from both 
nationality and citizenship, and it needs to become more universal in its nature. 
Citizenship and nationality remain interchangeable at national level in as much as they 
are based on democratic principles rooted in the political culture, and there is little need 
to separate them at this level since the real problem lies more at the European Union 
level. A more universal and comprehensive re-definition of ‘legality’ or ‘legal status’ 
detached from citizenship would make this link less problematic. In this way citizenship 
and nationality will be detached from rights and they will represent cultural and ethnic 
traits in a pluralistic community.
Although both the British and Italian forms of semi-integration incorporate local 
political rights and employment rights, full citizenship rights are still attached to 
national citizenship. The redefinition of legal status should guarantee a range of rights 
from a minimum level of security and welfare to full participation in the society. This 
would mitigate the negative effects of the exclusion function of citizenship while 
reducing the unequal distribution of resources among all categories of ‘legal subjects’. 
Instead, under present conditions, immigration encourages the definition of semi­
citizenship status by introducing new element of heterogeneity.
Chapter 2: Immigration and citizenship policies 96
Figure 1. Summary
Similarity with the English 
case
Euro-citizenship
Similarity with the Italian case
Immigrants’ rights
Citizenship and immigration 
are in a stronger relationship
Redefinition o f the status of 
citizens
Citizenship and nationality are in 
a stronger relationship
Common process o f homogenisation with a 
stronger relationship between 
citizenship nationality and immigration
Chapter 3
Forms and Functions of the Euro-citizenship
Chapter 3: Forms and Functions of the Euro-citizenship 98
Introduction
This chapter examines the extent to which Euro-citizenship leads to a ‘binary typology’ 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’. It is possible to discern two processes, the first of which expands 
the ‘inner circle’ of citizenship rights in each member state and defines the category of 
EU citizens, while the second reinforces national citizenship when Euro-citizenship 
stands against the ‘outer circle’ of non-citizens1. This implies both an internal and 
external mechanism of legal recognition, which reproduces inclusion and exclusion 
functions that are a typical feature of citizenship practice.
The first part of the chapter explores the expansion of citizenship rights with 
respect to the so-called acquis communautaire2 that delineates potential resources for 
citizenship policy-making. Within these mechanisms, moreover, immigration policy 
can be used to mobilise resources that affect the nature of Euro-citizenship, expressed 
for instance in the enlargement of citizenship rights based on residence and not on 
nationality. In the process of expansion of the ‘inner circle’, free movement rights 
become first the set of values fulfilling the necessity of a firmer control of external
1 The expression ‘inner and outer circle of loyalties’ is used by Wight to describe the manner in which 
the new loyalties to the state replaced the conventional loyalties to an ‘immediate feudal superior’ 
(Wight, 1978: 25). I use this terminology here to refer to the passage from the model of nation state to 
the European Union.
2 This expression appears in the Draft European Union Treaty by the EP on 14 February 1984, known 
also as the Spinelli Draft. The term acquis means literally ‘acquired’ and, in a figurative sense, 
achieved. It is understood as the body of principles and political objectives o f the treaties and 
agreements between member states connected with the Community’s activities. The term, therefore, 
has a strong constitutional implication since it refers to what the Community has achieved. The oldest 
concept concerns the enlargement of the Community, the so-called ‘accession acquis' which refers to 
the body o f rules, political principles, and judicial decisions to which new member states must adhere 
when they become a member o f the Community. The term has been used in different contexts. In this 
chapter, the acquis communautaire is emphasised as a means to safeguard the model created by the 
Treaties o f Paris and Rome, and to discourage any fundamental modification o f the model. See also 
The Oxford Encyclopaedia o f European Community Law. 1990. Vol. I, Institutional Law, pp. 9-10.
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frontiers. Free movement rights that embody economic and social resources are leading 
the symbolic process of Euro-citizenship.
The second part of the chapter focuses on the problem of the creation of the 
public sphere and the legitimisation of the new European setting. One of the core 
principles underlying Euro-citizenship concerns the protection of fundamental rights, 
but this raises questions about the role of the judiciary in safeguarding such rights and 
about the difference between citizens and non-citizens. Ultimately, Euro-citizenship 
performs its inclusive and exclusive functions through its relationship to nationality in 
each of the member states.
3.1 The formation of Euro-citizenship within the acquis communautaire
A comparison of Euro-citizenship with the pattern of citizenship in modem European 
nation-states reveals similarities as well as differences. In the preceding chapter, I 
argued that citizenship practices at the national level are defined by citizenship laws and 
immigration regulations. The latter govern the condition of those who are not protected 
by the former. This means that legal borders are drawn to differentiate citizens from 
non-citizens. The challenge of Euro-citizenship affects not only national citizenship but 
bears also upon immigration policy and political opportunity that Euro-citizenship 
entails. It is possible to observe changes in policy-making at the national level (Tilly, 
1975 and 1984; Bendix, 1964), but it would be inappropriate to maintain that these 
changes have resulted in a transformation of citizenship. Changes in policy-making at 
the national level should be seen rather as a consequence of the establishment of Euro- 
citizenship.
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The effect of Euro-citizenship on national citizenship has to take into account 
several variables such as resources, actors, and political patterns at any given time. As a 
distinctive institutional feature, the acquis communautaire embraces the development of 
the European construct and what the European Union has achieved in relation to the 
unity of the market. In other words, the acquis communautaire serves as a body of legal 
resources that is given shape through the policy-making process. The Maastricht Treaty 
gives Euro-citizenship a constitutional status by designating it as a part of the acquis 
communautaire. It is mentioned both in the Common Provision (Art. B; Art. C) and in 
the preambles to the Protocol and the Agreement on Social Policy3.
For present purposes, the articles state that the Union shall (1) strengthen the 
rights of the nationals through the introduction of a common citizenship, and (2) 
maintain in full the acquis communautaire in the sense of the ‘community patrimony’ 
and constitutional status. Only the development of a substantial acquis of citizenship at 
the level of the European Union would provide the mobilisation of resources sufficient 
to accomplish these tasks, and this is where the controversy lies. From the substantial 
acquis of Euro-citizenship, there emerges the idea of a Community that is more than a 
mere mechanical system of economics and that constitutes instead a system 
commensurate with the society that it has to govern. This would lead to a legal system 
corresponding to the concept of social justice and to the requirement of the integration 
in Europe not only of the economy but also of the people. In practice, the general 
political attitude at the European Union level is in accord with this ambition. Many 
believed that the construction of the Community could not ignore that any human
3 Before to Maastricht Treaty, however, the concept of the acquis communautaire had been used in 
different contexts. In particular, it referred to the enlargement o f the Community (the ‘accession 
acquis'’).
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construction is ultimately conceived for the benefit of man, and more specifically of 
social man (Monaco and Trabucchi, 1965).
The human face and the social content of that ‘mechanical system’ turned out to 
be an imperative for the concrete establishment of a new model of citizenship, though 
they did not guarantee its effectiveness. The European Commission has often 
emphasised that the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights, and 
fundamental freedoms are essential elements for membership of the European Union4. 
These factors are considered essential for shaping a common heritage in terms of 
citizenship that comprises tangible institutions, constructed meaning and practices. This 
would then constitute the citizenship ‘acquis ’.
Any shift of normative and institutional undertakings towards the condition of 
residence rather than nationality would suggest that Euro-citizenship depends upon an 
expansion of the resources of the citizenship acquis. If human rights and fundamental 
rights were conceived as part of the citizenship acquis, for example, then citizenship 
would be susceptible of universalisation. This would provide a framework for the 
formulation of immigration policy in relation to the acquis of citizenship as far as the 
rights of third-country nationals are concerned. In practice, however, citizenship rights 
are bound to nationality rather than residence that undermines any prospect for 
substantive change in the acquis of citizenship.
3.1.1 The fundamental changes on policy-making: the historical setting
The evolution of citizenship status at the European level is linked to the transformation 
of institutional ‘possibilities’. The principal changes that occurred in policy-making
4 COM (97) 357; and O.J. C.l 15/178, 1993.
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affected the constitutional framework of citizenship before the Maastricht Treaty. Until 
then, there was no institutional recognition of Euro-citizenship but the acquis 
communautaire established the groundwork for its constitution. The provisions of the 
acquis communautaire, in other words, were able to serve more wide-reaching specific 
goals.
In the middle of the 70s, the acquis communautaire is used in several 
documents concerning the European construct. At the Paris Summit in 1974, as an 
outcome of several debates on ‘European Identity’, ministers adopted a new set of 
provisions regarding ‘special rights’ and passport policy5. The EC6 also wanted to 
consolidate a more European role in global politics7. Special working groups produced 
reports for the development of passport union, special rights, universal suffrage, and a 
concept of European Union8. For the first time, citizens were considered active in the 
process of the European integration.
The acquis communautaire began to incorporate principles and values that 
could not be repealed in full or in even part without altering the system as drafted in the 
founding treaty. The category of fundamental principles and values included those 
regarding democratic guarantees, judicial protection, fundamental rights, and respect for 
national identity. More than a mere incorporation, the acquis communautaire endorsed 
these fundamental principles in the process of integration. I shall analyse these 
categories more in detail in the following sections, but it is worth noting that this
5 Bull. EC. Supplement 12, 1974. See Copenhagen Summit. Declaration on European Identity. 
Copenhagen 14-15 December 1973. See also Wiener (1998, 61-122).
6 The terms EU and EC will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. The EC is mainly used 
when refering to circumstances pre-1992.
7 Bull. EC, Supplement 5, 1975.
8 Bull. EC, Supplement 7, 1975. The Commission’s report Towards European Citizenship concerns 
policy-related problems regarding the granting of special rights and the introduction o f a passport 
union.
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political mechanism of ‘recognition’ relies on the importance of these values for 
citizens though it does not yet reflect citizens’ expectation and their substantial needs.
The European Commission on a few occasions has considered the 
circumstances of European citizens who reside in an EU country other than the one in 
which they hold nationality, and the Commission has laid out provisions for adding 
rights related to the original nationality to the rights in the host-state9. At the European 
Union level, naturalisation is replaced by ‘additionality’, which refers to the addition of 
specific rights more than belonging or participation in the sense of the intense 
commitment to direct political action. This certainly does not agree with the aim of 
shaping a new political Community. To issue a uniform passport can have a symbolic 
function of self-representation as an entity vis-a-vis the rest of the world. But what 
about the feeling of belonging among citizens of the Community to that entity?10. The 
fact that the acquis communautaire is mutable and subject to expansion in order to 
embrace additional citizens’ values and principles does not imply that it functions to 
serve this purpose.
The emphasis on political and social rights during the 1980s, when the main 
objective was the creation of an internal market without frontiers - denotes first of all 
that the market policy also was oriented towards the construction of a social space 
(Byre, 1989; Meehan, 1993), and secondly that the political status of Community 
citizens towards the Community needed to be preserved. Once citizens moved, in other 
words, they lost access to participation in politics. Citizens are not considered according 
to what they really need but the political mechanisms reflect what politicians think to be
9 Bull. EC, Supplement 7, 1975.
10 Bull. EC,Supplement 12, 1974.
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the citizens’ main priority11. If the additional right of free movement allows citizens to 
change their priorities, then this transformation should be respected politically.
Based on the movement of workers, two types of special citizens’ rights were 
negotiated. These rights include, first of all, social rights such as the right to establish 
residence and access to health care, and secondly, the right to vote and stand in 
municipal elections which is to say local political rights). The latter is insufficient in 
terms of citizens participation in politics but it definitely represents a shift in Euro- 
citizenship practice since it tries to link normative values to the politics of the market. 
As I shall discuss later in this chapter, this is functional in terms of expanding the 
acquis communautaire but not sufficient in terms of citizens’ consensus.
3.1.2 The political achievement of the citizenship acquis
The following stage began after the Maastricht period when Euro-citizenship was 
institutionalised. At that time, there were important citizenship debates and proposals 
that contributed to the mobilisation of some resources fundamental to the development 
of the citizenship acquis12. The evolutionary aspect of Euro-citizenship within its ‘inner 
circle’ is attested in the fact that Euro-citizenship was interrelated with other areas of 
Community policy13. This enabled the institution of citizenship to develop in response 
to changing societal needs. The political discourse continued to address the idea of 
belonging, but the focus of the debate in the post-Maastrcht period shifted from creating
11 This will be analysed further in the two following chapters.
12 See: O.J. EC. C. 77/33, 1984. Europe Documents No.1653 2 October 1991; Bull. EC, Supplement 2, 
1991; Europe Documents, No.1709/1710, 1991); O.J. EC C.183/473, 1991.
13 Euro-citizenship is also an issue included in other areas o f legislation such as the Act o f ‘Common 
Provision’. The second and third pillar o f the Maastricht Treaty, ‘Common Foreign and Security 
Policy’ and ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, concern among other things asylum policy, immigration 
policy, and residence rights o f third-country nationals. It is worth noting that with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, Asylum and Immigration are incorporated into the first pillar.
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a feeling of belonging to establishing the legal ties of belonging. This constitutes a 
fundamental step in defining those who were to be included in the new ‘inner circle of 
loyalties’, and the period was in fact marked by a new debate about inclusion and 
exclusion at the Union level, symbolising the institutional formation of the category of 
‘us’.
While the function of citizenship had been broadened it had not yet been 
changed. In terms of citizenship rights, the acquis communautaire has been expanded 
with several implications for citizenship practice, but citizenship practice relies not only 
on institutions. The emerging public interest mediated by interest groups (NGOs) and 
political parties implies that citizenship now includes more actors and a changed set of 
values. Interest groups and the EP in particular demanded certain changes in the 
citizenship legislation of the Treaty and the so-called ‘place-oriented’ citizenship was 
proposed based on residence rather than nationality (Jenson, 1991)14. Instead of granting 
European citizenship to every person holding the nationality of a Member State15, the 
ARNE group16, for example, also requested citizenship for every person residing within 
the territory of the European Union. The discourse of place-oriented citizenship 
facilitates another perspective on the conceptualisation of Euro-citizenship. In other 
words, arguments that residence should serve as legal criteria for membership in the EU 
(Kostakopoulou, 1988) contrast with normative undertaking for a route to Euro- 
citizenship linked to nationality. Within this framework, which focuses upon the 
changing political structure, it is possible to argue that the provision embodied in the 
Maastricht treaty facilitate to a certain extent the involvement of individual citizens in
14 See European Parliament.Van Outrive Report. 1992.
15 Article 8(1)  o f the TEU.
16 Antiracist Network for Equality in Europe.
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the political process by enabling interest groups to express concerns about rights, access 
and belonging with reference to Euro-citizenship as a new centralised institution. The 
additional rights provided by Euro-citizenship affect national citizenship in this respect 
but the new provisions neglect the link between immigration and citizenship (Brubaker, 
1989). The realisation of a place-oriented Euro-citizenship will also depend upon a re­
examination of immigration policies in an inclusive rather than exclusive manner.
3.2 The outer and inner circle: naturalisation or exclusion
The emergent Euro-citizenship entitles its holders to important privileges, which 
distinguish them from non-citizens. The Maastricht Treaty declaration on citizenship 
affected single member states in the definition of who is included under Euro- 
citizenship and who is not. In this regard, nothing has changed in terms of citizenship 
although member states have had to strengthen their regulations for Community 
purposes. As noted above, member states still retain exclusive power to determine their 
own criteria for nationality, but the ECJ obliged member states to observe EU 
objectives and principles in its decision on the Micheletti case17. Nationals from third 
countries may expect different conditions of access to Euro-citizenship rights depending 
on the country where they attempt to naturalise.
Naturalisation reflects different historical and national concepts of citizenship, 
but in general the naturalisation option is not an adequate measure since it strengthens 
the conditions of nationality and perpetuates conditions of unequal treatment. A strict 
interpretation of Article 8 would suggest that member states are no longer completely 
free to determine policies of naturalisation independent of the interests of the
17 See Micheletti and others v. Delegacion del Gobiemo en Cantabria, case C-369/90, 1992.
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Community. As a consequence national laws regarding the naturalisation process 
throughout the European Union are becoming more homogeneous (Clarke at al., 1998), 
though the ECJ still has no jurisdiction in most cases in which naturalisation is denied. 
The failure to develop a condition of residence rather than naturalisation for the 
enjoyment of Euro-citizenship rights may ultimately discourage immigration while 
placing aliens already resident in member states in a perhaps delicate situation. Home 
countries, particularly non-member states, may attempt to deter their nationals from 
integrating into the member states to which they have moved by depriving them of their 
nationality if they are ever naturalised there18.
The literature is divided with respect to solutions for enabling Euro-citizenship 
to function. One recommendation suggests that the state of residence should ‘oblige’ 
third-country nationals to file for naturalisation after a legal period of residence and to 
become citizens. In other words this solution entails the relaxation of naturalisation laws 
in the member states (Evans, 1994). This would make third-country nationals eligible 
for EU citizenship subject to the satisfaction of certain criteria modelled upon those 
required by national laws, such as lawful entry and residence, age, employment, etc. 
(O’Keeffe, 1994: 105). In such a way, there would not be an uneven distribution of 
rights and duties between citizens and residents. This solution nevertheless seems 
impractical in countries such Germany where rates of naturalisation have remained low 
because of reluctance to grant citizenship to foreign nationals.
Another recommendation calls for the recognition under EC law of resident 
status with its own rights and duties, which would undermine the distinction between
18 Convergence in naturalisation practices among member states, according to Clarke, can be identified 
in general reduction in the residence period required prior to eligibility for naturalisation.
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resident and citizen. Residence within the physical boundaries of the Community 
should be independent of whether the person in question is a national of any of the 
member states (Preuss, 1996: 135). If the focus on residence rather than nationality 
seems to coincide logically with the EU’s commitment to facilitating free movement, 
then there is little reason why immigrants from non-EU states should be treated any 
differently than immigrants from states within the Community (Welsh, 1993: 29). This 
recommendation rejects the view of harmonising nationality laws for the purposes of 
free movement (O’Leary, 1992). The difference between these two recommendations is 
that laws concerning nationality in the former would still provide the basis for the 
exclusion of substantial numbers of individuals from participation in the political and 
social life of their state of residence. In the latter instance, by contrast Euro-citizenship 
would be related to the status of legal subjectivity rather than citizenship and, it would 
refer to the criterion of residence rather than nationality. In other words, Euro- 
citizenship, in the latter instance, would be detached from the function of inclusion and 
exclusion that are inherent in the concept of national citizenship.
The social tensions posed by immigration and free movement are some of the 
consequential effects of the broadening of the concept of acquis communautaire. These 
problems will constitute an ever-increasing pressure for co-ordinated solutions that are 
available only at the European Union level. The legal borders of citizenship are put into 
question and a ‘de-territorialised’ citizenship becomes the new imperative. This 
explains why political citizenship rights lose their importance within a geo-political 
region when they are stipulated on both the supra-national and on local levels. The 
mobility of local voting rights throughout the Union’s countries relies on the principle
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of residence and no longer on citizenship. This also explains why in some member 
states local voting rights are granted to non-citizens.
The normative content of Euro-citizenship is dissociated from that of national 
identity and therefore it cannot accommodate restrictive and obstructionist asylum or 
immigration policies. However, supra-national norms are incorporated into national 
legislation and they are effective for individuals because of their membership within 
one of the member states. Citizenship remains constant while the community changes in 
terms of membership (Weale, 1990). States nevertheless remain the main repository of 
citizenship rights and obligations. The moral-theoretical discussion regarding the 
definition of ‘special duties’ and ‘special responsibilities’ is restricted to the social 
boundaries of a community. The main problem with Euro-citizenship is that 
government have retained for themselves the right to confer nationality. The formation 
of the inner circle or the category of ‘us’ in which the citizen status is functional to the 
creation of the community reinforces nationality. In the outer circle or category of 
‘them’, on the other hand, not all persons who reside within the same geo-political 
space enjoy the same citizenship privileges.
3.2.1 From the political to the market citizen
As far as European Union relations with citizens are concerned, it is possible to 
envisage a new model of participation. Individuals are perceived to exercise a number 
of functions that are affected by European Union intervention. Citizens would have a 
direct interest in the formulation of EC regulations at least to the extent that these 
regulations bear upon their actions. In this new form of participation, the legal status of 
being a citizen is still crucial though citizenship is no longer functional to the process of
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legitimisation in the political community. In this respect, Majone considers the Euro- 
polity as mainly a regulatory order that does not derive its legitimacy from citizenship 
but from its ability to enhance functional logic of regulatory flows -  labour, 
communication, finance, market, etc. (1996). If stateless persons, refugees, and those 
deprived of rights will determine the market of this century, then Arendt’s analysis will 
turn out to be correct. The capacity of the economic system to absorb these people is not 
so important as long as the readiness to integrate immigrants politically and socially 
depends more upon how citizens perceive the social and economic problems posed by 
immigration.
The ‘market citizen’ is still very far from the political European citizen. This is 
because the typical interplay between citizens and public power does not take place at 
the European Union level. The absence of an intermediate structure that constantly 
transmits input necessary for citizens’ self-identification does not grant to citizens the 
means of opposition or consensus. Their participation in European elections is not 
politically effective. This is partly due to the fact that European parliamentary elections 
lead to the formation of neither a government nor a coherent programme of public 
policy. Moreover, political rights of citizenship in the European context perform 
differently than in national systems.
As information becomes more and more the key element for a higher degree of 
citizens involvement in the decision making process of the European Union, it is not 
only to the politicians that we have to turn but also to the information specialists 
(Neunreither, 1994). There is, however, the high risk of information deficit as the 
channels of access to this form of participation are still not affordable by all. Moreover,
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most information on EU activities is transmitted in a nationally biased way making it 
difficult for citizens to receive objective information.
The new model of a horizontal society potentially allows each member to 
become an actor on the basis of that individual’s level of information and competence. 
Direct access of an interested citizen to basic knowledge in relevant areas of policy 
could mean the beginning of a new era in the relationship between citizens and 
government. Although the political function of citizenship in these forms is diminished, 
some citizens would be able to participate actively in policy matters of a large territory. 
The de-territorialised citizenship through the autonomy of the market is still far from 
creating a space in which citizenship can become susceptible of universalisation 
(Turner, 1986, 1992).
At this stage, information and education are strictly linked. Well-informed 
citizens would be more inclined to challenge the claims of their representatives to be 
experts on complex questions of EU policy. The change in our political systems under 
the impetus of the EU therefore affects citizens and their relationships both horizontally 
and vertically, and it undermines the classic functions of political rights for the 
participation and integration processes. Full participation in the political process is 
absent in the creation of the new legal order.
An analytical approach presents two different dimensions of the issue. In the 
first place, the inclusion of certain groups implies the exclusion of others, and secondly, 
Euro- citizenship draws attention to the extension of the rights and duties that form the 
condition for participating in the public life of a community. In a sceptical view, 
d’Oliveira argues that Euro-citizenship is exclusively a symbolic concept without 
substantive content. The concept of additional rights does not delineate the rights and
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duties entailed in Euro-citizenship (1995). If Euro-citizenship is based not on political 
rights but rather on free movement, then the spill-over from market ideology to social, 
political, and civil dimensions requires a new structure that facilitate the evolution of 
free movement not in accordance with the needs of Euro-citizenship but rather with 
societal needs. Such a structure would be less discriminatory towards third-country 
nationals, who are disadvantaged by current policies19. A new structure created along 
these lines would also encourage the emergence of a pan-European public-sphere.
3.2.2 The direct impact of Euro-citizenship on third-country nationals
It is sometimes argued that the establishment of the principle of free movement within 
the EU threatens the control of external frontiers20. It is plausible, however, that the free 
movement of persons as a key element in the definition of Euro-citizenship facilitates a 
firmer control over external frontiers. This is because the privilege given to Union 
citizens affects the free movement of aliens. Furthermore, it shows that the power of the 
EU in controlling national policies is stronger than it sometimes appears. I define this 
mechanism as negative control since it prevents individual states from adopting liberal 
measures towards third-country nationals. The EU may intervene directly only when 
conflicting national policies towards non-citizens threatens the free movement of 
citizens within the Community. Euro-citizenship is an exclusive privilege of member 
states’ nationals, and there are no provisions governing the acquisition of Euro-
19 Discrimination of third country nationals is evident in the TEU’s explicit enumeration o f  rights 
under the jurisdiction o f the ECJ, which inhibits the ability o f third country nationals to defend their 
rights on equal terms. This discrimination should disappear with the transfer o f Asylum and 
Immigration policies in the Community Pillar and therefore under the jurisdiction o f the ECJ, though 
it is to early to analyse the effect o f this change (Amsterdam Treaty).
20 See chapter 4 and 5 below.
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citizenship by nationals of non-member states. Article 8 of the Maastricht Treaty 
stipulates only that:
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a
citizen of the Union21
As already noted above, resident third-country nationals may also enjoy some of the 
rights enjoyed by Union citizens. This is the case, for example, in the right to address a 
petition to the EP and the right to make complaints to the Community Ombudsman 
(Articles 138D/E). The main problem here is that these rights are not substantive, but 
mere procedural rights. They nevertheless allow third-country nationals to seek the 
protection and promotion of their substantive rights, on which the Maastricht Treaty did 
not introduce anything novel.
With respect to the regulation of the legal position of third country nationals, the 
action taken by the EU has been very ambiguous. In the last few years, there has been a 
progressive empowerment of the EP in the legislative process. This has led to several 
EP proposals regarding the status of third-country nationals. According to the EP, 
resident third-country nationals should be entitled to vote and stand for election at the 
local level22. With respect to the internal market, the Commission envisaged a 
harmonisation of national legislation on asylum, entry, residence, and access to 
employment of non-community nationals by the end of 199223. Because of the 
reluctance of member states to cede their sovereignty in these sensitive areas, it is only 
after the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty that decision-making in matters passed
21 Article 8 o f the TEU, par.l.
22 O.J. 1989, C. 71/2.
elections in their Member States of residence.
23 See COM (85) 310 final. Bruxelles 14 June 1985, 15.
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from an inter-governmental to a supra-national approach, which is sometimes referred 
as the ‘Community method’.
What is not very clear is how member states should proceed in this co­
ordination. Schengen for many reasons has been not a correct answer. The Schengen 
acquis has had the effect of focusing efforts on measures to compensate for the loss of 
internal frontier controls. The objective for the integration of the Schengen acquis has 
so far been closely linked to free movement of people, which is conceived as one of the 
fundamental rights for EU citizens24. The Amsterdam Treaty enhances the Schengen 
acquis by introducing greater inter-institutional co-operation in policing and criminal 
justice. Bringing asylum and immigration matters under Community arrangements 
indeed makes it necessary to give Community institutions a role in co-ordinating co­
operation between member states in these areas25.
The Amsterdam Treaty has ‘communitised’ four areas: (1) free movement of 
persons; (2) controls on external borders; (3) asylum, immigration, and the 
safeguarding of the rights of third-country nationals; (4) judicial co-operation in civil 
matters. These areas formerly came under Title VI of the Maastricht Treaty (Justice 
and Home Affairs or Third Pillar), but they are now included in a new Title IV 
written in the Amsterdam Treaty. Communitisation means transferring a matter 
which, in the institutional framework of the Union, had been dealt with using the 
inter-governmental method (Second and Third Pillars) to the Community method 
(First Pillar). The Community method is based on the idea that the general interest of
24 ‘With the integration of the Schengen acquis the Union will receive a foundation on which to build a 
genuine area of freedom, security and justice within the Union framework’. Bull. EC, Supplement 7/8, 
1998.
25 Ibid. ‘The integration of Schengen rewards the efforts o f the member states which embarked on this 
cooperation and gives the Union a base on which it will have to build further’.
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Union citizens is best defended when Community institutions play their full role in 
the decision-making process, with due regard for the subsidiarity principle. In other 
words after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, questions relating to the free 
movement of persons, which had been treated under Title VI, were ‘communitised’ 
and so will be dealt with under the Community method after a five-year transitional 
phase. One of the main achievements of the Amsterdam Treaty in this field is the fact 
that the ECJ will have jurisdiction in the area of immigration and asylum. This 
constitutes a positive step with respect to the problem of social discrimination towards 
third-country nationals.
It is obvious that national immigration policies vis-a-vis third-country nationals 
may affect Community labour market and social policies. Moreover, the distinction 
between the powers of the Community in the area of the labour market on the one hand 
and social migration policy on the other (subject to inter-governmental co-operation)26 
may not be easy to draw. Under Articles 49 and 7a EEC Treaty, the Community claims 
a power to regulate access to the labour market of third-country nationals who are 
already residing in the territory of one of the member states. Measures concerning 
nationals of non-member states may also be taken within the ambit of social policy 
(EEC Treaty, Article 117 et seq.).
Beyond the framework of the social policy (Article 118), the ECJ has also given 
the EU power to regulate the legal status of third-country nationals within the EU 
(Article 238)27. Originally, the ECJ justified the wide application of the social benefit
26 Part One - Principles TEU, unchanged in the Amsterdam Treaty (Art.2 and 3 o f the TEU).
27 This Article refers to the Association Agreements with third states. The ECJ concluded from Article 
238 that an agreement of association creates a special relationship between the EC and the associated 
state covering all areas regulated in the EC Treaty including the freedom of movement for workers. 
Article 238 thus makes it possible to extend market freedoms to nationals of associated states as part
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clause in Regulation 1612/6828. In order to permit the complete freedom of movement 
within the Community, every discrimination in social rights and benefits that could be 
perceived as an obstacle preventing EU nationals exercising their freedom of movement 
had to be abolished. Freedom of movement for third-country nationals would also 
require equal treatment in social rights such as a minimum salary, financial assistance 
for families with children, unemployment payments, and university scholarships.
On this point, there is consensus that harmonisation cannot be achieved easily. 
The Commission stated that the current employment market situation does not give the 
Community the grounds for operating an entry and residence policy of the very open 
kind that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s. More generally, a common immigration 
policy at the European Union level will need to be flexible so that it can reflect the 
manifold dimensions of migratory flows, be they economic, social, cultural or historical 
relating both to host countries and to countries of origin29. The Commission is also 
planning to look into the legal position of third-country nationals holding a long-term 
residence permit and into the application of a provision enabling third-country nationals 
lawfully residing in one member state to reside in another member state (Article 63[4]). 
The legal status of non-citizens, remain ambiguous, however, and this is one of the 
reasons why the criteria for entry, residence, and access to employment of third-country 
nationals should be harmonised30.
The full integration of third-country nationals will be impossible as long as their 
legal status is not defined. In accordance with the Council and Commission Plan of
o f an association treaty. The provision in the Association Agreement with Turkey was declared not
directly applicable within the domestic legal order o f the member states, and no consensus could be
reached on the freedom o f movement for Turkish nationals.
28 This regulation will be analysed more in depth in chapter 7.
29 COM (99) 638 final (section 1.4).
30 O.J. 1990, C. 175/180.
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Action of 3 December 1998, an instrument on the legal status of legal immigrants 
should be adopted within two years of the Amsterdam Treaty taking effect. Rules on 
the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by 
member states of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the 
purposes of family reunification, should be prepared within five years31. A clearer 
definition of the legal status of third-country nationals should result from the 
harmonised criteria of entry, residence, and access to employment. The residence 
permit is defined in broad terms to include all categories of applicants residing in the 
territories of the member states irrespective of their reasons for the residence there32.
It is very doubtful that freedom of movement for non-EU nationals resident in 
the Community will be granted in the absence of further progress towards the co­
ordination of migration policy and co-operation in police matters throughout the EU. It 
also demands at least a minimum level of co-ordination in social schemes that now 
differ widely between EU member states. As discussed in the preceding chapter, there is 
also a common interest in reducing immigration pressure, visible in the new national 
mechanisms for controlling immigration flows. This illustrates the manner in which EC 
law in general and the legal principle of the Euro-citizenship in particular affect national 
migration policies. This control is based in principle on the restrictive approach adopted 
by member states towards the harmonisation of admission policy. Some member states 
insist on their sovereign power to determine the residence rights of non-EU nationals 
and harbour serious reservations about extending some rights of Euro-citizenship to 
resident third-country nationals.
31 Proposal for a Council Directive on the right to family reunification (presented by the Commission) 
COM (1999) 638 final (Article 2 General Provision).
32 Ibid.,
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The process of ‘communitisatioiT is functional to the definition of the 
category of ‘them’ in relation to the inner circle. The concept of citizenship is 
challenged only to the extent to which it no longer presupposes a large set of common 
or shared values. In one sense, this is positive in that it implies the ability of individuals 
to handle differences in their dealings with others who do not necessarily share the 
same values. In another sense, however, it is disappointing because the institutional 
effort to arrive at a common definition of legal subjectivity for third-country nationals 
maintains the traditional link between citizenship and nationality. National unity thus 
becomes compatible with increasing social and cultural pluralism though at the expense 
of third-country nationals. Some scholars have posed the dilemma in considering the 
revision of citizenship in modem society (Mouffe, 1992; Lehning, 1997; Meehan, 
1997).
3.3 The foundation of a European public sphere: the problem of legitimacy and 
fundamental rights
It has been shown that the expansion of the acquis communautaire reflects the political 
necessity to gain a unitary character in the public sphere through the establishment of 
Euro-citizenship. In this process, political means are employed to guarantee the social 
and civil rights that become leading values in the process of the symbolisation of Euro- 
citizenship. The gap between governments’ interpretation of societal needs and citizens’ 
expectations is illustrated by a lack of political legitimacy and the shortcomings in the 
safeguarding of fundamental rights.
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3.3.1 The public legitimisation in the development of the European Union 
democracy
At the European governmental level, it has often been argued that a genuine European 
citizenship would entail, inter alia, the right of individuals to participate in the political 
life of member states on the basis of residence, beginning with the full recognition of 
the freedom of expression, association and assembly. This idea was supported by the 
Commission, which advocated the inclusion of the right of political association in the 
Treaty. It also saw Euro-citizenship as an important means by which to counter a 
perceived democratic deficit and to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the 
Community33. It is important to stress the citizens themselves had not requested Euro- 
citizenship through ordinary channels. The legitimacy of the EU nevertheless has relied 
on the criterion of a supra-national citizenship and the tacit consent of the 
overwhelming majority of the populations of member states towards the Union.
The problem of legitimacy and consent needs to be analysed with respect to 
citizenship’s functions rather than simply as a matter of constitutionalisation. The social 
context in which Euro-citizenship performs its symbolic functions is marked by the 
absence of popular participation, defined as the ‘technocratic’ aspect of the European 
Community (Habermas, 1995). This profile of the European community leads us to a 
sceptical approach regarding the normative expectation associated with the role of the 
democratic citizen. In point of fact, citizens have no really effective means by which to 
oppose the European decision-making process34. The Maastricht Treaty began the process 
of demonstrating the existence of common and shared rights, and the liberal principles of 
the single market were equated with democratic rights. The ‘technocratic’ features of the
33 Bull.EC, Supplement 2, 1991.
34 For an argument concerning the absence o f European public opinion see Lepsius (1990).
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Treaty brought forward the problem of the democratic deficit. The lack of parliamentary 
legislation at the EC level, and the inadequate transparency and parliamentary 
accountability of the decision-making process have led to a detached attitude among 
citizens, many of whom feel they are governed by distant ministers and bureaucrats from 
other countries. In general, the law-making process of the EU lacks transparency and 
democratic legitimacy, which exacerbates the difficulty experienced by many European 
citizens in the identification with the new legal order.
The constitutional traditions common to member states, as a general principle of 
Community law, do not offer a sufficiently precise answer for many of the 
constitutional problems of the EU. This is reflected in the tensions between the Treaty 
objectives on the one hand, and the limiting of Community powers by the principle of 
subsidiarity and the requirements that decisions be taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen on the other. According to a key passage in the TEU:
The Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever- 
closer union among the peoples o f Europe, in which decisions are 
taken as openly and as closely as possible to die citizen35.
This declaration is to be commended, but on its own it is insufficient. Without an 
explicit formulation of the rights that can be asserted in relation to the decision-making, 
there is no real guarantee of institutional accountability. It is important to bear in mind 
that citizens’ experience in the nation-state is of interacting with an existing polity in 
which the distribution of power has already been determined. In the European scenario, 
however, citizens are confronted with a political system in the making (Neunreither, 
1994). Habermas argues that European citizens belong to a pre-political community 
which is the economic community (1995). In the economic sphere, the association of
35 Second paragraph o f ‘Tide I’ Common Provision Article A TEU. Art.l. Amsterdam Treaty
Chapter 3: Forms and Functions of the Euro-citizenship 121
interests is structured by relations of ‘mutual recognition’ of rights and obligations. This 
was one of the key principles of the 1992 ‘Single Market Programme’. The result, 
according to Habermas, is the risk that citizenship merely serves the interest of a ‘client’. 
This could occur if the different apparatus of the state become entirely autonomous, 
cutting themselves off from their environments and obeying only their internal 
imperatives of money and power. In this way, they would not fit into the model of a 
self-determining community of citizens (Habermas, 1995).
The model to which Habermas refers is one of a deliberative democracy based 
on communication flows, which is to say on the interplay between institutionalised 
processes of opinion and informal networks of public communication. In this model, 
citizenship carries more than the passive enjoyment of political rights bestowed upon 
individuals by the paternalistic authority of the state. Even if nothing else, the Habermas 
model certainly provides an additional means by which to rescue the concept of 
citizenship from the logic of the nation-state (Habermas, 1995).
In practice, citizenship grounded in the plurality of EU nationalities has not been 
enough to secure a thoroughly democratic decision-making process. The reconciliation 
of private autonomy linked to the market on the one hand and public self-determination 
on the other thus has been substantially weakened by the European integration process. 
The legitimacy dilemma consists of ‘the ability of citizens to exercise democratic 
control over the decisions of the polity versus the capacity of the system to respond 
satisfactorily to the collective preferences of its citizens’ (Dahl, 1994: 28).
Political exigencies on the European Union level are contingent upon the 
perceived desirability of supra-national democratisation in which European citizenship 
becomes a normative imperative. The supranational processes follow their own logic,
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which tends to relegate not only democracy but even politics itself to a subsidiary role. 
Soysal has argued, for example, that public spheres are constructed either on an 
international basis or a trans-national basis. The referent is no longer national citizenship 
but an abstract individual entitled to claim the collective right and to bring it back to the 
public sphere as his/her ‘natural’ right (Soysal, 1996). This means that identity derives 
not only from a pre-democratic element of national democracy but also from an 
amorphous set of universalistic values. It is thus reasonable to call into question the 
creation of an EU democracy based on forms of European identity that replicate models 
of national identity. There is no automatic or self-evident relation between national 
identity and democracy, and the formation of a unitary identity in Europe based on 
nationality therefore would guarantee neither democracy nor legitimacy36.
The absolute priority of domestic matters combined with the expectation that 
they should be resolved by national governments has been problematic for the 
emergence of a European public sphere. The logic of self-interested nationalism in 
Europe, which everyday behaviour tends to follow, has served as a contradiction to the 
rhetorical ideal of a common European interest and thus to EU politics. The revaluation 
of legal subjectivity as a meaningful and alternative status to national citizenship finds 
its counterpart in ‘actorhood’ rather than membership as the essential element to define 
participation (Soysal, 1996). If Euro-citizenship becomes the very mechanism by which 
preferred forms of life are secured, it is thus within the public sphere and through public 
consent that Euro-citizenship should find its rationale.
36 This is discussed below in chapter 6 through the analysis o f the Opinion Polls.
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3.3.2 The protection of fundamental rights
The connection between Euro-citizenship and the protection of fundamental rights is 
one of the principal factors underlining the status of the European citizen. This is based 
not upon ethno-cultural identity but rather upon the civic and judicial protection of 
citizens while respecting their diversity, and it constitutes the political premise of the 
deepened European democracy. The founding Treaties contained no specific provisions 
on fundamental rights. Before the Amsterdam Treaty, the only legal recognition of 
fundamental rights is given by Article F (2) of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), which 
states:
The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
member states, as general principles of Community law.
By bringing fundamental rights to the fore, those who drafted the Treaty of Amsterdam
were endeavouring to give formal recognition to human rights. The Treaty of
Amsterdam clarifies Article 6 (former Article F) of the TEU by stating unequivocally
that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the mle of law. These principles are common to
the member states. Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty gives more power to the ECJ in
this area by amending Article L of the TEU. The amended article, issued as Article 46
of the Amsterdam Treaty ensures that Article 6 will be applied. The Court now has the
power to render decisions concerning respect for fundamental rights in the EU.
It is possible to argue that Euro-citizenship has served the acquis on fundamental 
rights through the extension by the ECJ of the judicial and legislative protection of 
fundamental rights. Individuals in the European legal system generally nevertheless
Chapter 3: Forms and Functions of the Euro-citizenship 124
continue to derive their supra-national rights from their constitutional position as 
nationals of a member state (Mancini, 1989). Most member states grant ‘everyone’ 
freedom of expression at the constitutional level while freedom of association and 
assembly are subjected to more severe restrictions since they involve organised political 
participation. In this way, Euro-citizenship does not fully symbolise a common 
constitutional institution in recognising fundamental rights. Euro-citizenship should 
express of a common European interest. To the degree that this interest is symbolised by 
the need for the protection of fundamental social, political, and civil rights, the question 
at issue concerns the capacity of Euro-citizenship to serve that function. Judicial 
protection and equal treatment are two important needs connected with the relationship 
between the individual and the community, and Euro-citizenship has the opportunity to 
address this relationship. Euro-citizenship really contains little per se, but it could lend 
greater significance to the Union through the creation of a system that guarantees 
equality for all legal residents through judicial protection.
It has already been argued that a sense of belonging at the European Union level 
needs to be based on an additional set of values that require legitimisation and protection 
(Garcia 1993:13). Preuss stresses the fact that the nation-state has remained the basic 
political organisation able to guarantee protection (Preuss, 1995b: 273). In this respect 
the Treaty of Amsterdam introduces an important change by giving the ECJ power 
jurisdiction in the protection of fundamental rights, which provides a common 
denominator that in time may translate into shared values. Individuals would be able to 
address their complaints to the European Court, which in turn might facilitate a belief 
among Europeans in a unitary body that protects their interests. It is undeniable 
nevertheless that one of the main obstructions to the shaping of a common denominator
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is that these rights, granted at national level, are undoubtedly perceived by certain 
national constitutional Courts as inalienable evidence of their sovereignty37. On the 
contrary, the protection of fundamental rights must now be understood as a principal 
factor in the relationship between the individual and the supra-national state in Europe.
The concept of a supra-national citizenship thus has served the expansion of the 
acquis on fundamental rights. The expansion of the ECJ’s jurisdiction overcomes the 
need to refer to national status. Consequently, there is no longer any need to refer to 
national status and the legal status of people living lawfully in the community should be 
a sufficient condition for granting citizenship rights (civil, political, and social rights). 
The new challenge is the detachment of civil, political and social rights from the status 
of nationality.
Conclusion
While the territorial organisation of the EU clarifies the boundary between insiders and 
outsiders, the categorisation of legal status among member states follows no unitary 
criterion. The elimination of conditions of nationality for the exercise of certain rights is 
an important step towards the coexistence of the European and the national models. This 
would imply first that national citizenship will become inconsistent in relation to the 
European system, and secondly that Euro-citizenship becomes substantially different 
from the former in performing its functions. As the concept develops through the 
expansion of the acquis communautaire, it can provide a shared platform for individuals 
by which they can participate in that process, enhancing democratic legitimacy.
37 Among several pertinent judgements o f the Constitutional Courts, see for example Frontini v 
Ministero delle Finanze. Case C- 27/12/1973.
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If one legitimises Euro-citizenship based on nationality, this indirectly confirms 
the acquis on fundamental rights derived from principles common to the legal traditions 
of each member state. Yet, the notion of Euro-citizenship should in practice go beyond 
tins and allow the expansion of rights terms of subject matter rather than nationality, 
which would overcome the need to refer to the status of nationality. Although the ECJ 
has assumed that all the individuals throughout the Union constitute a single 
Community, this has to be combined also with considering the individual within a 
supra-national context as detached from their ethno-cultural characteristics. This entails 
the possibility to detach Euro-citizenship from nationality and afford citizenship rights 
on bases other than nationality. It would thus be possible to be a Union citizen without 
being a national of any of the member states. Perhaps the designation of ‘Union 
subject/subjecthood’ would be more appropriate than ‘Union citizen/citizenship’.
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Introduction
This chapter examines in a comparative perspective the political debate on Euro- 
citizenship at both the European and national levels. It focuses on the tensions that exist 
between supra-nationalists and inter-govemmentalists who disagree on how far 
European citizenship and interests should encroach on national citizenship and 
interests1. In so doing, it considers the extent to which Euro-citizenship can develop 
independently from national citizenship. The European political elite, who are the prime 
constructors of the typologies of ‘us’ and ‘them’, are split between those who desire 
deepened integration at all levels of society and those who defend state sovereignty in 
all policy areas, favouring reform and territorial expansion in the EU to deepening 
existing ties. Supporters of both positions nevertheless agree that a cultural identity is 
necessary to legitimate existing EU institutions, though they differ on how strongly this 
component should be emphasised. This chapter considers the question through an 
analysis of two fundamental issues: (1) the role that Euro-citizenship has in the 
formation of the Euro-polity, and (2) the degree to which the political discourse has 
fostered the formation of the typology of ‘us’.
The aim of this and the following chapter is to compare the supportive and 
sceptical views of Euro-citizenship and immigration at the both the European and 
national levels. These chapters use the example of the United Kingdom to illustrate the 
difference in these approaches at the level of the nation-state for several reasons. First, 
the intent is not to compare supportive and sceptical approaches between nation-states.
1 Supranationalists support the expansion of European jurisdiction across the EU over a wide range o f  
policy areas. Intergovemmentalists, by contrast, wish to preserve as much as possible the 
independence and sovereignity o f each nation, keeping fundamental decisions in the hands of  
democratically organised societies (Nugent, 1994: 433; Heywood,1994:67).
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Comparison of these two approaches need not consider both Italy, and the United 
Kingdom at the national level. In many ways, Italy is ill-suited for such a comparison 
because support for Euro-citizenship is relatively strong there and the sceptical view, 
comparatively speaking, is poorly represented. In the United Kingdom by contrast, both 
the supportive and the sceptical approach to Euro-citizenship and Immigration are very 
much in evidence, and both views can be discerned across the main political parties. 
Moreover, the debate on Euro-citizenship at the national level has been far more 
animated in the UK than in Italy.
4.1 The relationship between Europe and people
The identification of democracy with national representation obscures a conceptual 
problem. Democratic theory is intimately associated with the form it has assumed under 
the prevalent form of political power in modem societies. Representation is the 
mechanism that enables large populations to participate indirectly in the political 
process while accommodating differences of opinion, belief and values. As long as 
representation is restricted to nation-state, the political subjects are nationals. In a supra­
national context, however, the deepening criteria of the political subject for purposes of 
democratic representation need to be reconsidered. There is no reason why 
representation cannot be structured in such a way as to transcend national political 
boundaries. According to Preuss, representation is a mechanism of mutual support for 
‘pre-existing feelings of commonness and institutions’ that simultaneously ‘reflect and 
[...] actively shape the community’ (Preuss, 1995b: 277).
The idea of national representation is merely one historical construct into which 
formal democracy has transformed itself. In relation to the four historical models of
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citizenship outlined in the first chapter, it is possible to identify three ways in which the 
representation process was transformed. The first transformation resulted in the advent 
of the Greek city-state, followed by subsequent incarnations of the city-state in Roman 
antiquity and the later Middle Ages. The second form has been representative 
democracy within the nation-sate. The third transformation is currently taking place 
through the supra-national form of governance, which affects citizens' daily lives at the 
same time that it restricts their ability to influence decisions (Dahl, 1994).
The manner in which the relationship between ‘Europe and people’ is put at the 
centre of European political concern reveals that the main political objective in the 
process of unification is concerned with the formation of a demos through the rationale 
of an ‘ever closer union between people’2. Weiler objects to this point stating that 
Europe should diverge from the purpose of being ‘about nation building’. (Weiler, 
1996b: 112). According to this view, there is no European demos and there should not 
be one. What is needed is a rationale to justify the normative order that has already been 
created. As long as a European demos is non-existent, however, the idea of belonging to 
a European Union and the hope of realising European citizenship is very dim (Lehning, 
1997: 189). Because it is not possible to conceive Europe in terms of a relationship 
between an individual and the nation-state, the idea of a single demos is not only 
unnecessary but also unlikely. The normative order that has already been established 
requires a rationale that is not ‘statal’. Euro-citizenship as it stands now can be seen as a 
part of ‘a statal telos and exclusionary ethos according to which Europe is about
2 O.J. No 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State of the European Union’, President of the Commission Santer.
Further details regarding European parliamentarians are listed below in Appendix 1.
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redefining a polity in which the ‘us’ would become European and the ‘them’ non- 
European’ (Weiler, 1996b: 113)3.
The whole discussion about a European demos becomes superfluous in a supra­
national context requiring a shared understanding of rights rather than a shared 
understanding of ethos (Weiler, 1996b). Current narratives on the democratic deficit in 
Europe convey different implicit understandings of who should be the political subject 
of democracy. The definition of an EU-democratic regime seems to imply a legitimacy 
dilemma, a choice between two models of legitimacy, either formal or substantive. The 
legitimacy of the EU seems to rest first and foremost on its efficiency, that is, its ability 
to solve problems.
Left-wing groups, which tend to express an optimistic view on Europe, attempt 
to conceptualise the main social problems as instrumental to the discussion on citizens’ 
consensus. For instance, the political concern about the right to work is considered to be 
the European internal challenge that citizens stress the most4. The former President of 
the Commission Jacques Santer has reiterated that the issue of unemployment remains 
the greatest problem for the citizens of Europe, and he has acknowledged the 
importance of the right to work by stressing the need to combat unemployment. 
Protecting the right to work would provide Europeans with the economic security 
necessary for them to put their faith in the new order. According to Santer, it would also 
help to reconcile Europeans with the idea of Europe:
‘People still do not feel that Europe is active in their daily lives dealing with
problems of unemployment. Therefore, the first operation we must
3 The term telos refers to the rationale behind the establishment o f Euro-citizenship as a normative 
institution. The term ethos is interpreted as the attitude o f the community.
4 O.J., No 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State o f the European Union’, President-in-Office o f the 
Council, Gonzalez Marquez (Spain). The right to work has also been identified at the ‘Amsterdam 
Summit’ (1997) as one of the most important matters with which the Union must deal with.
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undertake is to develop a whole strategy for combating the scourge of 
unemployment. That is o f great priority if  we are to reconcile the citizen, the 
man in the street, with our Europe’5.
The positive approach of left-wing parties consists of regarding the origin and the 
effects of this challenge beyond national frontiers and demanding a European response. 
The response should be effected ‘without detracting from the fundamental freedoms 
and rights that form part of a common identity’6. It is believed that a common response 
could help citizens to develop a sense of ‘collective fate’. The communitarian element 
is still strong through this political practice. The common fate of European citizens 
extends beyond national frontiers though it is still restricted to the nationals of the 
member states. The support of European citizens is considered indispensable for the 
construction of a European ‘social model’. Political influence also plays an important 
role: ‘this can be exerted showing the people of Europe that the Union is effectively 
addressing the issue that is top of the public’s concern’7. Forging a level of social 
cohesion in the EU is essential for the Union to gain legitimacy and viability as a supra­
national unit. The introduction of state-resembling institutions such as Euro-citizenship, 
however, is not sufficient to achieve this aim. Legal and political institutions establish 
only a formal vertical relationship between the EU and non-state structures of 
government, but there is no assumption that this correlates to a horizontal relationship 
which incorporates a unifying identity between individuals across the community 
(Shaw, 1998:231).
5 O.J., No 4-470,15 November 1995, ‘State of the European Union’, President of the Commission Santer.
6 O.J., No 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State of the European Union’, President-in-Office o f the 
Council, Gonzalez Marquez (Spain).
7 OJ. No 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State o f the European Union’, Pauline Green (UK-Lab) 
Chairwoman Party o f European Socialist Group:
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A more pessimistic political view, often expressed by right-wing parties, is 
based on the lack of a clear vision about the current purpose of the European project. 
According to Jean-Claude Pasty ‘the larger Europe becomes, the more the meaning of 
building Europe becomes obscured’8. This is certainly reflected in a growing pessimism 
in public opinion, even though the lack of vision stems largely from real problems 
related to the working of the Single Market. Given that EC law is constructing a supra­
national sphere for economic activity, the EU is increasingly providing the scope for 
individual autonomy through the logic of the Single Market. This should be welcomed 
by those of a conservative orientation who see the politics of a common identity linked 
to the role of the market in a modem society (Plant, 1990).
The main problem here is that the public power regulation of this private sphere, 
which has a growing influence on individual autonomy, is being taken away from the 
traditional framework for individual self-realisation: the state. In other words, the public 
regulation of individual activity is removed from the traditional framework of the nation 
state (Closa, 1998). Therefore, the politics of a common identity linked to the role of the 
market pursued by the conservatives would necessarily entail a redefinition of the 
concept of common identity. Yet, this is not the role that Euro-citizenship is 
performing.
As Closa puts it, ‘the practice of European citizenship grounded in the plurality 
of EU nationalities has not been enough to secure the reconciliation of private 
autonomy and public self-determination, which is at the very basis of the idea of 
democratic citizenship’ (1998: 173). This is inevitable considering the fact that the EU
8 O.J., No 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State of the European Union’, Jean-Claude Pasty (France).
Chairman European Democratic Alliance Group.
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is the paradigmatic case of an enlarged area for private spaces whose corresponding 
institutionalised public spheres are still very much delimited by the boundaries of each 
member state. In this situation, nation-states are facing a truly democratic dilemma: ‘the 
ability of citizens to exercise democratic control over the decisions of the polity versus 
the capacity of the system to respond satisfactorily to the collective preferences of its 
citizens’ (Dahl, 1994: 28).
This democratic dilemma is emphasised in Habermas’ argument on the existing 
gap between the nation state’s increasingly limited manoeuvrability and the imperatives 
of inter-woven, world-wide modes of production which create the illusion of real 
sovereignty. In his words, ‘the greater danger is posed by the autonomization of 
globalized networks and markets which simultaneously contribute to the fragmentation 
of public consciousness’ (Habermas, 1995: 305). For Habermas, the effects of this will 
be post-industrial misery because of the surplus population and moral erosion of the 
community. National self-determination is more of a chimera than a reality, whilst 
supra-national processes have their own logic that supersedes not only democracy but 
also politics itself. The loss of sovereignty arising from supra-nationalism is 
counterbalanced by the collective strength of the EU as a whole. In this way, member 
states are able to promote economic growth, to control economic and financial forces 
no longer confined to national boundaries, and to strengthen their political influence 
(Nugent, 1994: 434). This is the basis on which the desirability of supra-national 
democratisation based on supra-national citizenship becomes a normative imperative.
Chapter 4: Euro-citizenship in political debates 135
4.1.1 Citizenship in the political debate and its impact on public opinion.
The political debates current during the time in which Euro-citizenship was established 
emphasised the role of the ‘citizen’ in the new social context. In particular, these 
debates revealed a change in the relationship between citizens and institutions: 
‘European history is now concerned to establish its second great historical role, the role 
of the European citizen. The institution of citizenship attempts to establish a number of 
basic concepts and bring the European institutions closer to citizens’9.
These words entailed what Habermas calls a liberal political culture that can 
‘hold together a multicultural society only if democratic citizenship [...] can be 
recognised and appreciated as the very mechanism by which the legal infrastructure of 
actually preferred forms of life is secured’. For Habermas, these ‘forms of life comprise 
not only liberal and political rights, but of social and cultural rights as well’ (Habermas, 
1995: 33-34).
For Habermas, the emergence and survival of this political culture depends on 
the recognition of Euro-citizenship as the very mechanism that secures preferred forms 
of life. Rather than a comprehensive ensemble of rights that is more coherent within 
national contexts, the development of rights attached to Euro-citizenship needs to be 
carefully balanced with those available under national citizenship. In political debates, 
however, Euro-citizenship is often seen as a threat to cultural specificity. Antonio 
Marques Mendes of the Portugal’s Social-Democratic party sought to allay such fears 
in stating that ‘it is necessary to reaffirm that Union citizenship does not in the least 
diminish the importance and meaning of national citizenship, just as it cannot be
9 O.J. No 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State o f the European Union’, Dimitros Tsatsos (Greece-
Panelino Socialistiko Kinima) Party of European Socialist Group.
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granted to those who are not nationals of member states’10. Worries about cultural 
specificity nevertheless persist in view of the fact that European citizenship has its own 
nature, and once it is put entirely into practice, it will consequently challenge national 
citizenship in spite of political promises.
The fact that the rights of citizenship are granted without an explicit consensus 
dictates a tacit political obligation to confer rights that come first according to citizens’ 
priorities. Although the point of reference is ‘the citizen’, citizenship is not only a 
question of conferring a political and social status, but it is also a question of creating a 
sphere for citizens’ action. The sceptical approach towards Euro-citizenship followed 
two different lines of reasoning. The first argued that Euro-citizenship is vague and 
lacks substance. As an advocate of the sceptical approach Philippe Herzog of the 
French communist party insisted that ‘this citizenship does not exist, because no public 
social order exists, there are no Union obligations towards its citizens and no direct 
relationship between them and the Union’11. Although the causal relationship between 
citizenship status and the creation of a public sphere has not been firmly established 
(Soysal; 1996), the absence of a coherent legal status of citizenship is relevant in 
normative terms. An interpretation of Euro-citizenship along these lines thus would 
need to identify the practical requirements that may help to create a new legal status for 
individuals and arenas for public deliberation.
The second line of reasoning followed by the sceptical approach was a 
discourse of denial. This argument stated that ‘the citizens of our European nations are 
intrinsically European citizens; European citizens must necessarily be citizens of the
10 OJ. No. 3-441, 18 January 1994, ‘Citizenship o f the Union’, Antonio Marques Mendes (Portugal- 
Social Democratic party), European Liberal Democratic Reformist Group.
" O.J., No. 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State of the European Union ‘, Philippe A. Herzog (France- 
French Communist Party) Group for the European Unitarian Left.
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nation of Europe as well and so we do not need European citizenship [...] the Treaty on 
European Union establishes a group of States and not a State of European people’12. 
This approach saw Euro-citizenship as a way of forcing upon the people of Europe 
‘things they do not want’. It also followed a logic that legitimated the denial of Euro- 
citizenship: ‘if the European Union is not a state and does not have a people, it cannot 
introduce citizenship’13. This view follows the conventional definition of citizenship in 
which citizenship mediates the relationship between citizen and state14.
Although democratisation may seem an unavoidable future necessity of the 
Euro-polity (Schmitter, 1996), efforts in this direction are neither normatively neutral 
nor have they gone unchallenged. It is probably true that the people of Europe would 
acquiesce to the factual existence of political structures associated with Euro-citizenship 
(Howe, 1995: 34). Given the lack of normative consensus, however, practical attempts 
to create a political sphere in the European Union from Euro-citizenship can be 
legitimately accepted only if they satisfy the paradoxical condition of being compatible 
with processes of public deliberation. This not only implies a process of de­
nationalisation among member states, but it also places normative strategies within a 
supra-national context.
4.1.2 Europe's citizens: more than a constitutional matter
Efforts to arrive at a public consensus continued in other areas of constitutional 
concern, particularly with respect to institutional change. The debate in the European 
Parliament has followed three distinct approaches corresponding broadly to different
12 O.J., No. 3-441,18 January 1994, ‘Citizenship o f the Union’. Johanna Christina Grund (Germany) Non­
attached, Independent Group.
13 Ibid.
14 For further discussion on this subject, see below in this chapter.
Chapter 4: Euro-citizenship in political debates 138
political orientations: Right, Centre, and Left. Figure 1 outlines the general approach in 
each political coalition.
a) The right-wing view
The approach taken by right-wing groups was characterised by a sceptical political 
reaction. Challenges against institutional changes reflected the fear of possible 
irreversible effects on public opinion if the people were to benefit from such changes 
and strengthen their consensus. An example of this fear can be found in the statement 
that:
‘The European super-constitution will simply be a weapon in the hands of 
the Euro-unitarians, the Eurocrats. The idea o f a European constitution is a 
travesty, a denial o f the idea of and desire for a confederation of Europe's 
free peoples working freely together’15.
Euro-citizenship was, moreover, seen as an ambiguous notion to be used with discretion 
but not to replace the national citizenship rooted in the individual histories of each 
nation. Some commentators even considered Euro-citizenship as a threat: ‘the very 
notion of the European citizenship and the ill-considered use of the term may constitute 
a real danger’16. According to this approach the idea of Euro-citizenship was regarded 
as a challenge to the primacy of national citizenship, and it is interesting to note that 
here citizenship and nationality are used interchangeably. Euro-citizenship is related to 
European identity and the fear is that the latter will eventually supersede national 
identity. What stands out in this approach, therefore, is the preservation of nationality.
15 O.J., No. 3-442, 9 February 1994, ‘Consttution o f the European Union’, K. C. Dillen (Belgium  
Flemish-Block, Flemish National Party), Technical Group o f the European Right.
16 O.J., No. 4-470, 15 November 1995, ‘State of the European Union’, Jean Claude Pasty (France, 
EDA/RPR).
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b) The centrist view
The ‘Centre Group’ believed that the development of European institutions would 
enable people to better understand the function of the Euro-polity. Centrists wished to 
address an objection frequently levelled against the Maastricht Treaty ‘that its structure 
and language are so complicated that Europe’s citizens are unable to understand it’17. 
Those who supported the introduction of a ‘draft constitution’ were also sympathetic 
towards the issue of public consensus:
‘Clear structure and a clear allocation of responsibilities may make it 
possible to regain approval, and this is an important issue. A draft 
constitution of this kind can provide the capacity to act that is urgently 
required if  the Community is to be in a position to form the nucleus o f a 
pan-European structure o f peace and freedom and to strengthen itself 
internally. The draft is needed to enable us to embark on the necessary 
debate on more civil rights, greater closeness to citizens and greater 
involvement o f citizens: that is remedying the democratic deficit’18.
This approach conceives Euro-citizenship as functional to the establishment of a 
European public sphere that legitimates the new Community.
c) The left-wing view
The ‘Left Group’ considered the issue of ‘public consensus’ very important but, they 
did not believe that it necessitated the transformation of the Maastricht Treaty into a 
European Constitution. They also recognised that any effort towards this sort of 
institutional change would be compromised by a series of structural defects in terms of 
democratic guarantees and transparency:
‘Thinking of a written constitution does not imply that these important 
democratic principles would be sufficient to give different signals to the 
citizens. It cannot be in the interest of the citizens to provoke an institutional
17 O.J., No. 3-442, 9 February 1994, ‘Constitution of the European Union’, J.M. Gil-Robles (Spain, 
Partido Populare), European People’s Party.
'* O.J., No. 3-442, 9 February 1994, ‘Constitution of the European Union’, Elmar Brok (Germany, Social 
Democratic Centre Party) European People’s Party.
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battle. What we really need to do is take measures to combat mass 
unemployment, protect the environment on a cross frontiers basis and use 
means available to us to secure peace in Europe’19
This approach emphasised the expansion of rights as functional to the establishment of 
supra-national values. The Left also argued that citizenship should come after the Union 
is built. Citizenship is thus seen as a consequence of the construction of a new political 
community rather than functional to its construction.
d) Comparing the ‘centrist’ and the ‘left-wing’ orientation
The European People’s Party and the Socialist Party Group, respectively, constitute the 
Centre and Left in the European Parliament. They both searched for popular consensus, 
but they approached institutional change and European citizenship in different ways 
largely because they viewed citizens differently. The Centrist approach stated that 
citizens should have obligations in the process of unification. According to J.M. Robles 
of the European People’s Party (Spain):
‘The Maastricht Treaty made it clear that the citizens o f the European 
Union -  whose citizenship is established by the Treaty itself -  now have a 
role in the process of building the Union, which cannot be ignored’20.
Conversely, the Left argued that it was not clearly conceptualised why citizens should 
have the duty of building the Union as long as they received no direct and immediate 
benefit from their new status.
The methodological tools to evaluate these two different perspectives are related 
to a different perception of the public sphere. In the Centrist approach, the perspective 
of the EU public sphere is modelled on the nation-state. This approach seeks to preserve
19 O.J., No. 3-442, 9 February 1994, ‘Constitution o f the European Union’, Klaus Hansch (Germany, 
Social Democratic Party) Party o f European Socialist Group,.
20 O.J., No. 3-442, 9 February 1994, ‘Constitution of the European Union’.
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national citizenship and to establish public consensus while searching for common 
values. In this view, the capacity to reproduce romanticised elements of the nation-state 
is the criterion defining the demos. The influence of the nation-state model continues to 
be attractive to certain authors who argue, for instance, that ‘it is an empirical question 
[...] whether the populations of the Member States share common ideas, values, 
interests and feelings of unity and social solidarity, which have become characteristic of 
the political and cultural coherence of the nation-state and which are amenable to be 
represented in common institutions and to be reflected in a common public sphere’ 
(Preuss, 1995b: 278). A certain degree of homogeneity is thus seen as an essential 
element of democracy.
National identity becomes the fundamental constituent for the kind of political 
communities in which democracy operates (Smith, 1992). It emerges as the element on 
which democracy is based, and the absence of a pre-democratic element in Europe, in 
other words a distinctly European identity, appears to be an obstacle for the formation 
of EU democracy and thus also for the formation of a public consensus. According to 
Grimm, for example ‘the obstacles to EU democracy are the weakly developed 
collective identity and the low capacity for trans-national discourse’ (1995: 297). In 
chapter 6, it is shown that parts of these arguments are indeed empirically founded, 
though identity is not a fundamental element in the constitution of the Euro-polity.
The concept of democracy is remodelled according to the concrete sociological 
features operating in a given national context. These features are assembled as the 
model of the public sphere, which then assumes normative status, effectively 
neutralising alternative proposals that are not explicitly grounded on the empirical 
model of the national democratic state. In this political perspective, conceiving
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democracy above the nation-state level is empirically difficult, owing to an obvious 
problem of identification with a model derived from national public sphere in a supra­
national setting. The implication is that the supra-national sphere is incompatible with 
the national public sphere (Closa, 1998).
By contrast, the approach of the Left brings into question the survival of a 
model based exclusively on the nation-state. For the Left, identity is based not merely 
on pre-democratic elements of national democracy but also on universal values rooted 
in basic human rights. Delanty argues that the new order derives legitimacy neither 
from citizenship nor from the political culture of democracy. It derives its legitimacy 
instead from its ability to permeate people’s lives through ‘functional logic of 
regulatory flows’ such as labour, communication, finance and markets, which suggests 
that Euro-citizenship should also be conceived in terms of function (Delanty, 1998: 
353-354). Directly criticising Grimm’s thesis, Habermas argues that ‘the burden of 
majority and solidarity formation must not be shifted from the levels of political will 
formation to pre-political, presupposed substrata because the constitutional state 
guarantees that it will foster necessary social integration in the legally abstract form of 
political participation and that it will substantially secure the status of citizenship in 
democratic ways’ (Habermas, 1995: 306). In other words, there is no automatic or self- 
evident relation between national identity and democracy. The transformation of the 
Euro-polity into a democracy requires new experiments or concrete manifestations of 
citizenship, representation, and decision-making.
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Fig. 1 General Approach in each European Political Coalition about Institutional 
Change/ Consensus and Euro-citizenship
Institutional change Public
Consensus
Euro-
citizenship
Right Denial No Interest Concern 
preservation of 
nationality
Centre Support Interest Essential
Functional
Left Denial Interest Not Essential
Note: This table summarises my own interpretation o f the debate.
4.2 Two case studies
It is useful to delineate, through parliamentary debates, the impact of Euro-citizenship 
on voting rights and the freedom of movement. This will facilitate a consideration of 
the extent to which limits on voting rights and the freedom of movement in the EU run 
counter to democratic values and frustrate the hopes placed on European integration, 
effectively denying the spirit embodied in Euro-citizenship.
4.2.1 Voting Rights
By creating the notion of Euro-citizenship in Article 8b(2), the TEU guarantees every 
citizen the right to take part in European elections in the member state in which he is 
resident even though he may not be a national of that state. The Article also states that 
‘this right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements to be adopted by 31 
December 1993 by the Council, (...) these arrangements may provide for derogation 
where warranted by problems specific to Member States’.
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Derogations actually allowed from this principle of non-discrimination offer a 
shelter to certain communitarian understandings of the relations between individuals 
and the state based on nationality. Anxieties about national identities thus are well 
protected by current EU provisions, for example in derogations for citizens in the Grand 
Duchy of Luxembourg on restrictions on voting and eligibility. Another example can be 
found in Council Directive 94/80/EEC of December 1994 included a express 
derogation in favour of the ‘Kingdom of Belgium’ allowing the Belgian Government to 
draw up a list of municipalities where the percentage of non-Belgian nationals exceeded 
20 per cent of the municipal population. The derogation enabled Belgium to make the 
right to vote in municipal elections for non-nationals contingent on a period of 
residence in the municipality equal to the length of an electoral term. The Council was 
accused of not having consulted the Parliament on this derogation, this was perceived as 
a breach of the institutional balance, ‘depriving public opinion of the opportunity of 
joining in a debate on derogation concerning the fundamental issue of citizenship’21.
The way in which a similar matter was treated in Spain perhaps better illustrates 
the point. In elections on 28 May 1994, only citizens of the European Union coming 
from the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden were able to vote according to Royal 
Decree 202/9, based on a criterion of reciprocity. The Spanish Decree thus 
discriminated against citizens of other EU countries resident in Spain on the grounds of 
nationality. This could be conceived as a breach of Article 6 of the European 
Community Treaty and an infringement on the freedom of residence. Such a situation 
demonstrates the need for measures guaranteeing the right to vote, which should
21 O.J., No. 4-461, 4 April 1995, ‘Right to vote for citizens of the European Union in municipal
elections’, Carlo Casini (Italy, Christian Democrats Party) European People ‘s Party.
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prevent derogations of EU provisions from discriminating against EU citizens and 
devaluing this right.
Because of their inevitable indirect consequences, these measures could affect 
the rights of EU citizens who are migrants in other countries of the Union. This could 
also cause serious abuses at the municipal level, fomenting tensions and resentments 
instead of creating more positive expressions of the new Euro-citizenship. The 
argument in favour of derogation viewed it as a means by which to strengthen support 
of Euro-citizenship and to give it greater chances of success in particular countries. The 
justification of this position is based on the political will to introduce certain safeguards 
so that electoral law could make allowances for specific circumstances in various 
countries. It was for this reason that the principle of derogation was enclosed in the 
Treaty. The opposite view argued that the principle of derogation would actually open 
the door to discriminatory measures, since it would not necessarily apply equally to the 
citizens of all member states, thus compromising the fundamental principle of equality.
Lundberg argued convincingly that the right to vote and to stand as a candidate 
in local elections already included under Euro-citizenship cannot be exercised 
effectively without full guarantees of political freedom: expression, assembly and 
association (1995). Whilst freedom of expression falls into the category of human rights 
and is consequently widely accepted in all member states, rights of assembly and 
association have a more discretionary interpretation in the national legislation of EU 
countries.
Germany’s Aliens Act makes it possible to restrict or to forbid non-national 
political activity and the Portuguese constitution requires either explicit or tacit 
government permission before engagement in political activities is even allowed. This
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is not much of a problem in practical terms. As Lundberg argues, it is likely that the 
ECJ will remove difficulties deriving from such restrictive interpretations and 
concerning the exercise of the political rights protected by article 8 of the TEU by 
recourse to the doctrine of effet utile and the principle of equality (1995:129).
In the political debate, it was disputed whether a high degree of participation 
implies a parallel high degree of legitimacy. The position of the ‘Left Group’ regarding 
citizens’ participation emphasised the expansion of rights rather than mere political 
participation. In this view a fuller definition of the political rights of Euro-citizenship 
will likely emerge as a spill-over effect from regulations on other rights. Basically, 
participation should mean political action in a Union where too often everything 
happens at the level of experts, civil servants, and States. The problem here was to 
understand whether citizens’ political action was wanted at European level:
‘Who really wants political action within the Union? Who really wants to 
create the conditions to allow the citizens to participate in the debate to 
consult them not just at the election time but continuously, so that Europe 
becomes a part o f every day political life?’22.
Nationality in these special cases was still perceived as an obstacle to the exercise of 
voting rights. Some spill-over effects were to be expected from provisions for Euro- 
citizenship, but nationality still remains under the exclusive jurisdiction of individual 
member states. EU citizens resident in EU countries other than their country of 
nationality are limited in their exercise of political rights by the naturalisation rules that 
apply in each member state. Incremental changes in the forms of direct participation 
seem fully consistent with the development of the discursive capability of a European 
demos. Though diverging arguments about the public good have the functional effect of
22 O.J., No. 3-438, 17 November 1993 ‘Rights to vote and stand as candidate for European Parliament’, J.
Cravinho (Portugal, Partido Socialista) Party o f European Socialist Group.
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identifying focal points of interest, thinking of European unity as a theme around which 
to create a European public sphere should be avoided (Schmitter, 1996).
A closer relationship between Europe and its citizens relies on inter-institutional 
bargaining within the EU. The EP can influence the legislative outcome when this 
bargaining is positive. A positive inter-institutional relationship occurs when the other 
institutions like the Commission and the Council of Ministers pay attention to the EP’s 
requests. As it is now, the EP does not symbolise an institutional body that represents 
the people and rules can be adopted without its consent (Judge, et al., 1994), and this 
does not encourage other institutions to heed to its requests. Weale suggests that one of 
the major developments in the political constitution of Europe would be a shift from the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers towards the EP ‘as the locus of policy 
initiative and decision within the Union’ (1995: 223). This process would eventually 
contribute to the formation of a European political identity.
The right to vote and to be elected to the EP in a Member State other than one’s 
own can be very functional to the formation of a European public sphere. However, in 
so far as the EP has neither legislative initiative nor full legislative power however this 
right will not give much strength to Euro-citizenship. It is nevertheless important to 
recall that this right collides on the one hand with the narrow concept of national 
sovereignty and on the other with the idea that the European Union is an association of 
individuals.
If the Union is an association of individuals rather than a collection of peoples 
and if the EP is representative more of citizens than nations, then the political 
legitimisation of the new European polity is not so bound to collective identities built 
through national membership. The question here is not how we can make Europe more
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like the nation states it composes, but how the nation states could develop a model of 
pluralistic relations with a new political identity (Weale, 1995: 224). In Weale’s view, 
the process of identification with habits and norms of the new polity depends on how 
democratic Europe will become (1995). This is a problem of political legitimisation 
implicit in the construction of a European political order itself and not solved with 
the establishment of Euro-citizenship.
4.2.2 Euro-citizenship in the frontier regions
The second aspect emphasised by the European political elite as partly undermining the 
substantial effect of Euro-citizenship, regards the matter of living and working 
conditions in the frontier regions. In relation to this functional problem both the 
European People’s Party and the Socialist group proposed establishing a directive under 
which every national law should be reviewed in terms of its effect on people in frontier 
areas, and frontier commuters in particular. ‘This is to realise the citizens’ Europe for
9 Tworkers also in relation to social issues’ . Inflexible national structures continued to 
prevent people in frontier areas from experiencing Europe as an entity. In this debate 
two major problems emerged: social and institutional. Particular attention was given to 
residence rights since freedom of movement as the core of Euro-citizenship essentially 
involves the right to reside. This right of residence was emphasised repeatedly in the 
debate as not only the right to live anywhere but also the right to enjoy social and 
economic conditions similar to those enjoyed by everyone else.
23 O.J., No. 3-427, 8 February 1993, ‘Living and working conditions in frontier regions’, Elmar Brok, 
Report on the behalf o f the Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and the Working Environment on 
the Commission Communication on living and working conditions o f community citizens resident in the 
frontier regions with special reference to frontier workers.
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In many practical respects, there still is in frontier areas no citizen’s Europe with 
respect to social issues and employment. In particular, the problem of double taxation 
was raised. A German national working in the Netherlands but living in Germany, for 
instance, is still unable to rely on free movement rights in any sensible way in regard to 
taxation. Even when the hospital on the Dutch side of the border is a lot nearer, German 
sickness insurance generally refuses to allow patients to be treated in the Netherlands 
because the daily treatment rates there are calculated differently from the way in which 
they are calculated in Germany. In the context of the Rhine/Ijssel/Ems Euregio, a joint 
initiative was taken to provide the young unemployed both German and Dutch with 
professional qualifications. The German Employment Protection Act nevertheless states 
that such a grant cannot be made from Nuremberg if the activity is taking place five 
meters away on the other side of the German border.
The issue was one of ‘rational choice’, since these European citizens/workers 
‘do not choose daily or weekly exile out of capriciousness, but out of a legitimate quest 
for higher pay or because the alternative is unemployment’. The problem, moreover, 
did not involve ‘frontier workers commuting between a country of the European 
Community and a third country’. MEPs recognised ‘a whole series of problems that are 
daily irritants in the lives of frontier workers’ incomes, which we recommend should be 
settled by bilateral agreements, on the understanding of non-discrimination on 
residential grounds’24. The cultural as well as social aspects of this problem also 
constitute a case in support of the construction of a new Europe without frontiers:
‘It is really a sad state of affairs that precisely those people who are 
interpreting the spirit o f the Community and go to work in a neighbouring 
country are still facing so many problems in 1993.1 see commuters as being
24 O.J., No. 3-427, 8 Februry 1993 ‘Living and working conditions in frontier regions’, Fayot, Party of
European Socialist Group.
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the interpreters o f the trans-frontier idea. They can tell us better than anyone 
else how much has to be done in the field o f free movement o f persons’25.
The institutional conflict arises when the European Commission’s answer to this 
problem implies again an inter-governmental approach that diminish the validity of the 
European Parliament’s position in representing citizens’ interests. On this occasion, in 
fact, the Commission repeated that ‘there is no need for a specific status for frontier 
workers but it can be taken into account in some fields provided that objective reasons 
justify different treatment’. The report of the Commission on the issue also 
demonstrated support for an inter-governmental approach: ‘This matter could more 
adequately be dealt with by the member states themselves. This would be the best way 
to proceed’. This reveals that issues related to Euro-citizenship as a supra-national 
institution can still be left to national rulings.
4.3 The definition of Euro-citizenship in the British parliamentary debate.
Discussions concerning Euro-citizenship in the British Parliament before the 
implementation of the Maastricht Treaty26 faced the problem of the original definition 
of citizenship. The debate centred more on the effects of Euro-citizenship on the 
expansion of citizenship’s rights in the UK and particularly on the political implications 
of the formation of the new Euro-state on relations between citizens and the state.
Reaction in the UK to European citizenship was divided between those who 
were sceptical about the formation of a supra-national state in Europe and those who 
saw euro-citizenship as both an evolutionary development in the tradition of citizenship 
and an essential element in the process of European integration. These two main
25 O.J., No. 3-427, 8 February 1993, ‘Living and working conditions in frontier regions’, Oomen- 
Ruijten (The Netherlands, Christian Democratic Appeal) European People’s Party.
26 In 1993 Conservatives lead the government.
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approaches towards Euro-citizenship are not necessarily divided along party lines 
between Right and Left27. It is possible, instead to discern two different supportive and 
sceptical approaches with respect to the main political split.
4.3.1 The politics of assurance in the redefinition of rights and obligations
a) The supportive approach
Support for Euro-citizenship was not oriented towards a constructive conceptualisation 
of the new relationship between citizens, rights, and obligations. It was built instead on 
assuring citizens that the acceptance of Euro-citizenship imposes no new duties on 
individuals (Ashdown, 1989)28. Arguments in favour of Euro-citizenship stressed that 
‘it is the existing duty of us all to comply with the law as is directly applicable in this 
country’ and that ‘sometimes a United Kingdom court judgement will impose a duty on 
an individual to comply with what is the law of the land because of our European 
Community membership, but no new duties are being enclosed’29.
Euro-citizenship was thus presented as a matter intrinsic to United Kingdom 
law and the obligation to observe it was seen as the law of the land: ‘The duties that fall 
on us as a result of Britain's membership of the European Community, and any future 
membership of the European Union, will arise from those legal obligations on us all to
27 Since 1979, in general, the Conservative Government in Britain has pursued what might be called a 
politics o f common identity based on market logic and individual empowerment, which emphasises 
consumer choice and individualism (Plant, 1990). On the other hand,, citizenship has become a basis 
for the politics o f the Left offering the basis for a new approach to the idea o f common identity and an 
alternative to the government’s appeal to indivualism and consumer choice as the basis for it. In other 
words, in the Left’s approach citizenship and its attendant rights and obligations provide a real 
alternative to the market-based approach, in terms o f individualism and consumer sovereignity. It is 
possible to find a trace o f this ideological differentiation within the debate on Euro-citizenship.
28 Further details regarding UK parliamentarians are listed below in Appendix 2.
29 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) B ill’, col.35, 
K.Clarke (Conservative Party).
Chapter 4: Euro-citizenship in political debates 152
obey the law of land’30. In this view, obligations stemming from membership in the EU 
were always regarded as imposed directly by each member state, and the repository of 
rights and obligations remained the state, which regulated the identity of individuals as 
citizens.
This politics of assurance and identification nullifies the substantive values of 
Euro-citizenship, which are also defined by the new relationship between citizens and 
their obligations. In other words, this approach minimises the importance of the new 
status for citizens of the Union and it underestimates the obligations attached to it. The 
function of the terminology used by then Secretary of State Kenneth Clarke was to 
reassure the public about any perceived loss of their nationality:
‘I feel no sense o f outrage at the idea that, together with being a national of 
the United Kingdom, I shall be a citizen o f the European Union. I 
understand that some people in this country feel qualms about that 
proposition, but I do not believe that their view is held by the majority’31.
The positive approach of the Left, on the other hand, rationalised Euro-citizenship 
merely as a formal relationship between rights and obligations. They argued that it has a 
symbolic function in that it establishes a ‘formal status’ in the European Union for the 
first time. The word symbolic was intended to indicate that nothing had changed since 
the introduction of Euro-citizenship and that the new institution would entail no radical 
changes in the future. The debate made it abundantly clear, in fact, that there was 
overwhelming support for guarantees enabling each European country to determine its 
own criteria for nationality:
‘Citizenship is established by the new treaty, but the rights that people have 
are rights that they already had to a certain extent under the Single
30 Ibid., col.41.
31 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col.34, 
K.Clarke (Conservative Party).
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European Act. The purpose of citizenship is to add, in part symbolically, to 
the rights that people already possess’32.
Euro-citizenship naturally results from the fact that people are given certain rights and 
obligations in the wider Community. The symbolic function attributed to Article 8 of 
the TEU in the UK demonstrates the degree to which the emphasis in the debate lay in 
influencing public perception to achieve the broadest possible consensus.
‘Many people understand that the European Community has a power over 
the citizens o f the Community, so it is entirely sensible that, where people 
both ruled and have a share in ruling, citizenship should be established for 
them. Indeed, we should be looking for new and better ways to involve the 
citizens o f Europe in the decisions that will affect them’33.
The new institution of Euro-citizenship was thus seen simply as an initial step in 
promoting greater involvement in Community decisions while preserving the autonomy 
of member states in matters related to nationality and national citizenship. The 
Government’s position with regard to the function of Article 8 also revealed a general 
misunderstanding since it was perceived as establishing just a co-operation function 
rather than a community function: ‘I see nothing in Article 8 which is contrary to the 
Government’s policy of the interests of the United Kingdom’34. The positive approach 
portrayed the European Union as having little if any direct authority. Membership in the 
EU would result in no conflict between the laws of the United Kingdom and those of 
the Union. The intent of this approach, in other words, was to assure people that EU 
membership entailed no significant change in the daily lives of UK citizens. It 
dismissed both the imperative to identify with the EU and the fear of losing any sense 
of nationality.
32 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 30, A. Blair 
(Labour Party).
33 Ibid., col.31.
34 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993 ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, Col. 43, 
K.Clarke (Conservative Party).
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The symbolic function of Euro-citizenship was also stressed in efforts to gamer 
support among the younger generation, many of whom already regard the UK as an 
integral part of Europe and saw both the restrictions on individual citizenship and 
divisions between European countries as archaic:
‘Many members of the younger generation find it extremely difficult to 
understand the narrow nationalism portrayed by so many of the artificialities 
and distortions. The symbolism provided by citizenship o f a greater 
Community should be welcome. It is important to have formal but tangible 
recognition of the rights o f European Community citizens in the 
Community at the beginning’35.
This is consistent with findings on the significance of age for public support towards 
Europe, which are discussed below in Chapter 6.
The arguments in support of Euro-citizenship maintained a strict connection 
between identity and the norms of citizenship. Within the European Union as a whole, 
on the other hand, the advent of European citizenship has produced an increasingly 
conspicuous gap between the community as sets of individuals and the norms of 
citizenship as institutional practices (Weale, 1990: 158). While the community changes 
in terms of membership the norms of citizenship remain constant, which implies that 
citizenship is increasingly detached from identity and that it serves less and less to serve 
as a means for identification.
b) The sceptical approach
The sceptical approach towards Euro-citizenship acknowledged the possibility that 
fresh duties could be imposed on citizens as a consequence of closer ties with Europe. 
This was based on the belief that the further development of the European Union would
35 House of Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill ‘, Col. 60, J. D.
Fraser (Labour Party).
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involve new Treaty obligations. Paradoxically, the central argument of the pro­
citizenship group established the basis for the principal objection of the anti-citizenship 
group, which wondered why the entitlements stemming from Euro-citizenship actually 
required citizenship and why there was the need to pass the Bill at all since the rights 
and obligations of Euro-citizenship already existed under the previous EC 
(Amendment) Act of 1986.
This objection about citizens’ obligations emphasises one of the structural 
problems of Euro-citizenship whereby agreements concerning rights and obligations are 
spread over a variety of Treaties that involve different decision-making procedures. In 
this respect, the so-called ‘pillar structure’36 on which European governance is based is 
considered inaccessible to the understanding of citizens. Should the European citizen 
attempt to comprehend his/her citizenship, it would be necessary to search for its 
meaning scattered among the various ‘pillars’ where decisions proceed according to 
different processes. All of this results in a distorted approach towards the new 
relationship between citizens, rights, and obligations. Although the rights of common 
citizenship are enacted at the Community level, there remains uncertainty regarding 
obligations since they are distributed amongst all the Community’s institutions.
These structural obstacles provoke feelings of uncertainty in public opinion. 
From the citizen’s perspective, the fact that Euro-citizenship is a supra-national
36 The Treaty o f the European Union established a new organisation o f the European Union based on 
three pillars: the European Communities, a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Co-operation 
in the Fields o f Justice and Home Affairs. The First Pillar incorporated most of the EU’s policy 
responsibilities, including those concerning Citizenship in the Union. Immigration and Asylum were 
incorporated in the Third Pillar, which entailed co-operation only in areas o f ‘common interest’. The 
European Court o f Justice has no jurisdiction in this Pillar. At the administrative level, the 
mechanisms o f co-operation are headed by Article K.4 Co-ordinating Committee and, at the political 
level, by the Council o f Ministers meeting in the form o f the Justice and Home Affairs ministers. The 
Amsterdam Treaty establishes the transfer of immigration and Asylum policies from the Third to the 
First Pillar.
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institution rather than an intergovernmental one is beside the point. What really counts 
is the way that people perceive the practical implications of their new status. The 
rationale behind Euro-citizenship, moreover, cannot be divided and confined to various 
‘pillars’ but must be found in the European Union as a whole.
Proponents of the sceptical approach justified their attitude by emphasising one 
aspect of public understanding concerning the development of the institution. They 
suggested that young people would be slightly less enthusiastic about being European if 
they suddenly discovered that their future in Europe is to be determined by a large 
organisation in which they would have a little say. According to this perspective, 
Article 8 on Euro-citizenship was portrayed as ‘undemocratic’. The sceptics drew 
attention to paragraph 2 of Article 8a, which states that decisions regarding citizenship 
should be the purview of the Council of Ministers rather than national legislative bodies 
or the popular will. Although any decision of the Council of Ministers requires 
unanimous approval, the sceptical argument intimated that the Council acts in response 
to neither national legislatures nor the popular will. Instead, this argument encourages 
the public to believe that the power to legislate in matters of citizenship would rest 
entirely with the Commission, thus both demonstrating and inciting fears about the loss 
of power from the Parliament to Brussels.
Sceptics refer to the changing requirements for voting rights in domestic law as 
an example of the shift of power from national to supra-national institutions. This 
particularly affects the United Kingdom since residence no longer confers national 
political rights37. At the national level, the status of residence loses its original function
37 See Chapter 2 above.
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in conferring political rights while national citizenship is strengthened. This places 
greater emphasis on national citizenship for the exercise of voting rights.
The question concerning the political rights of legal residents in the UK gave 
rise to a whole series of related questions. How long must an individual reside in the 
UK before becoming eligible for legal resident status? Would there be any right to 
appeal if residence were refused? What would happen to a person denied the right of 
residence, given that there are no deportation rights under the prevailing provisions? 
These questions can be answered only if the issue of residence is justifiable by a citizen 
of Europe in exactly the same way as it is now under the domestic law of the UK.
It is in this respect that the Community level becomes significant for individual 
member states. Although the qualification for residence is a key element of Euro- 
citizenship, the definition of who is considered a legal resident still depends on national 
law. One of the most controversial issues concerns the residence qualifications for 
European citizenship. An answer to this question could probably give more significance 
to the Community level. What is clearly misinterpreted and left out is that Article 8 
carries with it an extension of possible ‘opportunities’ within the opportunity structure
of the EU. Neither the politics of assurance nor the politics of denial adequately
portrayed the positive consequences that this new institution entails. All of this may 
have affected public opinion in terms of confidence in the new Euro-polity.
4.3.2 Two paradigms of denial
a) The rejection of a new state
The sceptical discourse was built around the preconception that the only point in 
creating citizenship is to set up an obligation to a State. According to this approach, the
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introduction of Euro-citizenship implies the formation of a new State without public 
consent. The sceptics’ argument was punctuated by recurrent expressions of denial 
formulated in terms of imposition, subordination, conquest, and abuse. This approach 
implied two main forms of denial: (1) first, Euro-citizenship is rejected if it involves the 
formation of a new state, (2) secondly, Euro-citizenship is a vacuous concept if it does 
not relate to a state.
The lack of understanding that citizenship without a state is no longer 
meaningless attests to the failure to acknowledge all the possible implications that Euro- 
citizenship entails. Sceptics nevertheless portrayed Euro-citizenship as an imposition, 
declaring that it is ‘an insult to the concept of citizenship if people are obliged to have it 
whether or not they want it’38. The new institution was also seen in terms of 
subordination, since national citizenship would have been subordinated by Euro- 
citizenship. National citizenship, according to this view, is acquired primarily by virtue 
of birth, or else it is acquired by conscious and carefully considered application, which 
is the process of naturalisation. The acquisition of Euro-citizenship, by contrast, is 
compared to a process of conquest. The debate has even stressed ‘This is the manner in 
which citizenship has been traditionally imposed on those who did not wish to assume 
it voluntarily’39.
There are two main counter arguments against this view. Firstly, the acquisition 
of citizenship by birth can also be considered an imposition since one cannot 
voluntarily decide about it at the time of the birth. Secondly, naturalisation cannot be 
assumed to be an entirely voluntary decision when one has no other choice for
38 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993 ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 51, A. R. 
Marlow (Conservative Party).
39 House o f Commons, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, 1 February 1993, col. 52, A. Rowe, 
(Conservative Party).
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obtaining specific rights. It should be taken for granted, moreover, that the acquisition 
of Euro-citizenship also stems from birth since that the vast majority of citizens of the 
Union were bom within the European Community. This undermines the argument 
comparing Euro-citizenship to a citizenship imposed by ‘conquest’.
In general, those who are more sceptical towards Euro-citizenship believed that 
the introduction of Euro-citizenship would lead to abuses of British citizenship and that, 
to discourage such abuses, one must be careful about to whom one grants it.
‘The signatories o f the proposed treaty of the European Union are not 
careful. They think that they can bestow it on anybody, whether or not he or 
she wishes it, so long as the individual happens to hold citizenship o f a 
European Community country’40.
Criticism was directed at the fact that Euro-citizenship hinged upon national citizenship, 
which thus made national citizenship a means by which to gain supra-national 
citizenship in Europe. This lends greater weight to citizenship policies at the national 
level, resulting in a more protective attitude towards national citizenship. The problem 
here is that Euro-citizenship was conceptualised as having the same function as national 
citizenship and, as a consequence, it was assumed that the implications were also the 
same. Part of this discourse was directed against the traditional citizenship theory of the 
Left, which suggested a radically different vision of the relationship between the citizen 
and the state. Another problem involves terminology. Sceptics defined as ‘weasel 
words’, for example, the language used to encourage a feeling of involvement in 
European integration.
‘One signals one’s intention with weasel words, which can mean anything, 
so that people cannot say that they were not warned. We are warned that by 
European citizenship we will encourage a feeling o f involvement in 
European integration. In years to come people will say that they made it
40 House o f Commons, ‘European Communities (Amendment) B ill’, 1 February 1993, col. 51, J. A.
Wilkinson, (Conservative Party).
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clear that they wanted Euro-citizenship. No one can say that he was not 
warned that we were going down the path o f reducing our national rights 
and increasing our international burden, and changing the relationship 
between the British citizen and the Queen or British citizens and other 
citizens of the Euro-state’41.
The controversy had thus shifted towards the relationship between the individual and 
the state, and towards the question of jurisdiction in matters of citizenship. Sceptics 
argued that only the law of the state can determine citizenship policy and that 
citizenship sets up an obligation to the state. The rationale against the introduction of a 
new citizenship is thus based on concerns over the formation of a Euro-state.
‘The European state will be superior to the existing nation state. It will have 
the power to decide and to enforce rights and duties. Citizenship ought to 
indicate where ultimate power lies. Can the government put their hand on 
their heart and promise us that, if  Maastricht is ratified, the importance of  
British citizenship will not be progressively downgraded, that Euro- 
citizenship will not become more important?’42.
The real intention of the framers of the Treaty and its signatories is often emphasised.
‘It seems clear to me that the real intentions are to diminish the nation state 
and the concept o f national citizenship in favour of the Euro-state. If all that 
were wanted were reciprocal rights, there is no reason why they could not 
have been provided without the concept of citizenship’43.
The request for reciprocal rights, in other words, should not necessarily lead to the 
creation of a new citizenship.
b) Euro-citizenship as a vacuous concept
The second form of denial follows from the assurance that there is nothing in the Treaty 
to imply that the Union is taking on the essential attributes of statehood.
41 House of Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 76, Sir Ivan 
Lawrence (Conservative Party).
42 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’ col. 79, Sir Ivan 
Lawrance (Conservative Party).
43 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 75, Sir Ivan 
Lawrence (Conservative Party).
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‘The Union has no legal personality. It has to act through those o f its 
component parts which have a legal personality - the communities - 
whenever there is a question of giving rights enforceable in law’44.
This statement is a response to the liberal objection to the notion that citizenship 
requires a direct relationship between the individual and the state. This approach 
regards citizenship as an empty concept as long as it is not ‘a status defined in terms of 
rights and duties between the individual and the sate’ (Delanty, 1998: 353). If there is 
no Euro-state, Euro-citizenship is vacuous and therefore is meaningless. In this view, 
citizenship means something only in terms of a relationship that links the individual to 
the political structure in which he/she lives or by which he/she is governed.
The inadequacy of the Government’s response when asked simple questions 
about the significance of the creation of a new citizenship attested to the importance of 
identifying a new relationship that differed from that between the individual and the 
state, thereby giving substance to an otherwise vacuous concept. The political discourse 
embodied the conviction that Euro-citizenship as delineated in the Treaty is essentially 
indistinguishable from nationality as it applies to the nation state.
This observation was echoed in discussions concerning the possibility for a
citizen to opt out of European citizenship. The fact that an individual could not simply
reject Euro-citizenship became a very disputed point. The controversy is based on the
fact that there is no separate provision whereby a person can remain a United Kingdom
national but renounce citizenship of the European Union. Conversely, when someone
now wants to renounce his/her citizenship an additional consequence will follow, since
he or she will also lose European citizenship: ‘There is no process for renouncing
European citizenship, whereas a British citizen can renounce citizenship whenever he
44 House o f Commons ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill 1 February 1993, col. 80,
B.C.Gould (Labour Party).
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or she wishes’45. If a British citizen renounces his or her citizenship, it will have an 
impact on his or her citizenship under the Treaty. This crucial point also illustrates 
another important aspect of Euro-citizenship, which is to say that Euro-citizenship 
rights are added to birthrights and nationality rights acquired by naturalisation. It is thus 
impossible for a citizen to renounce Euro-citizenship without renouncing British 
birthrights or British nationality rights. In general terms, this means that the 
renunciation of national citizenship in any member state would also entail the 
renunciation of Euro-citizenship. In other words, with national citizenship goes the only 
right to claim Euro-citizenship. This illustrates the manner in which European 
citizenship and nationality are strictly linked. This process, typical of states such as Italy 
in which citizenship and nationality are interchangeable, now also involves those states 
such as the Untied Kingdom, in which citizenship and nationality are no longer 
separated.
The main criticism of this arrangement concerned the fact that the rights 
conferred by citizenship include the right to deny oneself citizenship, to renounce it. 
Instead, the only way in which a European national could renounce his European 
citizenship is to renounce the nationality acquired by birth or by naturalisation. 
According to this view, the Treaties should provide for renunciation of Euro- 
citizenship.
Another way to establish Euro-citizenship in such a way as to permit its 
renunciation would have been by some means independent of national citizenship in 
one of the member states. Euro-citizenship would have had its own status, independent
45 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993 ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, J.A. Wilkinson
(Conservative Party).
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of the nation-state to which each citizen belonged. As a consequence, however, Euro- 
citizenship would have assumed a character similar to the kind that those who oppose 
the Euro-citizenship are arguing against: the citizenship of an independent unit, the 
European Community.
It is illogical to demand that a citizen should be able to give up that citizenship 
when it must and should be entirely dependent upon his/her citizenship of another 
European Community country. The debate thus deviated from the central problem, 
which is not a matter of defining citizenship as dependent or independent from the 
national state but rather to acknowledge it in terms of new possibilities at the societal 
level. Moreover, as Delanty suggests, the emergence of a European citizenship leads to 
a new discourse different from the liberal-pluralist and the communitarian approaches. 
The new discourse should conceptualise Euro-citizenship beyond the nation-state and it 
should involve both the question of rights and the question of participation (1998). 
Figure 2. Summary of the Supportive and the Sceptical approach:
European Level:
Supportive approach
Euro-citizenship functional for the legitimisation of the EU/Symbolic function
Sceptical approach 
Preservation of nationality
National Level:
Supportive approach 
Right Left
Politics of assurance Symbolic function/ formal status
Sceptical Approach
Against the politics of assurance/ New duties will be attached 
Two paradigms:
1- Euro-citizenship is rejected if it does involve the formation of a new state
2- Euro-citizenship is a vacuous concept if it does not relate to the state
Chapter 4: Euro-citizenship in political debates 164
4.3.3 In addition to the politics of assurance
The definition of citizenship as part of the relationship between the individual and the 
state is no longer appropriate as far as the relationship established by Euro-citizenship is 
concerned. Some important observations dealt with examples of the creation of. 
citizenship in the absence of a state. In political debates, it was pointed out that 
Commonwealth citizenship indeed creates type of citizenship that goes beyond that of 
the nation state46. In addition, the Government’s efforts to preserve national sovereignty 
have been undermined by the supra-national reach of the European Court of Justice. For 
example, a person can use the fact that he/she owes a superior duty and allegiance to the 
European Union as his/her defence in cases where the issue of citizenship is critical. If 
conflict arises between national and Community law, the European Court of Justice 
would find in favour of Community law. This gave rise to a further criticism against the 
supra-national responsibilities held by European institutions. The fact that the European 
Court of Justice will have superior jurisdiction in some cases became a highly 
controversial point: ‘We can be perfectly sure that what is and what is not a duty will be 
interpreted not by a British court but by the European Court of Justice’47.
It is worth highlighting two points: firstly, the European Union defined in the 
Treaty has a legal reality, and this undermines the Government’s discourse of 
assurance; secondly, citizenship envisaged by the Treaty does not have a centralising 
function, which effectively weakens the argument against the introduction of Euro- 
citizenship. Citizenship of the European Union is undoubtedly a new concept and 
opponents criticised not the lack of substance in the Treaty but its institution. It was the
46 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993 ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 46, J.D. 
Fraser (Labour Party).
47 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993 ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 67, Sir Ivan 
Lawrence (Conservative).
Chapter 4: Euro-citizenship in political debates 165
matter of subordination that was contested. Opponents feared that citizenship in the 
member state would be subordinated to Euro-citizenship. In point of fact, those who 
supported the institution of European citizenship thought of it as ‘a great proposition 
and that the United Kingdom, as one of the contracting parties, is a subordinate 
constituent of what the contracting parties are forming: the union of Europe. This means 
that the United Kingdom must of itself be subordinate’48.
Attacking the concept of European citizenship simply on the basis of 
safeguarding the nation state is not satisfactory if one views the nation state as a 
relatively modem phenomenon. Moreover, it is a contradiction to insist on retaining full 
British sovereignty while benefiting from European economic liberalisation. This 
process deprives the Community's citizens of both the social and political dimension of 
participation in European decision-making. The significant feature of this new process 
is that it is not the relationship between individual and state that changes but rather the 
function of certain rights that link an individual to the state. More broadly, the political 
debate also fails to acknowledge that political rights are now losing their importance as 
part of a relationship with a superior body of law and a wider geographical entity. What 
seems to be more important in comparing national and Euro-citizenship is to examine 
whether the latter embodies the practical values embodied in the concept of citizenship 
in general.
One of the main problems, or fortunes, with Euro-citizenship is that it is granted 
under an exceptional governmental system, without a written constitution. Under this 
system, citizenship rights are not clearly defined in all the Community’s institutions.
48 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Communities (Amendment) Bill’, col. 107, Robert
MacLennan (Liberal-Democratic Party).
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For the most part, this is not a real problem at the European level since the Treaty 
leaves plenty of room for change and evolution. It does present a problem at the 
national level, however, where Euro-citizenship is sometimes seen as a challenge to the 
traditional idea of national citizenship, precipitating a defensive reaction that reinforces 
the national definition.
Conclusion
The political conceptualisation of the new idea of citizenship is very controversial; 
strategies of both support and denial presume a certain degree of gullibility among the 
public. The contradictory nature of Euro-citizenship no doubt encourages such 
approaches. The existence of concrete obstacles to the establishment of Euro- 
citizenship also lends greater legitimacy to objections.
This chapter explored the challenge posed by the construction of a European 
citizenship to the supremacy of national sovereignty and identity’s supremacy. Efforts 
to construct both a new European polity and a European identity are hindered by 
disunity within the European political elite, which is split between inter-govemmentalist 
and supra-nationalist supporters who have opposing prescriptions for the future of the 
European project. For the UK, one of the main difficulties at the national level consists 
in internalising notions of Europe into their own identity constructions and considering 
other member states as ‘us’ rather than as ‘others’ whilst preserving the peculiarity of 
their nationality.
The European Union serves as the medium for individual autonomy, though 
mediation between citizens and the state occurs more through the politics of the market 
than the politics of citizenship. The anticipated economic benefits of European
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integration may provide sufficient impetus for the formation of a stronger, more 
overarching sense of European identity. Neither debate deeply considers that the 
construction of a supra-national sphere for economic activity requires the same 
development for the rights of individuals. The whole European project is threatened to 
be undermined if it cannot find expression and meaning at a grassroots social level 
across the community. The problematic inter-institutional relationship delays the 
creation of a closer relationship between citizens and the Euro-polity and this is the 
central argument of the sceptical approach against Euro-citizenship.
The pro-citizenship argument is based on the ‘politics of assurance’ at both 
levels with little attention paid to the evolution of the different functions that Euro- 
citizenship could perform. This approach seeks to achieve public consent for Euro- 
citizenship and, through the politics of the market, solutions for common problems. 
Though the debates give a certain relevance to social rights as pivotal elements of Euro- 
citizenship, they fail to describe them as the means to perceive new societal 
relationships.
Discussions about Euro-citizenship are inspiring alternative modes of social 
organisation without necessarily implying the end of the nation-state. The extent to 
which Euro-citizenship influences society beyond the domain of the nation-state is still 
very limited. As these new ideas circulate among the political elite, the elite are 
encouraged to alter their own identity and interest constructions. Euro-citizenship thus 
increasingly becomes functional to legitimise the new order and to internalise notions of 
Europe into the identity of each member state. In the struggle between liberal and 
communitarian attitudes towards Europe, however, a multi-layered form of political 
community would better reflect the multiple identities of EU citizens.
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Introduction
This chapter analyses political debates on the integration of immigrants at the European 
and national levels. The process of integration is multi-faceted, but this chapter 
identifies three main spheres: cultural-national, trans-national, and eurocentric. All 
these spheres are interrelated and changes at the European Union level will affect the 
national level through new institutional practices. Although the thrust of European 
legislation has been to dismantle political boundaries within the Union, this conflicts 
with the natural impulse of the nation state to maintain control of rights of entry into the 
territory and to deny entry to individuals who are perceived to be undesirable. This 
chapter also examines the conceptualisation of the category of ‘them’ in the political 
discourse and as revealed through common practices. It also considers whether the 
integration of immigrants can be achieved in the absence of the formal acquisition of 
citizenship.
5.1 The integration practices: a general approach
The processes of social and political integration for immigrants, which are distinct from 
those concerning acceptance and assimilation, rely mainly on the reorganisation of the 
societal system. Any change in the societal system affects the relationship between 
citizens and the state in terms of both citizens’ priorities and their political 
representation. The context of the new societal system in which those who are 
considered European citizens dwell can be divided into three main spheres, identified 
above, and each of these spheres involves a different level of integration.
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The first of these three main spheres, the cultural-national sphere, is the sphere 
in which political rights play a central role in the mechanism of integration, and it is 
possible to define integration at this level as settled integration. The trans-national 
sphere involves economic rights enjoyed by residents who are usually but not 
necessarily citizens. At this level, foreigners can remain members of the political 
system of their nation-state of origin yet become members in the economic or 
educational systems in their host country. Here, residence rights are not related to 
membership in the political system. I define this a transient integration. In this sphere, 
according to Brubaker, ‘citizenship status is no longer the axis of routine exclusion’. 
This sphere provides a temporary model of integration and it ‘no longer matters to the 
state whether or not immigrants have citizenship’ (Brubaker, 1992: 182). This is better 
explained by the fact that political representation in a trans-national context loses its 
primary function. The last of the three main spheres is the eurocentric sphere which 
represents a level of integration in which social rights, particularly the right to work and 
residence rights, are the major forms of inclusion for both citizens and non-citizens.
It is possible to discern a level of interaction among these three spheres. For 
instance, the eurocentric sphere constitutes a point of departure from national 
sovereignty, which is to say the cultural-national sphere through institutional practices. 
This could happen, for example, if the Union were to implement new common social 
policies in fields like social relations, education and, most importantly, immigration 
policy. This process has been defined as the communitising project through which the 
relationship between the citizen and the nation-state changes1. This not only creates 
conditions that allow movement across the spheres but it also signals an important
1 For further explanation on the Communitising project see section 5.1.2 below.
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change in values and priorities that arise any time new possibilities are developed. In 
short, by breaking the traditional structure that binds the individual to the nation-state, 
the European Union is setting up a social context in which the mechanisms of inclusion 
need to allow for avenues of participation, that occur through something other than 
political rights. The difference between the eurocentric and the cultural-national sphere 
is that in the former individuals are now actively involved in democratic legitimisation 
as members of society rather than of the polity (Baubock, 1994).
In the cultural-national sphere, only a selected number of foreigners are eligible 
to undergo the process of naturalisation under the condition that they transfer their 
political loyalty to the political community of the host nation-state. Residence, on the 
other hand, is granted when inclusion in the community by means of something other 
than the political rights is deemed desirable or unavoidable. This has two consequences. 
First, it encourages supra-national migration regimes to regulate the discriminating 
effects of the nation-state’s segmentation of the policy system (Soysal, 1994). Secondly, 
the discrepancy between citizenship and residence may spark domestic conflict over the 
criteria and procedures for excluding or including persons in the social systems of a 
particular nation-state. As Brubaker reminds us, ‘citizenship is a decisive instrument of 
closure’ (1992: 181). Migration can fuel conflict in nation-states as long as the 
universalist inclusiveness of the political system is mediated by the societal organisation 
of nation-states. The classification of non-citizens can be drawn simply by using the 
opposite definition of the statute that defines the citizen within national boundaries. 
Non-citizens for the most part can be defined as all foreigners outside the country, but 
especially those foreigners outside the country seeking to come in; those who are in the
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country as permanent residents; those in the country whose residence is temporary; and 
those who are seeking recognition as refugees.
Within the eurocentric sphere, the introduction of Euro-citizenship.has given 
member states a more homogeneous definition of the status of the non-citizen: those 
who are not nationals of a member state. Such a definition is nevertheless inconsistent 
with the recognition of different legal categories that still define the status of national 
citizenship. Definitions of citizen and non-citizen are therefore strictly related and they 
both refer to the same sphere of action. Non-citizens, if included, will belong only 
partially to the cultural-national sphere if not they are considered outsiders. This 
implies that they are excluded from both the communitising project conceptualised at 
parliamentary level and democratic legitimisation through membership in the new 
societal system.
Based on these preliminary remarks, the study of the formation of the typology 
of ‘them’ relates to three main political attitudes: (1) partial integration, (2) 
representation, and (3) exclusion. The formation of the typology of ‘them’, by 
extension, also permits the formation of the opposite typology, that of ‘us’. Although 
political rights are no longer the only means of achieving a significant level of 
integration, the advocacy of non-citizens’ rights in the political arena is still the first 
step towards the integration of non-citizens.
The fundamental variables for the social integration of non-citizens at the 
European level are the right to work and residence rights. This is because, these two 
rights are closely linked in any consideration of social policy on immigrants, the right to 
reside is linked to the purpose of the stay, which in most cases depends on a work
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permit. In this manner, employment itself becomes a major form of participation and 
inclusion2.
The extremely incoherent policy of European Union countries leaves doubt over 
the real and substantial model of European social integration. The lack of adequate 
solutions related to practical and very real problems relegates immigrants to a status 
lacking substantive rights. The concept of legality varies across member states and even 
assumes a new meaning in the European Union scenario. An immigrant can be legal in 
one European Union country and illegal in another. This is owing to the intricate nature 
of immigration law in each of the member states, which makes it impossible for an 
individual subject to immigration control to move confidently in the new frontier-free 
Europe. People who are lawfully resident in one of the member states could be 
excluded from the benefits of the new European order. Without the same rights as 
citizens of the Union, third country nationals, including those who lawfully reside in 
one of the member states, will inevitably suffer discrimination.
As has already been noted, an expanded naturalisation policy is in itself not the 
answer, though naturalisation is often presented as the only alternative. It is unlikely, 
however, that member states will happily renounce their rights to determine their own 
criteria for nationality or citizenship. This is evident, for example, in the difficulties 
experienced in negotiating shared external frontiers and common visa policies. By the 
same token, for a variety of reasons, not all of those settled within the European Union 
wish to acquire the status of citizen. As the majority of third country nationals are from
2 Although Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948) states that everyone has a 
right to work, few Western nations have incorporated this right into their constitution. This is particularly 
the case for foreign citizens exploited on the black market, which is useful to capitalism but contrary to 
any form of social integration.
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visible ethnic minorities, moreover, the spectre of racial discrimination will be raised 
specifically at the national level.
5.1.1 Representation and integration practices.
In the political debates at the European level, many European institutional proposals 
towards equal treatment of lawfully resident third country nationals have encountered 
serious obstacles. Political debates can be considered institutional practices of 
representation functional to the process of social integration and in which rights are 
conceptualised. The political barriers at the national, sub-national, and, consequently, at 
the European level prevent any concrete progress. The mechanism of representation 
should not simply convert what it perceives to be the desires of its constituents into 
specific policies and goals. They should also constitute a suitable channel through 
which immigrants can direct their concerns since they have no voice in the political 
process except for the voices of those few who speak on their behalf in the hill 
knowledge that their political advocacy will not translate into votes at election time.
The process of representation is functional in exerting both social influence to 
affect ‘public’ attitudes and legal control, which has a direct effect on immigrants’ 
rights. Political parties and interest groups are the intermediaries between citizens and 
government. It is obvious that this relationship excludes immigrants from being 
represented since they are not political constituents in the fullest sense3. International 
obligations and the indirect effect of the debates on good race relations can constitute 
the only means by which their interests can be voiced. Even at the sub-national or local
3 In saying that ‘immigrants are not political constituents’ I am referring to the fact that legal
immigrants who are not citizens are ineligible to vote in national elections.
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level where they might have more rights, the pressure they are able to exert on the 
decision-making process will be too weak usually to engender significant change. 
Representation at the European Union level, moreover, still hinges on national 
government policies since immigration is still under the jurisdiction of each individual 
member state. In this scenario, the only solution would be to establish a system whereby 
immigrants’ rights must be claimed at Community level.
This point was developed by the Green Group’s report on the ‘Status of third- 
country nationals in the EU’. This report highlighted the importance of the right of 
abode, the right to work, and the right to education. The right of abode was claimed as 
fundamental: ‘immigrants should be housed in a way that creates balance within a 
quarter’4, or in other words not in ghettos. In fact, access to decent housing is another 
factor in integration. Interestingly, the report also suggested that immigrants’ rights 
ought to be governed and represented at the Community level. This would necessarily 
involve the implementation of a legal framework that guarantees fundamental rights 
and equal opportunity. The main problem, therefore, concerns not so much immigrants’ 
access to basic rights in their place of residence but whether any practical system of 
representation can be achieved.
The role played by supra-national institutions in providing immigrants with 
access to rights at the Community level is crucial. The role of national parliaments, 
moreover, should be essentially indirect5. In 1994, a Communication from the 
Commission on Immigration and Asylum Policy expressed concerns about the 
strengthening of integration policies for the benefit of the 10 million third country
4 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994, ‘Status o f third-country nationals in the EU’.
5 With the Amsterdam Treaty national parliaments have been denied any direct involvement in die 
legislative procedures o f the European Parliament.
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nationals who are legally resident in the Community. The Communication was meant to 
reflect concerns that had been aired in the European Parliament on many occasions. 
Some of the priorities that have surfaced in parliamentary debates nevertheless seem to 
have been ignored in the Communication. For instance, the EP called for separate rights 
on immigrants and refugees in addition to the right of asylum while the Commission’s 
Communication contained no real proposal on this matter. The proposal from the 
Commission, instead, basically aimed to reject the idea of a segmented society and 
favoured taking steps that would have gone further towards assimilating the rights of 
third-country nationals with those of citizens of member states6. The Commission has 
presented a report to the Council on this plan and a new set of initiatives was proposed. 
These initiatives concerned rules for immigration and residence permits, including 
measures to facilitate family reunification; review of the rights and obligations of legal 
immigrants in the Union (this covers work permits, basic security, education of children 
and so forth); and temporary residence permits for refugees and displaced persons.
The Communication promised that ‘things are going to change’, but the main 
thrust of criticism over the Communication casts doubts on the prospects for significant 
change while complaining that the Council of Ministers7 acts as if the Maastricht Treaty 
did not exist as far as the Third Pillar is concerned8. One of the paradoxes of the 
Maastricht Treaty lies in the fact matters relating to the Third Pillar, which most often
6 O J., No. 3-477, ‘Immigration and Asylum Policy’, 19 April 1994.
7 The Council o f Ministers is the main inter-governmental institution at European Union level.
8 In the Maastricht Treaty ‘immigration policy’ is included in the ‘Third Pillar’ in which the European 
Commission, the Parliament and the European Court of Justice have no jurisdiction. Therefore, decisions 
are taken at intergovernmental level and Member States have strong influence in the process of decision 
making.
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directly concern the fundamental rights of citizens, were matters in which intervention 
by the European Parliament was minimal9.
As has already been noted, the Amsterdam Treaty attempted to change the 
existing scheme by re-addressing Parliament’s position in several respects though the 
EP still lacks legislative initiative or full legislative power10. For the first five years 
after the Treaty of Amsterdam’s entry into force, moreover, the policy areas 
transferred from the Third to the Community Pillar will be only partly under the 
Community umbrella. This is because the Commission continues to share its right of 
initiative with the member states, Council decisions still have to be unanimous, and 
the European Parliament still is not directly involved in decision-making but is 
simply consulted. The purview of the EP is still very limited while the European 
Court of Justice has become involved in co-operation in the Third Pillar on a wider 
scale11.
The debates on refugees in particular and the status of third-country nationals in 
the EU illustrate the manner in which politicians think in tackling the problem of 
immigrants, immigration, and political asylum in relation to EU citizens’ interests. 
These debates divert attention from a fundamental aspect of the issue because they 
focus more on the deportation of immigrants and the destination for deportation rather 
than the means by which immigrants might be integrated. On this matter the
9 Although the Maastricht Treaty stated that the Parliament should be consulted by the Council on all 
matters, it is usually informed after the event and is therefore unable to express an opinion on 
discussions while they are taking place. It is worth mentioning that Article K9 o f Title VI o f the 
Maastricht Treaty provided the possibility for shifting the decision-making process from the Third 
Pillar to the First Pillar. This constituted an open door for shifting some policy areas such as asylum 
and immigration policy into the Community Pillar in the following Treaty (Amsterdam).
10 See chapter 4 above.
11 In particular, The Amsterdam Treaty gave the European Court o f Justice is powers to settle disputes 
between member states on Third Pillar issues. The Austrian government then appealed to the ECJ in its 
new capacity for a clarification of its powers governing visas.
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Commission has been accused of supporting the behaviour of member states, which 
have adopted a policy of ‘passing the buck’, often to other nearby member states or 
states slated for entry into the EU. Some member states are indeed seen as ‘dumping 
asylum seekers and immigrants in their neighbours’ back gardens’12. For instance, 
Germany has been accused of shifting much of its responsibility on to the shoulders of 
its eastern and northern neighbours13.
What is visible in the political discussions is that the populist policy was aimed 
more at reassuring public opinion than proposing a real policy on this issue: ‘we must 
be able to show that we take people’s worries and questions seriously’14. Additional 
requests to strengthen integration policies for legal immigrant workers and their
families in Europe and to illustrate more clearly the contribution that immigrant 
workers and ethnic communities make to the economy of Europe are often reiterated. 
Such efforts could go a considerable distance towards xenophobic stirrings of an 
increasing proportion of the population, but it is still far from sufficient to transform the 
objective of full or nearly full integration into practice.
A significant comment comes from Lelio Lagorio of the Socialist Group, who 
firmly criticised the Council and the Commission for still being far too reluctant in this 
area:
12 O.J., No. 3-477, 19 April 1994, ‘Immigration and Asylum Policy’, M.M. Van den Brink (The 
Netherlands, Labour Party), Party o f European Socialist Group. Further details regarding European 
parliamentarians are listed below in Appendix 1.
13 This particular reference concerns the roughly contemporary deportation o f Kurds to Turkey on the 
pretext that they had committed a criminal offence in Turkey where torture awaited them in spite of 
promises to the contrary. For instance a couple deported on 6 April 1994 were met by the police on their 
arrival in Istanbul and tortured for three days. It is worth noting that the attitude adopted by Germany has 
placed greater pressure on other present or future member states to accept Kurdish immigrants and 
refugees.
14 O.J., No. 4-467, 20 September 1995, ‘Immigration and Asylum’, A. Gradin (Sweden), EC 
Commissioner for Immigration and Home and Legal Affairs.
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‘Even the Maastricht Treaty seems to have been written by Pontius Pilate on 
this point: it is right to establish the principle according to which Europe 
must not now build a wall to keep foreigners out, but organise itself better to 
enable Europeans and foreigners to live and live together. We are aware that 
there are many problems which arise because people are not prepared to 
face up to the many implications of a multi-racial society’15.
It seems that this Communication, like many others before it, possesses a global 
approach that does not even exist for Community nationals. Their rights and obligations 
continue to depend on their status as citizens of the member states. At the very least, the 
same process on which the rights of community nationals are based should also apply to 
legal immigrants, which would no doubt affect their integration in the EU.
5.1.2 The communitising project and exclusion
In European political debates following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the so- 
called communitizing project was introduced. This not only placed immigration policy 
under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice but it also gave member states 
less power in this matter16. Moreover, the communitizing project is concerned with ‘the 
people’s Europe’, removed from the inter-governmental province or cultural-national 
sphere.
Importantly, the communitizing project sought to co-ordinate policies at the 
European level concerning Euro-citizenship on the one hand and immigration on the 
other. In other words, the project followed the logic that Europe would be able to deal 
successfully with the new challenges posed by immigration and asylum only if it 
adopted a consistent common strategy of inclusion and exclusion. The harmonisation of
15 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994, ‘Status of the third-country nationals in the EU’ Lelio Lagorio (Italy).
16 This discussion has had its effect in the Amsterdam Treaty. See the preceding chapter for more 
clarification on the so-called ‘Pillar structure’ o f the Maastricht Treaty.
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the various national attitude towards immigrants that this would entail also leads to a 
definition of the category of ‘them’:
‘As we move towards the goal of the free movement of persons we have to 
overcome the temptation to go it alone that we see re-emerging in the 
various countries of the Union, persuaded that they can form an enclave 
more impenetrable than their neighbour. We need a genuine culture of 
conversion’17<
One of the issues reiterated in the debate was that Euro-citizenship will never be fully 
exercised as long as the problem of immigration is not tackled. This is because 
immigration not only challenges citizenship rights but emphasises them. The issue of 
immigration thus requires the same attention at the European level as efforts to arrive at 
a new definition of citizenship. Immigrants should be able to claim their rights at the 
European level, which would reduce or eliminate problems relating to naturalisation 
and changing nationality in cases in which dual citizenship is not allowed.
With regards to naturalisation, right-wing members of the EP have tried to 
dominate the debate on ‘granting rights’ by stating that third-country nationals are 
citizens who do not wish to become naturalised citizens of the Union:
‘Immigrants specifically wish to retain their status as third-country 
nationals, and this is the reason why they cannot be accorded the right to 
vote without restriction. They cannot have dual nationality nor can they 
enjoy the same constitutional rights, the right to suitable accommodation.
This would be a slap in the face for citizens of the Union’18
The evident discrimination used in these words was justified by the fact that third- 
country nationals did not wish to be completely identified with the Community or be 
fully integrated. The question, here, concerns the degree to which certain politicians can 
be so sure of what third-country nationals really desire since they never refer in these
17 O.J., No. 4-467, 20 September 1995, ‘Immigration and Asylum’, G. D ’Andrea (Italy, Partito Popolare 
Italiano), European People’s Party.
18 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994, ‘Status of third-country nationals in the EU’, K. C. Dillen (Belgium, 
Flemish Bloc), Technical Group o f the European Right.
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debates to data that attest to immigrants’ personal concerns. It seems that such attitudes 
shift the substantial essence of the problem. Moreover, the right-wing defence of the 
constitutional character of the Union is politically inconsistent with aversion towards 
Euro-citizenship among members of the same camp19.
The process of social integration within the Union must rely on the 
establishment of a common legal status for EU citizens on the one hand and for third- 
country nationals on the other, but there can be no legal status for third-country 
nationals in the absence of a Community policy on them similar to the policy that exist 
for EU citizens. The creation of a common legal status for third-country nationals 
would substantiate the legal standing of those residing permanently and working legally 
in the Union.
5.1.3 The significance of public opinion for the political debate
The message conveyed to the public in this debate with respect to immigration 
and immigrants’ rights can be considered in terms of its significance for promoting 
either social inclusion or exclusion. The message speaks volumes about the manner in 
which immigrants are considered in the political debate and the way in which their 
rights are conceptualised. For example, some political groups have referred to 
immigrants not just as transients, here only to work, but as people who have taken up 
residence, who wish to participate in the life of the Community, and who make an 
investment in their respective host society:
‘You cannot send out a message that actually we do not want any 
foreigners. I am alluding to the measure for deporting fellow-citizens 
legally residing in the Community who give a night’s lodging to an illegal
19 See Chapter 4 above.
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immigrant, and to the great concern you then show about the increasing 
violence against foreigners’20.
The denunciation of anyone that tends to place a permanent and systematic suspicion of 
guilt on every immigrant was explained in terms of a ‘negative message’. What 
emerges from the political debate is that only citizens of the member states are 
considered in the process of democratic legitimisation through membership of the Euro- 
polity. This point is consistent with Arendt’s strict division between the polity as the 
sphere of equality and society as that of discrimination (Arendt, 1958). Immigrants do 
not belong to the former and indirect discrimination against them can easily be 
rationalised in the latter. This difference was expressed in the debate in the support of 
Christian Democrats for third-country nationals resident in the Union to have the right 
to travel freely throughout. The Christian Democrats nevertheless sought to preserve 
differences mainly in the area of civil rights between citizens of member states and 
third-country nationals in the Community: ‘We reject the proposal of according [legal 
immigrants] the same civil rights as citizens of the Union’21. Like citizenship, Euro- 
citizenship accomplishes exclusive functions by denying the principle of equality to 
non-EC citizens.
Although residence rights reduce the differences between citizens and non­
citizens, they concern a different system of action. Residence rights do not empower 
individuals to ‘express consent or dissent in a way that has an impact on collectively 
binding decisions’ (Baubock, 1994: 224). This has already been discussed in relation to 
national legislation in which the status of semi-citizenship can be partially inclusive but
20 O.J., No. 3-433, 14 July 1993, ‘Free movement o f persons and immigration’ N. Mebrak Zaidi 
(France, Socialist Party), Party of European Socialist Group.
21 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994, ‘Status o f third-Country Nationals in the EU’, G. Jarzembowski 
(Germany, Christian Democratic Union), European People’s Party.
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does not allow for meaningful expressions of consent or dissent22. The proposal at the 
European parliamentary level was mainly to create a legal status of resident and to 
recognise the fact of their presence by issuing them with ‘a resident’s card that will 
allow them to move freely within European territory and have the opportunity to live 
and work here’23. This approach does not address questions of membership but only 
guarantees the allocation of functional rights. The option of citizenship should follow 
residence rights and immigrants should be free to decline (Carens, 1989).
Proposals advocating a policy of inclusion have nevertheless precipitated some 
extreme reactions. This is probably because residence rights do not require residents to 
show that they have in some way been integrated into the cultural practices of the 
society. In other words, these rights may be detached from any form of belonging to the 
host society. The development of a two-tier system of membership (citizen/resident) 
excludes all non-citizens from any of the special benefits of citizenship, that is, unless 
they take steps to be involved in the social life of the community as good citizens. As a 
consequence, the only suitable alternative to the model of citizenship is the 
discretionary model of naturalisation. A more drastic response came from some of the 
most extreme right-wing parliamentarians:
‘we demand that there should not be new aids to immigration but that long­
term unemployed foreigners be gradually returned to their countries of 
origin. That is neither inhumane nor xenophobic, as inevitably assumed by 
the left-wing extremists, but shows a responsible attitude to our citizens 
whom we represent’24.
22 See chapter 2 above.
23 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994, ‘Status o f third-country nationals in the EU’, D. Tazdavit (France), 
Green European Party.
24 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994, ‘Status o f third-country nationals in the EU’, K. P. Kohler 
(Germany, The Republicans), Technical Group o f the European Right.
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In accordance with this view, other responses sought to manipulate public concern to 
gain support for rejecting any form of inclusion:
‘Our concern must be primarily for the benefit of our people. This 
preference for our own nation, for putting our own people first has nothing 
to do with chauvinism, imperialism and marginalizing foreigners’25.
Right-wing responses also accused those who encourage immigration of being 
promoters of unemployment, as if immigrants were the main cause of unemployment:
‘those who wish to encourage further immigration are at the same time 
promoting mass unemployment in Europe. It is a significant slap in the face 
for national citizens who have themselves to fear for their jobs and are 
threatened by job cuts and unemployment’26.
Although these examples are probably too extreme and represent more the far-right, 
they nevertheless correctly portray the European debate on immigration generally as 
focused almost exclusively on control measures. An approach of this kind risks 
addressing the ‘symptoms’ of the problem but not its causes. It also sway public 
opinion through arguments that appeal more to the emotions and to fears about the 
impact of immigration on employment opportunities, job security, and cultural identity. 
The transformation of these debates into law, whether partly or wholly, perpetuates and 
even strengthens their effect on public opinion. The adoption of restrictive legal 
measures on immigrants convinces large segments of the public to condone the 
underlying reasoning of these measures. In popular belief, if it is law it must be right.
5.2 The representation of immigrants’ rights at national level: the case of the 
United Kingdom
The political debate on immigrants’ rights at national level concerned the issue of non- 
EU citizens mainly in relation to voting rights and freedom from discrimination. These
25 O.J., No. 3-441, 8 January 1994 ‘Status of Third Country Nationals in the EU’, K. C. Dillen 
(Belgium, Flemish Bloc), Technical Group o f the European Right.
26 K.P.Kohler see above.
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two issues were considered important components of Euro-citizenship. It was argued 
that Euro-citizenship could not be fully accomplished if  it did not embody a real device 
for the elimination of discrimination throughout the Community. Moreover, it was 
voiced that the Maastricht Treaty did not deal with the problem of granting political 
rights to non-EU citizens at European level. ‘Such people are very much second-class 
citizens and will remain so in the European Union envisaged by Maastricht. Should not 
the issue be dealt with, as it involves the civil rights of people throughout the world?’27.
The discussion about voting rights in relation to non-EU citizens emphasised 
the difference between residence and citizenship. Residents are afforded limited local 
voting rights while citizens enjoy full national voting rights. Local voting rights have 
been defended or proposed ‘with the argument that municipalities, in contrast with 
national parliaments, do not exercise legislative functions’ (Baubock, 1994:223). In this 
way both EU citizens living outside their country of origin and non-EU citizens are cut 
off from national consent in legislation and government. The only difference is that EU 
citizens can participate in European elections. The arrangement nevertheless results in 
‘second-rate’ political participation and deliberation at national level for many EU 
citizens, and the complete exclusion of non-EU citizens from any relationship with the 
European and national polities.
Even at the national level, the distance of European institutions from the 
concerns of a large segment of the European population was expressed by the Left in 
terms of the inadequacy of the Treaty in dealing with immigrants’ integration:
‘Do not the Maastricht Treaty and the whole thrust of European thinking 
and legislation completely ignore the political rights of fifteen million 
people who live and work on the continent of Europe, many of whom are
27 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, European Community (Amendment) B ill’, J. Corbyn (Labour
Party). Further details regarding UK parliamentarians are listed below in Appendix 2.
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refused nationality in their own countries? None of the legislation is 
addressed to them’28.
The political discourse also emphasised that EU citizens living outside their country of 
origin and non-EU citizens were treated in the same way in relation to national 
elections. Those who take up long-standing residence in the UK and feel themselves to 
be deprived of the right to vote in general elections are nevertheless afforded the 
perfectly straightforward choice to apply for British naturalisation29. This solution is 
obviously not easy to realise in practice. The requirements for naturalisation are heavily 
biased against individuals whose choice is restricted to one between the country of 
origin and that of present residence30. In the end, the decision falls upon the state to 
grant admission rather than upon the applicant simply to choose a new membership. As
Clarke and others have noted, ‘a large degree of discretion lies with the naturalising 
authorities’ (1998: 49).
Naturalisation remains, in the end, the only available means by which to achieve 
formal social and political integration. It is important to add, however, that the 
acquisition of citizenship by immigrants in their host countries does not automatically 
guarantee that they are liberated from any kind of discrimination (Clarke, at al., 1998: 
66). While naturalisation encourages integration, it does not necessarily secure it, and
28 House o f Commons, 1 February 1993, ‘European Community (Amendment) B ill’, J. Corbyn 
(Labour Party).
29 This can be generalised to all other European Union countries in which voting rights are still 
attached to formal citizenship (Baubock, 1994). In the case o f the UK, it becomes more relevant if one 
considers that residence rights offer any longer means for obtaining national (British) voting rights. This is 
discussed above in chapter 4.
30 It needs to be emphasised that the policy o f dual nationality does not depend only on the country o f  
acceptance but also on the country of origin. Even if  the country o f acceptance permits dual 
nationality the country of origin might forbid the holding o f another nationality alongside its own. A 
growing number o f European states nevertheless now accept a policy that permits dual nationality. 
Such a policy was formally accepted in the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland in 1992. Dual 
nationality is also allowed in Belgium, France Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In Germany, dual 
citizenship is permitted when naturalisation occurs through marriage. In the remaining contries, 
renunciation o f former citizenship is either compulsory or usual (Clarke, et al., 1998: 50).
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indeed the process of integration is very different from naturalisation. Even after a 
considerable degree of integration has been achieved, moreover, naturalised members 
of the community are still subject to forms of discrimination.
At present, citizenship serves as a device by which to identify those who should 
be allocated a package of entitlements, though without more detailed inquiry into 
whether a particular entitlement is required in a particular situation. Citizenship 
guarantees, among other things, both the right to vote and the right to enter and remain 
in the country. How can one dispense with the need for having such a status in the first 
place? There are two alternatives: The first involves separating the component parts of 
this package and determining the allocation of each entitlement according to its merits. 
The answer to the question of who should have the right to vote, in other words, might 
be different from that given to the question who should have the right to remain in the 
country. Another alternative involves grounding the right to vote on stable residency 
rather than on national citizenship31. By using the concept of equality as the grounds for 
distribution, we can dispense with the notion of citizenship, which as a legal device to 
determine the manner in which entitlements should be allocated, conflicts with a 
commitment to equality at both the national and European levels.
5.2.1 The politics of ethno-national exclusion in the UK
By focusing on the case of the United Kingdom it is possible to show the manner in 
which legal practices at the national level differ from political objectives that are 
emphasised in the parliamentary debate at the national and European levels. It 
emphasises the national politics of exclusion and inclusion in the United Kingdom
31 Brewin suggests a similar solution but only in relation to European elections (1997: 224).
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through the parliamentary debates that anticipated the introduction of the Asylum and 
Immigration Bill of 1996. This illustrates the ways in which immigrants are dealt with 
on the cultural-national level and in which the mechanisms of integration are often 
closed to immigrants within national borders.
The issues on residence and naturalisation seem to be less problematic than the 
matter of the right of entry into the host country. At the cultural-national level, citizens 
can influence political representations in politicians’ response to and sometimes 
exploitation of their constituents’ requests. As political representations are transformed 
into legislation they produce both legal effect on immigrants’ integration and a social 
effect on public attitudes32. The Asylum and Immigration Bill of 199633 is a clear 
example of how the issue of integration was neglected in the main aims of the 
Government. Instead three most important objectives of the Bill were punitive in intent. 
The Bill strengthened the asylum procedure so that bogus claims and appeals could be 
dealt with more quickly, combated racketeering through stronger powers, new offences, 
and higher penalties, and reduced the economic incentives that attracted people to come 
to the United Kingdom in breach of the immigration laws.
This action was mainly justified by popular resentment towards those who 
abused the previous claimant procedures. The Home Secretary stated that the ‘Bill was 
a firm commitment to maintaining a tolerant society in which the diverse cultures and 
backgrounds of those who are lawfully present in this country are fully respected’34. The 
t£ims ‘tolerant’ and ‘lawful’ in this passage are particularly revealing. A tolerant society 
depends on the ‘lawful’ status of those who reside in that society, but the central point
32 This point has already been discussed in the preceding section.
33 See chapter 3 above.
34 House o f Commons, 11 December 1995, vol. 268, col. 699, Michael Howard (Conservative Party).
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of conflict in the debate on this Bill was the definition of a legal status for immigrants 
and asylum seekers. The commitment to maintain a tolerant society thus relies on the 
resolution of this conflict. In other words, the tightening of immigration control was 
considered indispensable and a necessary condition for a ‘tolerant’ society.
Clause 8 and 9 of the Asylum and Immigration Bill, concerning the right to 
work and the entitlement to housing, lay at the heart of the issue. The Government 
believed that the absence of controls acts constituted a strong incentive to people to 
come to the UK in order to work illegally. Clause 8 made it a criminal offence to 
employ a person who was not legally entitled to work in the United Kingdom, and 
Clause 9 placed similar restrictions on the entitlement to housing. With respect to the 
latter, the Government argued that ‘it is unacceptable that people who are here illegally, 
or who have come here on the understanding that they will not rely on public funds, 
should have access to housing at the taxpayer’s expense’35.
It seems that the main aim of Clause 9 was to deny any housing entitlement 
both to those seeking asylum after entering Britain, and to those whose applications had 
received an initial refusal. Clause 8, moreover, sought to reduce incentives for 
immigration by placing restrictions on the right to work which carried clear overtones 
of discrimination against third country nationals:
‘If people are not legitimate citizens of this country, it is not right that they 
should have jobs. We are therefore right to ask employes to check before 
accepting applicants’36.
The problem is to understand what is meant by the expression ‘legitimate citizens’. Are 
there cases where citizens are not legitimate? This expression, therefore, may imply that 
those who are legal and allowed to stay and work in the UK are automatically
35 House of Commons 11 December 1995, vol. 268 col. 707, Michael Howard (Conservative Party).
36 House o f Commons, 11 December 1995, vol.268 col. 759, J.R. Carlisle (Conservative Party).
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considered as nationals and consequently integrated. The right to work thus assumes an 
important connotation in the process of integration.
One of the main obstacles is a problem in defining immigrants. The new 
derogatory definition put forward at the time was so pervasive that it provided the 
power to remove, for example, child benefit from anyone who had been in the United 
Kingdom for perhaps as long as ten or twenty years, made Britain his/her home and 
paid his/her taxes like anyone else, but who did not have an EU or UK passport37. 
According to the provision, such people could be classified only as ‘unsettled’. If 
immigrants declared themselves to be asylum seekers at their point of entry, there 
would be a strict inquiry into their application. On the other hand, if they stated that 
they were iooking for a job and a better standard of living, there would be no possibility 
of entering. Incredibly, and for the first time, under this regulation, some people who 
had black or brown skin, who did not have a United Kingdom passport but who had 
made the UK their home were to be classified as ‘immigrants’. Ministers were using 
this tactic as a means by which to withdraw their benefit. All of this stressed the need 
first of all for a clear definition of the category of ‘immigrant’ and secondly, to address 
the matter of discrimination towards those without EU or UK passports. The 
importance attached to national and European citizenship had made Europe and EU 
citizens a single point of reference in matters relating to immigration.
The impact of Clause 8 was extremely damaging to particular sections of the 
community. The law put the onus of immigration control on employers, who were 
required to identify people who entered illegally or overstayed or who were not entitled 
to work. This law, therefore, effectively encouraged employers to operate on a
37 See Clause 10 of the Asylum and Immigration Bill which concerns the issue of child benefits.
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presumption that all prospective immigrant employees were illegal unless they 
demonstrated the opposite.
At the parliamentary level, there were two general comments put forward by 
some left-wing MPs. Firstly, the indirect effect of this Bill clearly would have been to 
discriminate against one section of the population since employers were unduly 
encouraged to behave in a racist manner, even though they would otherwise have been 
in no way inclined towards racist behaviour. A perfectly rational choice for employers 
would be to avoid the additional paperwork entailed in the employment of not only an 
immigrant by anyone who might be construed as an immigrant:
‘Employers will say “We are not going to be bothered with all this”. The 
more than 1 million small employers whom the Government cannot even 
quantify, and the number of which they are guessing at because they do not 
even know those figures will say, “ We are not going to do this”. If they 
receive an application through the post, and the applicant involved has an 
easily discernible Asian name, the applicant will never be seen. Employers 
will not subject themselves to that’ 38#
Another effect of the Bill would have been to encourage the British public to 
discriminate time after time: At national level law also creates a climate: it conditions 
public opinion’39. In other words, this legislation may have fostered a dangerous climate 
in terms of race and community relations. For example, when employers are given the 
responsibility to become, in effect, immigration policemen, it cannot help but have an 
impact on the community in which those employers operate. In addition, the opposition 
accused the Conservative government of pursuing a false cause:
‘The language and the tone of Conservative Members explain why the Bill 
has been introduced. The problem is not illegal immigrants, the problem is 
not bogus asylum seekers. The problem is that the Government is 30 per 
cent behind in the opinion polls, in the last full Session before the general
38 House o f Commons, 11 December 1995, vol.268 col. 745, G.B. Kaufman (Labour Party).
39 Ibid., vol. 268 col. 746.
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election. They have run out of cards to play, so, as usual, the Tory party is 
playing the race card’40.
The Bill on housing offered an even more disgraceful scenario. Under the social 
security legislation implicit in the Bill, people could be thrown out onto the streets by 
private landlords, who were already refusing to accept asylum seekers as tenants on the 
grounds that their applications might be refused and they would be unable to obtain 
housing benefit. A possible consequence of the legislation was an increase in the 
growing number of homeless people, which fostered fears among left-wing 
parliamentarians about the creation of a sub-culture of totally despised people. The Bill 
was seen as a further step towards ‘public’ prejudice: ‘Right now we are creating 
groups of people with no apparent rights. In effect, we shall create a category of non­
persons’41.
The problem of unequal treatment under the social security proposals even 
involves class discrimination, favouring asylum seekers who have the means to support 
themselves while they proceed with their appeals over poorer claimants who will either 
be dependent on charity or else will have to drop their appeals and return to the 
countries from which they came, regardless of the consequences. These issues 
ultimately affect the whole of society, which will pay the price for the changes in social 
security legislation once they come into effect.
There was also interest in Parliament on whether the Asylum and Immigration 
Bill fulfilled international legal obligations. This was occasioned by concern that 
immigrants have virtually no voice in political debates, aside from a few advocates who 
speak on their behalf, and by the fact that international obligations can be claimed to
40 Ibid., vol.268, col.747.
41 House o f Commons, 11 December 1995, vol. 268, col. 762 R. Cunningham (Scottish National 
Party).
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defend immigrants’ rights. Some left-wing parliamentarians believed it essential both to 
point out the contribution that many immigrants have made in the UK and to speak out 
for people for whom nobody else would speak. The advocacy of immigrants’ rights was 
often coming from politicians who represented Black and Asian constituents with 
political rights. In protecting legal residents against those who portrayed them as 
potential bogus applicants for housing benefit, politicians also represented the interests 
of a larger group of immigrants and asylum seekers. It is easy to appreciate how the 
representation of minority constituents also benefited other immigrants in statements 
such as this: ‘They are being talked about as though they cannot hear what we are 
saying, and as separate, different and inferior’42.
The Government’s reaction to these allegations suggested that the opposition 
was paying little attention to the real concerns of the British public. It is necessary to 
stress, however that British employers are part of the British ‘public’ and that the 
majority of them rejected the Bill though for reasons already noted above. The 
Government, moreover, was often accused of making an insult out of the term 
‘immigrant’. The opposition, by contrast, emphasised the view that immigrants help a 
culture to grow and change calling the Government position ‘a mean-minded attitude 
[...] redolent of the narrow-minded provincialism that colours so much of what the 
Government is about’43.
The idea that every immigrant is a problem or a threat certainly contributes 
nothing positive to race relations, but this is precisely the impression that this kind of 
regulation encourages in public opinion. The Government interpreted the opposition’s
42 House o f Commons, 11 December 1995, vol. 268, col. 746, G.B.Kaufman (Labour Party).
43 House of Commons, 11 December 1995, vol. 268 col. 762 R. Cunningham (Scottish National Party).
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refusal to acknowledge a problem of abuse in the existing asylum system as an 
unwillingness to take firm action to deal with the difficulties in the system. The thrust of 
the opposition’s argument, however, assailed Clause 8 as a threat to equal opportunity 
and an obstacle to overcoming racial discrimination. The media nevertheless observed 
that the Bill was not racist in the strictest sense since the discrimination that it entailed 
crossed racial lines: ‘Howard’s proposals are not racist as they did not only apply to 
ethnic minorities’44.
The problem of immigration for economic reasons was also addressed in the 
parliamentary debates. Criticism against the Bill focused on its piecemeal approach to 
economic immigration, which may have made it more difficult for genuine refugees to 
enter the process first as illegal immigrants. Accordingly, they stressed the need to 
clarify the criteria for refusal. Which of the motives for entering the country were 
considered invalid? Since the vast majority of claims for asylum were not valid, most 
applicants must have had other motives. It was thus seen as logical that economic 
motives were a major factor. Economic refugees were regarded as people ‘driven by 
greed’ who wanted to share the good life in the UK and who used asylum procedures to 
attain that aim. This ignores the possibility that economic rights can also be considered 
human rights in terms of individual determination: ‘To put people into a group and to 
say that those from a particular country are unlikely to have a genuine case is to ignore 
their right to individual determination’45.
Objections to Government proposals centred on the so-called ‘white list’46, 
which enumerated the countries from which bogus claims for asylum were most likely
44 Paul Goodman, Daily Telegraph, 26 October 1995.
45 House of Lords, 14 March 1996, vol. 570 col. 975, Lord Lester o f Heme Hill.
46 The list was abolished in a 1998 White Paper entitled Fairer, faster andfirmer: a modem approach to
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to emanate. Countries were placed on the list if they generated a significant number of 
asylum applications, a very high proportion of applications from that country proved to 
be unfounded, and there was no serious risk of persecution. The first criterion alone was 
enough to provoke an indignant response since the number of cases generated by a 
country should be irrelevant. At the same time, no consideration at all was given to the 
human rights situation in countries generating a high number of asylum applications. In 
the Asylum and Immigration Bill, moreover, there was no clause that distinguished 
between genuine refugees and economic immigrants. The entire discourse about the 
distinction between political refugees and economic refugees is thus insignificant. To 
this may be added the fact that the term ‘bogus’ in reference to refugees has been used 
without discretionary criteria, for example in Government press releases: ‘I have a news 
release dated 7th March 1996 which refers to the requirement to impose visa 
regulations on Kenyan nationals. The press release says: “The action has been taken to 
stem the increasing number of bogus asylum claims from Kenya nationals”. [...] when 
one reads further down the press release it becomes quite clear that the increasing 
number is in fact very recent. In the first ten months of 1995, 400 Kenyans claimed 
asylum at ports. Since November a further 833 people have done so. None of those 833 
people will have yet had their cases determined. So how is it possible to say that they 
are bogus claims? The claims have not been heard and probably will not be heard for 
some months’47. The increase in asylum applications from Kenyans in 1995 stems from 
the fact that the human rights situation in Kenya deteriorated notably precisely during 
this period. The Kenyan government launched a crackdown against human rights
immigration and asylum. H .C ., c.4018.
47 House o f Lords, 14 March 1996, vol.570 vol.976, The Lord Bishop of Ripon.
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activists, opposition politicians and internally displaced people leading to an increase in 
asylum claims from Kenya nationals in the UK48. Because the processing of asylum 
applications requires many months, it was impossible for the Government to have 
already made determinations about the motives and reasons that underlay the asylum 
claims from Kenya in 1995 by the time of the 1996 press release. It is even possible to 
argue that in the UK the debate on the presence of immigrants is centred more on ‘race 
and ethnic relations’ than on integration of immigrants (Melotti, 1997: 80).
5.2.2 ‘Fairer, Faster and Firmer’: the new approach to immigration and Asylum 
in the United Kingdom.
The White Paper on immigration published in July 1998 deals mainly with immigrants’ 
human rights49. The paper recommended placing limits on the discretionary power of 
public authorities to act in a way that is incompatible with the European Convention on 
human rights (1950). The Labour Government also committed itself to use an order- 
making power established in the Convention to enable an asylum seeker whose 
application has been refused to appeal also on the grounds that his removal from the 
UK would constitute a breach of the ECHR: ‘This will ensure that measures to make 
our control firmer and faster do not compromise on fairness’50. The debate on the White 
Paper, again, was polarised between two extremes: those who opposed all immigration 
and those who opposed effective immigration control. According to the first approach, 
all asylum seekers were ‘bogus’, while the second approach considered almost all of 
them genuine.
48 Human Rights Watch 1995.
49 The section title is taken from the title o f the White Paper Fairer, faster and firmer: a modem approach 
to immigration and asylum. H.C., c.4018.
50 Ibid., chap 2.
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The Government believed that the real issue consisted of running an asylum 
system which serves the British people’s wish to support genuine refugees whilst 
deterring abusive claimants. To accomplish this goal, the Government played the card 
of ‘mutual obligations’ acknowledging its own obligation to protect genuine refugees 
by resolving applications quickly but also compelling applicants to recognise their 
obligations. These include telling the truth about their circumstances, obeying the law, 
keeping in regular contact with the authorities, and leaving the country if their 
application is ultimately rejected. Moreover, the ‘integrated approach’ was conceived 
within a framework of an integrated immigration control: ‘Potential abuse and 
exploitation of the institution of asylum harms the genuine refugees as much as it 
threatens to undermine proper control on immigration’51.
For the Government’s part, ensuring the speedy resolution of applications for 
asylum entailed the reorganisation of the immigration, asylum and nationality processes 
as a whole. This required increased investment in the determination of cases to reduce 
both the decision backlog and the number of appeals waiting to be heard. It also 
required the consolidation of multiple appeal rights into a single appeal right and the 
strengthening the role of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, and it involved the transfer 
of budget responsibility for asylum support to the Home Office. With these changes, the 
Government believed that it would not only fasten application process but also achieve 
both fairness and firmness. Among their objectives the Government intended to 
minimise the incentive to economic migration, particularly by minimising cash 
payments to asylum seekers.
51 Ibid., chap 8.
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‘At present economic migrants abuse the asylum system because its 
inefficiency allows them to remain in the UK for years. A faster system with 
more certain removal at the end of the process will significantly deter 
abuse’52>
Although the new Asylum and Immigration measure is based on a different approach 
which commits the Labour Government to a fairer course of action, it still views all 
immigrants in terms of an under the arrangements for asylum seekers; and it considers 
all immigrants as potentially ‘bogus’ asylum claimants. The Labour opposition raised 
these objections to the policies of the Conservative Government two years earlier.
In addition, the White Paper encourages the acquisition of citizenship as a 
means for a better social integration of immigrants, though it is not clear how the 
Government intends to fulfil this goal:
‘One measure of the integration of immigrants into British society is the ease 
with which they can acquire citizenship. Acquiring a new citizenship is an 
important event. For both the individual and the nation, it brings new rights, 
new responsibilities, and new opportunities. The government believes that 
encouraging citizenship will help to strengthen good race and community 
relations. Accordingly applications for citizenship should be dealt with more 
quickly’53
This approach mistakenly implies that integration will automatically follow from the 
formal acquisition of citizenship, which is to say from naturalisation.
5.2.3 The European example
The rationale underlying efforts to establish tighter controls over immigration in the 
United Kingdom encapsulates concerns about immigration that are common throughout 
Europe:
‘The world changes and the truth is that other countries have so tightened up 
their legislation that we are now in danger of being overwhelmed by those
52 Ibid.,
53 Ibid., chap 2.16.
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who cannot meet the conditions of the other countries’ immigration Acts.
Hence it is more important if we look at our existing legislation to ensure that 
we are not being unfairly targeted by people who are not genuine asylum 
seekers but rather economic migrants. I am sure that the economic migrants 
are the real reason for the backlog of dealing with the genuine asylum 
seekers’54.
The example of European neighbours was taken again in support of the Government 
view.
‘Most of them have already introduced measures similar to the ones we are 
proposing. Germany and The Netherlands are examples of countries where 
stricter procedures since 1993 have been followed by substantial reductions of 
resources’55.
The Government pointed out that resolution of the European Union, signed by the 
Home Secretary as a member of the Justice and Home Affairs Councils, gave the UK 
liberty to deal with asylum applications that were ‘manifestly unfounded’ or in which
there was ‘no serious risk of persecution’ in any reasonable manner they saw fit56. In 
point of fact, the ‘white list’ referred to earlier was devised by the British Government 
not independently but according Steering Group 1 (Asylum and Immigration working 
groups)57. From 1985, the European Commission started to coordinate national policies 
on visas to ‘complement the easing of internal frontier controls’ (Cannan, 1996: 141). 
This led to the emergence of the Trevi Groups (K4 Committee) and the ad Hoc Group 
on Immigration. Many have argued that the establishment of these groups has turned 
immigration in Europe into an ‘order issue associating black people, refugees and 
asylum seekers with drugs, crime and terrorism and disease’ (Cannan, 1996: 141;
54 House o f Lords, 14 March 1996, vol. 570 col. 1005, Baroness O’ Cathain.
55 House o f Lords, 14 March 1996, vol 570, col 960, Baroness Blatch, The Minister o f the State, Home 
Office.
56 These resolutins are discussed immediately below.
57 During the 1996 IGC, the Austrian Government proposed the abolition o f steering groups and the 
merger of the K4 Committee with COREPER (Committee o f Permanent Representatives/Council o f  
Ministers) to push issues to the fore of the Justice and Home Affairs Council’s agenda. This implies a 
stronger Intergovernmental approach.
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Bunyan, 1991: 19). In 1993, the ad Hoc Group on Immigration obliged member states 
to detect and expel anyone who breaches immigration rules58.
The immediate result of the Group’s deliberations was the European Union 
Resolution on ‘Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum’, and the EU 
Conclusion on ‘Countries in which there is generally no serious risk of persecution’. 
The Resolution and Conclusion were signed by Kenneth Clarke as Home Secretary at 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council in London in December 1992. In the UK, as 
noted above, these measures were used to justify the tightening of immigration control, 
demonstrating that decisions taken at the European level were affecting the national 
immigration policies. Criticism was levelled at the Home Secretary for not being able to 
keep his promises:
‘the truth is that despite their protestations to the contrary the Government 
have ceded their control of asylum policy to the European Union Council of 
Ministers. They have done so without any approval by Parliament’59t
The European example was also employed to justify a measure adopted to deal with 
precisely with the problem of immigration considered as a European problem and ‘one 
which cannot be confined only to our country’60. A crucial point is that a European 
problem as this was defined cannot be solved at the inter-governmental level in which 
agreements concern only restrictions and not more liberal measures as well Community 
benefits can be agreed. This lack of balance was very likely the reason behind 
objections to the secrecy with which any form of co-operation has been undertaken at 
the European level. These objections also had ramifications at the national level in the
58 The Guardian 26 May 1993.
59 House o f Lords, 14 March 1996, vol. 570, col. 966, Lord McIntosh o f Haringey.
“ House of Lords, 14 March 1996, vol. 570, col. 989, Baroness Elies.
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UK, since the Bill on Asylum and Immigration was based in part on European 
Resolutions, yet the way in which these resolutions were introduced in the Council of 
Ministers was never made clear.
Other Western European countries are moving in the same direction, which 
bears out the notion of a significant relationship between European resolutions on 
immigration control and the policies of individual member states61. For instance, stricter 
criteria for granting refugee status have caused a fall in the rate of acceptance in asylum 
applications across Europe. Between 1980 and 1990, the rate of acceptance fell from 
65% to 10% in the EU as whole (Webber, 1991:15). As already noted, the UK 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act signalled the end of the special relationship between 
the UK and its former colonies, and the 1968 Act tightened controls concerning the 
granting of British citizenship. It now became much more difficult to acquire British 
citizenship and the ‘the number of successful applications fell by 28% in 1992 to the 
lowest level for ten years’ (Cannan, 1996: 143; Clarke, et al., 1998: 55).
A deliberate convergence of policies is discernible through the ‘entry’ measures 
applied by each member state in dealing with immigration. In UK as in Italy and 
France, illegal ‘entry’ is discouraged more forcefully by the use of imprisonment as a 
deterrent. According to the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants more than 
10,000 people are imprisoned each year without trial, convicted under immigration laws 
(Cannan, 1996: 143; Ashford, 1993). Holding immigrants in detention centres or camps 
can constitute another deterrent62. Soysal nevertheless views converge positively,
61 In his comparative study, Melotti discerns a positive aspect o f convergence in that European Union 
countries are now moving ‘from their old reductive policies o f assimilation, separation or uneven 
pluralism to a new multiculturalism model o f integration’ (1997: 93). He rightly adds, however, that a 
substantial discrepancy still exists between the formal definition o f rights and their implementation.
62 Usually the so-called detention centres are for asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected
Chapter 5: The political representation o f immigrants rights 202
insisting that it has been accompanied by improvements in the degree to which 
immigrants are integrated into the social system, thus giving immigrants a more secure 
position in society (1994:132). Deeper consideration of policies of ‘entry’ casts doubt 
on this approach, however, since policies are more oriented towards the logic of ‘annual 
quotas’, leaving the problems of social integration and second class citizenship 
unresolved, it is probably true, as Soysal argues, that formal citizenship has lost some of 
its function (1994: 132) but the substantive effect of citizenship towards models of 
semi-citizenship needs to be considered as well.
It is in the policy of convergence that the common action of exclusion and the 
protection of the Fortress Europe occur. It is also in this process that the definition of 
the category of ‘us’ arid ‘them’ are defined. The category of ‘them’ can be defined 
outside the EU as the fully excluded and inside the EU as the partially integrated. 
Immigration measures enacted in member states have carried the restrictions put 
forward in EU resolutions without providing any safeguards or qualifications. As the 
case of the United Kingdom demonstrates, however, national interest remains always at 
the centre of any measure adopted through international or European arrangements. The 
1998 White Paper draws on the Amsterdam Treaty in two respects. Firstly, it provides 
for co-operation in the development of minimum standards on the reception of asylum 
seekers: ‘The Government will participate in the development of such co-operation if it 
is in the national interest to do so’63. Secondly, the United Kingdom obtained through 
the Amsterdam Treaty various rights to opt into co-operation in immigration and
and are awaiting removal. Sometimes, however, these centres also hold asylum seekers whose 
applications are still being processed. In Britain, there has been recently sharp debate in parliament on 
this subject. The Conservative proposal to detain all asylum seekers while their applications were 
processed has been criticised by the Government as expensive and unlawful. Blair plans to detain 
more illegal immigrants. The Financial Times, 11/5/2000.
63 See H.C., White Paper, c.4018. chap. 8.15.
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asylum. ‘To opt into such co-operation in a flexible way so as to enable us to preserve 
our particular approach where necessary while also participating in those areas of co­
operation which we judge important’64.
Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with common strategies of exclusion that define the inclusion 
practices, or in other words, with the definition of the category of ‘them’ through the 
political discourse on immigration. The Communitising project at the European Union 
level constitutes an important step in the co-ordination of citizenship and immigration 
discourses in that it brings Euro-citizenship more into line with immigration practices. 
The process involves the shaping of common strategies of exclusion to deal with the 
challenge posed by immigration. In the political debate, the issues of citizenship and 
Euro-citizenship have been discussed in terms of problems surrounding the integration 
and representation of immigrants. Naturalisation, which is to say the formal acquisition 
of citizenship, is presented as the only way through which immigrants can be integrated 
at the national and European Union levels, but is this true? If so, it confirms a strict link 
between nationality and citizenship, but if not, what is required is a redefinition of the 
concept of ‘legality’ in the context of the EU to embrace social, political and civil 
rights.
The formal process of integration relies upon citizenship practices while the 
integration and representations of immigrants in Europe which is at the best only 
partial, reveals the re-emergence of a dichotomy between society and the polity 
(Arendt, 1958). Non-EU citizens even if they are legally resident in an EU member 
state, are excluded from the democratic process of legitimisation because they are not
64 7bid., chap. 2.11.
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members of the polity. The category of ‘them’ is thus defined inside the EU as partial 
integration and outside the EU as total exclusion. Belonging at different levels and in 
different domains requires a ‘theory of deep diversity’ (Taylor, 1991: 75) to analyse the 
complex interplay of cultures (Werbner, 1997: 264). The categorisation of ‘them’ 
shapes the opposite category of ‘us’ in the search for a supra-national identity in 
Europe. As an identity that is itself marked by diversity, this new identity can no longer 
legitimise discrimination but should be partial, multiple, and fractured in order to 
embrace the politics of multiculturalism (Werbner, 1997: 265). Discrimination even 
against legally resident immigrants is nevertheless encouraged and institutionalised in 
laws that place constraints on citizens (for example in employment practices). At the 
same time, at the national level, naturalisation practices are politically and formally 
encouraged, which inevitably reinforces the validity of national citizenship.
While the nation-state has played a pivotal role in establishing and furthering 
the autonomy of social systems, it now becomes a source of conflict over the pre­
eminence of attributed versus acquired membership. The resulting paradox is that 
supra-national institutions would seem to be the proper means by which to establish an 
inclusive universalism, but only the nation-state can still effectively guarantee the 
implementation of a universalist standard of inclusion. To address this issue, the 
principle of equality should be harmonised and the flexibility of member states to 
derogate from the principle of non-discrimination should be minimised (Closa, 1998: 
181). Contrary to the argument put forward by Closa, however, a spill-over effect from 
Euro-citizenship on nationality laws is unlikely to occur for two main reasons. Firstly, 
these developments should be the purview of supra-national institutions rather than 
member states as Closa suggests (1998: 182). Secondly, the flexibility offered to
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member states to opt in and opt out from community developments in the Third 
Pillar could prove to be disruptive. As Soysal suggests, moreover, ‘a complex of legal 
rights and privileges may not dissolve discrimination and empirical inequalities’ (1994: 
132).
To make EU citizenship workable and equitable, both the redefinition of 
national citizenship and the harmonisation of naturalisation policies are beside the 
point. What would be desirable is the redefinition of ‘legality’ based on a principle of 
legal subjectivity at the European level instead of national or EU citizenship. In as much 
as Euro-citizenship is strictly linked to national citizenship, however, it is difficult to 
believe that the fundamental principles of the legitimisation of membership are already 
‘post-nationals’ and based on universal subjectivity rather than nationality (Brubaker, 
1992: 187)65.
65 Brubaker agrees with Soysal on this point (Soysal, 1991).
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Introduction
This chapter focuses on the formation of a public sphere at the supra-national level and 
its importance in mediating the relationship between citizens and the wider European 
polity. As argued in the preceding chapters, the establishment of Euro-citizenship 
implies the acceptance of nationality as a fundamental prerequisite. This is part of a 
broader political process anchored to the belief that Euro-citizenship would encourage 
the development of European identity without eradicating national identity. This 
scenario per se presents national identity and Euro-citizenship as strongly connected. 
The central aim of this chapter is to investigate whether Euro-citizenship encourages 
the development of European identity and whether identity constitutes a determining 
factor in the process of supra-national values orientation. Ultimately, this chapter 
demonstrates that an absence of cultural homogeneity is not an insurmountable barrier 
to further supra-national integration.
The comparative approach focuses on the fundamental differences between 
British and Italian attitudes towards the European Union and Euro-citizenship. There 
are striking differences regarding specific political matters, but it is possible to observe 
common characteristics in these two countries. Variables such as post-materialism, age 
and education cut across the nation-state influencing the mobilisation of values towards 
a supra-national identity without undermining national heritage. The formation of a 
post-materialist orientation, in particular, will foster such a process. Those best able to 
cope with more than one sphere of identity, moreover, are those with greater ‘cognitive 
mobilisation’, but this does not necessarily imply a greater process of identification
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with a supra-national entity. It will be shown that the manner in which the process of 
value mobilisation towards either ‘attachment’ to or ‘identification’ with a supra­
national entity also tends to correlate with a more tolerant attitude towards foreigners. 
In this respect, the manner in which the change in the orientation of values affects the 
concept of identity in relation to the recognition of ‘others’ will be investigated.
6.1 The deficiency of a public sphere in Europe
Habermas differentiates public opinion from the public sphere. The former comes into 
existence when a ‘reasoning public’ is presupposed. The latter, instead, mediates 
between public opinion and the state guaranteeing the very functioning of the former 
(1974). This functional aspect of the public sphere is partially undermined within the 
process of the European integration through which new normative undertakings 
encourage individual autonomy. The private sphere is no longer exclusively controlled 
and guaranteed by the nation-state, leading to a substantial weakening of ‘the 
reconciliation of private autonomy and public self-determination’ (Closa, 1998: 175). 
Closa argues that the development of an EU public sphere is a fundamental 
‘sociological prerequisite of democracy’. In this understanding, the realisation of a 
coherent public sphere in Europe ‘can connect sociological reality with normative 
models’1 (Closa, 1998: 172). If public opinion in the EU does not require a 
‘presupposed reasoning’, as Habermas argues, then the formation of a new public
1 Closa tries to establish the connection between supra-national democracy and European union 
citizenship. In this respect, he differentiates between a normative and a sociological aspect. The first 
is concerned with the question regarding whether there should be a supra-national democracy. ‘A  
model o f democracy in which people are constituted as self-defining entity’ (1998: 172). The second 
is an empirical aspect that refers to the characterisation o f functioning contemporary European 
democracies.
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sphere ought to follow from a redefinition of the polarity between the ability of citizens 
to exercise control over the new polity and the capacity of the system to respond to 
public preferences (Dahl, 1994: 28). Yet, this is not just a simple bipolar relationship 
that occurs in the same space of time. The transfer of political responsibility from the 
state to supra-national bodies is part of a process in the making. As the functions of the 
nation-state diminish, the mediation between society and state changes in many areas 
of general interest. Even the central relationship between the public, political parties, 
and legislative bodies is affected by this transformation in functions. The main changes 
do not affect the public or the society but they affect both the state and the means 
through which the public relates to the state.
The consideration of European public opinion is becoming increasingly 
important to the functioning of European Union institutions. European surveys attempt 
to identify general trends and the probable causation behind people’s attitudes. 
However, all this does not necessarily imply the existence of a functioning public 
sphere at European Union level. The crucial point here concerns the evaluation of the 
manner in which the process of mediation of citizens’ interests occurs. This can be 
tested through ‘net support’ and the mobilisation of values towards the new polity. The 
results obtained by observing of these two processes may reveal important implications 
for the construction of a new idea of citizenship and identity.
Inglehart identified the new European political context as a ‘remote political 
community’ in which the relationship between citizens and European institutions 
requires a high level of ‘cognitive mobilisation’ for the generation of public support 
towards EU institutions. In a supra-national context, a higher level of mass
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communications and rate of media exposure will engender a closer relationship 
between citizens and institutions. In this respect, education can increase individuals’ 
capacity to interpret and develop a more subjective attitude towards general issues. 
Inglehart estimated that education is the strongest single predictor of European 
mobilisation, accounting for twice as much of the variance in attitudes expressed than 
as does nationality2 (1970: 51-52).
However, the fact that European institutions become more familiar through 
‘cognitive mobilisation’ does not inevitably lead to increased support. The British and 
the Danish have the least developed European identity, for example, but they are 
among the countries that show the highest rates of media exposure. This is because the 
content of communications has been less favourable in Britain and Denmark than in 
other countries3. The influence of governments on mass communications plays an 
important role. Governments bear a considerable responsibility for having nurtured 
dissenting opinions. There are several cases that exemplify the manner in which public 
‘cognitive mobilisation’ can be negatively swayed by governmental attitudes (Spencer, 
1995: 16-17).
Inglehart’s hypothesis that the rising level of exposure to formal mass 
communication tends to favour integration at European and national level therefore 
depends primarily upon a Government’s mediation in the national public sphere (1970: 
46-47). As long as relevant issues that directly involve citizens’ concerns such as 
immigration or employment are regulated at the national level, certain social dynamics
2 9 per cent versus 4.5 per cent.
3 Eurobarometer: 40. European Commission. December 1993.
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will be integrated only into a national network. This is certainly dysfunctional to the 
integration of social mobilisation in a supra-national network.
6.1.1 Measuring public opinion convergence at the cross-national level
As noted above, there are common issues in which European citizens are involved 
since they are beneficiaries of the same legal benefits. There are areas of the welfare 
state, on the other hand, which are unevenly developed across the European Union. 
Education, unemployment, and provisions for immigrants in particular are areas of 
uneven development. Our data show that respondents were divided concerning who 
should decide on certain areas of social policy4. The ‘communitarian’ approach of 
Italian respondents confirms Italy’s positive attitude towards Europe and also reveals 
distrust towards the national government for the lack of an efficient and functional 
welfare state in the areas mentioned. Conversely, the British reaction is to maintain 
national control over issues regarding social benefits and social security. This attitude is 
probably the result of the fact that in those countries where a national social policy is 
seen as functioning more or less effectively, people are decisively more reluctant to 
make any change towards a ‘communitarian’ approach.
Contrasts between these two countries in their positive (Italy) and negative 
(United Kingdom) attitudes thus reflect the relationship between the public and the 
state in terms of trust and expectations. Table 1 illustrates that on issues such as 
unemployment, British respondents are firmly in favour of national decision-making.
4 See Meehan when she quotes Richard Sinnot’s research (1993:152). Sinnot’s research reveals that a 
significant majorities o f citizens in Member States simultaneously regard problems related to the 
social rights, such as unemployment and poverty, as having priority and as issues for which it is 
legitimate for Community institutions to act upon.
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Italy, by contrast, places more trust in European Union institutions. With respect to 
immigration policy respondents are even more divided on which institution is more 
competent to deal with this problem. These data are consistent with the respective 
attitudes of these two countries regarding net support for Community membership.
Table.l Common Policies (1994)
Unemployment Immigration Policy
UK IT UK IT
Nat. 60% 47% 62% 24%
Government
European 40 53 38 76
Community
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid cases 1285 1010 1252 984
Source: (ESRC Data Archive) My own elaboration o f raw data from the Eurobarometer 42: First year o f the new 
European Union November- December 1994.
The political and social issues of unemployment and immigration are about 
‘responsibility’. The question here is where the public receives its opinion from and 
whether that particular issue is perceived as a ‘problem’ in the nation in question. As a 
consequence, the decision concerning who is responsible will depend upon these 
circumstances. The lack of cultural homogeneity or cross-cultural differences (Reif, 
1993: 150) in the European public attitude probably does not necessarily constitute an 
obstacle in the furtherance of the European project, but the lack of cultural 
homogeneity certainly is accentuated when citizens of two different countries 
experience their relationship with political institutions in a different manner.
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Supra-national cleavages are often explained by adopting the simplistic 
assumption of the lack of cultural homogeneity, but this explanation typically fails to 
elaborate upon the manner in which a lack of cultural homogeneity in the European 
public opinion constitutes the main obstacle to a common European identity. Or, to 
consider this question in another way, to what degree would public convergence and 
similarity would be a necessary condition of a common identity? The major intellectual 
contributions concerning European unity and European identity are scarcely concerned 
about the problem of convergence and similarity within the European public sphere. 
Rather, given the fact that Europe is a unitax multiplex, the point of contact between 
culturally distinct national identities lies in their compatibility within the ‘axiological 
framework’ constituted by European citizenship (Closa, 1998: 179). This referent 
framework should not imply a culturally homogeneous society. This view is in line 
with Delanty, who remains sceptical about any political notion of Europe ‘unless the 
idea of Europe can be linked to multi-culturalism and post-national citizenship’ 
(Delanty, 1995: 159). He envisages in European citizenship the possibility of universal 
norms detached from a particularistic ethno-cultural idea of Europe. For Delanty, 
citizenship in Europe should not be conflated with the idea of an ‘essentialist’ Europe 
defined by the principle of nationality. This claim diverges from a greater political 
objective that conceives Euro-citizenship as essential in the process of European 
identity formation and consequently as a new ethno-cultural idea (Koslowski, 1994).
A crucial point, therefore, is not only to study differences and similarities in 
Europe, but also to find empirical indicators that explain particular orientations. To 
explain different attitudes in the United Kingdom and Italy, for instance, a multi-causal
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approach has been applied. I consider three main independent variables as supra­
national indicators of a multi-causal approach: education, age, and gender. The analysis 
shows that education and age are significantly related to variables such as ‘European 
support typology’, ‘Euro-citizenship identification’, and ‘foreign presence’. A 
comparison of results from the cross-tabulations of chosen variables across both the 
UK and Italy reveals a striking consistency. The question here is why, if in view of this 
consistency these two countries still vary in their support to Europe? Part of the answer 
has been already given above. Moreover, the assumption that there is a consistency, in 
comparative terms, on the lines of “ educated people support the EU more” does not 
imply that education is an indicator that would enhance support in both countries. 
Rather, this assumption must to be complemented by an explanation of the difference 
in attitude. It is useful, in other words, to analyse the manner in which the effect of this 
indicator varies not only in each country but also through each category of the variable 
selected to control the validity of our assumption.
Table 2 shows that ‘positive’ support for Europe increases with higher 
education levels in both the UK and Italy. It is possible to identify a significant 
relationship between these two variables both in Italy and in the UK as well as a 
consistency, in comparative terms, of their association coefficients (y)5. On the other
5 Gamma (y) is a measure o f association appropriate for ordinally measured variables. The numerical 
value o f y represents the degree of association. It shows die improvement in our ability to predict the 
order o f pairs o f cases on one variable from the order of pairs o f cases on the other variable, y may 
vary from +1.0 to -1.0. When y is +1.0, order is the same on both variables for all united pairs (predict 
same order). A y o f -1.0 indicates that, for united pairs, the order on one variable is always the reverse 
of the order on the other variable (predict reverse order). A  y o f zero or close to zero indicates that 
among all united pairs there are exactly as many pairs with reversed orders on the two variables, as 
there are pairs with the same orders. This would indicate no relationship between the two variables. 
Values intermediate between 0 and 1.0 indicate the degree to which guessing errors may be reduced 
by utilizing knowledge o f the order on a second variable. By looking at Table 3, for example, it is
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hand, Table 2a and 2b illustrate the limit to generalisations such as ‘educated people 
support the EU more’. If we control this relationship by Materialist and Post- 
Materialist value orientation6 it is possible to observe striking differences between the 
UK and Italy. In Italy, the relationship between education and attitude grows stronger 
for the category of Materialist while it becomes negligible for the category of Post- 
Materialist (subtable y = 0.03). Materialists who are also higher educated are much 
more likely to support Europe than Materialist compatriots with a lower level of 
education. Among the Post-Materialists in the UK, there is a clear and strong 
relationship between these two variables, but in Italy among the same category the 
relationship is unaffected by education. This indicates that ‘value orientation’ is a valid 
indicator for studying differences across these two countries. The point is that attention 
needs to direct the constitution of those features leading the process of values 
mobilisation towards a supra-national setting.
possible to say that in the United Kingdom when predicting the order o f pairs o f cases on ‘European 
Support Typology’ we would make 28 per cent (y = 0.28) fewer errors by taking ‘Education’ into 
account, as opposed to ignoring education. (Mueller, Schuessler, and Costner, 1970: 288-294).
6 Materialist and Post-Materialist values are related to Inglehart's ‘scarcity hypothesis’. The theory 
suggests that economic prosperity is conducive to the spread o f Post-Materialist values, which refer to 
the quality of life, rather than Materialist considerations such as security and economic well-being 
(Inglehart and Abramson, 1970). The ‘Value Orientation’ variable has been defined by the 
‘Eurobarometer: 42’ in line with Inglehart’s theory. This ordinal variable has been coded in three values:
1- Materialist, 2 -Mixed and 3-Post-Materialist.
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Table 2: Cross-Tabulation between Education and European Support Typology
UK IT
Low Medium Educ. High Low Medium Educ. High
Educ. Educ. Educ. Educ.
Negative 24% 15% 8% 4% 4% 2%
Ambivalent 45 51 30 41 24 24
Positive 31 34 62 55 72 74
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total Cases 223 800 326 362 233 460
Valid cases UK = 1349; y.- 0.28p-value -  0.000
Valid cases IT = 1055;~y: 0.55p-value = 0.000..........................................................................................................
Note My own elaboration o f raw data from ESRC Data Archive: Entries are percentages. Source: Eurobarometer 
42.
Table 2a: European Support Typology by Education controlling for value 
orientation (Materialist/Post-Materialist) UK.
UK Materialist Mixed Post-Materialist
SUPPORT
Education Education Education
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Negative 24% 15% 8% 24% 15% 8% 27% 16% 6%
Ambival. 47 52 36 43 53 34 47 35 20
Positive 29 33 56 33 32 58 26 49 74
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid
Cases
288 875 186
Subtable y 0.28 031 0.49
Overall y 0.28
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Table 2b: European Support Typology by Education controlling for value 
orientation (Materialist-Post-Materialist) ITALY.
IT Materialist Mixed Post-Materialist
SUPPORT
Education Education Education
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
Negative 5% 4% 3% 3% 5% 3% 3 - -
Ambiv. 50 16 22 39 27 23 29 19 27
Positive 45 80 75 58 68 74 68 81 73
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid
Cases
244 642 169
Subtable y 0.46 0.24 0.03
Overall y 0.35
6.1.2 The definition of European identity between identification and acceptance
The importance of detaching citizenship from nationality at the European Union level 
is shared among many scholars (Meehan, 1993; Tassin, 1992; Closa,1998; Welsh, 
1993; Preuss, 1995; Delanty, 1995). Authors differ in their individual approaches, but 
there are several common features. The failure of the nation-state to respond 
satisfactorily to the collective preferences of its citizens also implies that national 
citizenship can no longer define ‘civil and political spheres of the national life’ 
(Meehan, 1993: 146). As a consequence, the creation of a new ‘public space’ should 
also have a room for the compatibility of ‘various identities besides our national 
identities’. Along these lines, Euro-citizenship constitutes the possibility of a public 
space to legitimise ‘pluralism’ and not an ‘amalgamation of interests’ (Tassin, 1992: 
188). At the attitudinal level, the data reveal the rise of a process of mobilisation 
towards compatibility. At the same time, however, it is difficult to argue that the 
existence of a common legal framework creates a European public space on problems
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such as unemployment and non-EU nationals. It is widely agreed that this is one of the 
major limits of Euro-citizenship (Meehan, 1993; Closa, 1998).
Until recently, integration was a process of institutional high politics, both 
removed from and of no concern to the ordinary citizen. For European citizens, this led 
to an unfortunate vision of a centralised administrative meso-state that took sovereignty 
and power on the basis of illegitimate economic rationality. Dahl (1989) argues that the 
one defining criterion for a polyarchy is the right of citizens to influence through 
organisation such decisions as affect them. From this we arrive at the need to legitimise 
democratic representation. The EU has certainly acquired state functions, but it has also 
failed to allow concurrent channels of participation and responsibility. This is what 
Smith defines as the ‘European failure’. ‘The European failure underlines the distance 
between the political level and the realities of divergent national identities, perceptions 
and interest within Europe’ (Smith, 1992: 73). The question of democracy and 
representation is relevant to understand the implications that the passage from nation­
states to a supra-national system have in terms of the gradual movement of de facto 
power towards the political apparatus of the EU.
Now that the political progress of ‘Europe’ is becoming a contentious issue, it 
is necessary to examine whether the lack of Euro-citizenship in terms of identification 
with a common political entity, does not fulfil the need to legitimise further European 
unity. In other words, as the notion of political identity is very close to the traditional 
notion of citizenship, one needs to ascertain whether Euro-citizenship is functional to 
the process of legitimisation. The question, therefore, concerns not only whether people
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are interested in a new political identity, but also whether a new citizenship would 
bring about a corresponding change in perceptions of identity.
Eurobarometer surveys seem to define responses in terms of the ‘feeling of 
belonging’ and the ‘feeling of benefit’ from the Community7. Inglehart (1977) defines 
the former ‘affective’ and the latter ‘utilitarian’ support in response to the idea of 
European integration. Those who express a positive attitude towards the EU 
(attachment)8 can belong to both categories of ‘feelings’. It is worth mentioning that a 
positive ‘attachment’ towards Europe does not necessarily imply changes in people 
identification. I argue that when the level of ‘attachment’ to Europe is influenced by a 
high level of ‘affective involvement’, there is an ‘identification’ process. On the other
hand, the level of attachment to Europe can be also influenced by a low level of 
‘affective involvement’ that does not necessarily imply people identification. In fact, I 
identify this level of ‘attachment’ with the category of ‘compatibility’ between the two 
forms of identification, national and European. When the ‘utilitarian orientation’ 
determines the level of ‘attachment’, there is a process of ‘acceptance’ which does not 
involve people identification. It is worth mentioning that ‘identification’ and the 
mechanism of ‘acceptance’ are related to different lengths of time. The utilitarian
7 The Eurobarometer defines the ‘feeling o f belonging’ with the variable ‘European Citizenship - 
Feeling’ The question is: in the near future do you see yourself as: 1-Nationality only; 2-Nationality 
and European; 3-European and Nationality; 4- European only. I operationalise the second and third 
category in a single value which is called ‘compatibility’. The ‘feeling o f benefit’ or ‘utilitarian 
orientation’ refers to three main questions: A) Generally speaking do you think that (our country’s ) 
membership o f the EU is 1-Good; 2- Bad Thing. B) Taking everything into consideration, would you 
say that (our country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member o f the EU? 1- Benefited;
2- Not benefited. C) If you were told tomorrow that the EU had been scrapped, would you be very 
sorry about it, indifferent or very relieved? 1-Very sorry; 2- Indifferent; 3- Very relieved.
8 The value of ‘attachment’ is identified with the variable o f ‘European Support Typology’: 1- 
Negative; 2-Ambivalent; 3-Positive.
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acceptance can be relatively rapid, whereas the affective involvement is more 
internalised and therefore slower.
Can Euro-citizenship, constitute a political means and a normative standpoint to 
reach unity and identity (affective attachment)? This is an important point to test in 
order to measure the extent to which it is possible to connect attitudinal reality with 
normative and political undertakings. A positive association between people’s attitude 
towards ‘Europe’ and ‘Euro-citizenship’ cannot entirely answer this question. There are 
also other variables that need to be considered as factors influencing this process. I 
shall discuss two separate ways for dealing with this matter.
6.1.3 The ‘affective’ orientation
The general level of ‘attachment’ to Europe is fairly high with six out of ten Europeans 
feeling ‘very or quite attached’ to Europe. Italy is among the more attached at 70 per 
cent while the UK is among the less attached at only 43 per cent (Europinion no.9 
September 1996). Is this level of attachment related to an ‘affective’ or ‘utilitarian’ 
orientation? Considering that the ‘typology’ of European attitudes is codified upon 
answers that refer to the ‘utilitarian’ orientation, the straight answer to this question 
would be that the level of attachment reflects only the latter. This information, 
however, does not inform us whether the ‘affective’ orientation is somewhat related to 
the general level of ‘attachment’.
In Parliamentary discussions concerning citizenship policy, one of the 
arguments that has been emphasised is that the establishment of Euro-citizenship would 
encourage the development of European identity. Through the data analysis, it is
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possible to discern whether the ‘affective’ orientation is a determining factor for 
positive attitudes towards the European Union and whether the ‘feeling of belonging’ 
to Europe might influence the process of ‘ attachment’.
Examining the data available on this matter, it has been possible to separate 
‘attachment’ from ‘identification’9.1 expected to find a positive attitude towards Europe 
(attachment) associated with a higher feeling of being European (identification/affect). 
However, the results generally indicated that the level of European identity in Italy and 
the United Kingdom is consistently lower than their respective positive attitudes 
towards the EU. Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that although in Italy the attitude towards 
Europe is very positive (67 per cent Table 3), the identification with Euro-citizenship is 
very low (5 per cent Table 4). The same thing can be said for the United Kingdom. 
However, this pattern is not sufficient to argue that ‘attachment’ and ‘affective 
orientation’ are not related10.
Table. 3 European Support Typology (Attachment)
UK IT
Negative 15% 3%
Ambivalent 45 30
Positive 40 67
Total % 100% 100%
Valid cases 1351 1055
Note: Entries are percentages.
Source: My own elaboration o f raw data from Eurobarometer 42 Ibid.
9 In Karlhenz R eif s analysis, for instance, attachment and identification are not treated separately. In 
fact, he discusses the issue o f European identity and national identity mainly on the variable ‘feeling 
attached to a place’ (1993).
10 Note that the evaluation o f regional variations in the UK and Italy has not been pursued as the case- 
base became too small in individual cells.
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Table. 4 The Attitude towards Euro-citizenship (Affective Orientation)
United Kingdom Italy
Nationality only 50% 26%
Compatibility 44 69
European only 6 5
Total % 100% 100%
Valid cases 1351 1055
Note: Entries are percentages. Source: Eurobarometer 42
Through this first analysis it is possible to argue that the ‘ambivalent’ attitude in the 
UK is dictated by a strong ‘feeling of national identity (45 per cent Table 3 and 50 per 
cent Table 4). In Italy, most of the respondents do not seem to have strong national 
identification feelings, but they have a more positive attitude towards Europe (26 per 
cent Table 4 and 67 per cent Table 3). Table 4 shows a very low percentage within the 
category of ‘European only’ against a much higher percentage of those who see a 
European identity as being compatible with their national identity (compatibility). A 
probable explanation to this point is that people do not find it necessary to identify 
themselves as ‘European only’. Conversely, ‘compatibility’ represents a more 
appropriate dimension for the preservation of national and cultural values within a new 
supra-national context. This would also explain the reason why in both countries the 
level of identification with Europe is lower than their respective positive attitudes 
towards Europe. In point of fact, the significant relationship between identification and 
attachment is mainly dictated by the category of ‘compatibility’.
The cross-tabulation shows that these two variables are significantly related 
(Table. 5). This is shown by the y coefficients for both countries, which indicate a
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significant association (0.56 UK and 0.65 IT) between Euro-citizenship and attitudes 
towards Europe. The positive coefficients suggest that as the level of ‘identification’ 
increases, the level of ‘attachment’ should increase as well. Table 5 shows that the 
positive association effectively concerns two categories: ‘compatibility’ and ‘European 
only’. In fact, 60 per cent of the British and 86 per cent of the Italians who have a 
positive attachment to Europe think of themselves as Europeans while 58 per cent of 
the people in Britain and 78 per cent in Italy think that the two forms of identification 
(i.e., National and European) are compatible. This is in line with Reif s finding that 
62% of EU people interviewed in 1992 saw European identity as being compatible 
with national identity. Reif s analysis, however, is based on a different variable that 
measures the extent to which the European Union constitutes a Toss of nationality’ or it 
is ‘compatible with national identity’ (1993: 138-140). Though different, the variable 
used by Reif and that employed here are sufficiently alike to facilitate a direct 
comparison.
Table 5. Cross-tabulation between Euro-citizenship and European Support 
Typology 1994.
UK IT
National
only
Comp. Europ.
only
National
only
Comp. Europ.
Only
Negative 24% 5% 12% 9% 1% -
Ambivalent 52 37 28 51 21 14
Positive 24 58 60 40 78 86
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid cases 650 566 80 266 697 49
UK Valid cases = 1296 y  0.56, p-value = 0.000 
IT Valid cases = 1012 y  0.65, p-value =0.000
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What the table does not show is the distribution of respondents across other intervening 
conditions. The introduction of other variables facilitates an understanding of whether 
or not this relationship is genuine and what might cause differences between 
countries11. Each socio-demographic variable has different values. I have constructed 
partial tables that illustrate the original relationship in a more detailed form. By using 
partial relationships, it is possible to detect whether the effect of a third variable 
changes the strength of the relationship. A comparison of the y coefficients in each 
subtable with the overall y coefficient computed in Table 5 illustrates that none of the 
intervening variables changes considerably the strength of the relationship12. The 
changes in the subtable y coefficients from the overall y are not sufficiently great to 
invalidate the original relationship, but a few remarks will clarify some of the 
significant differences between the two countries.
In the first place, the relationship attenuates for the group of younger 
respondents in both countries. Among the younger groups the negative response in the 
category of ‘Nationality Only’ is insufficient to undermine the positive attachment to 
Europe. This is because younger respondents, particularly in the UK, deal better with 
the two levels of identification expressed by the category of ‘Compatibility’ (Tables. 
5a. 1, 5a.2). In the UK, the somewhat weaker relationship between ‘European Support 
Typology’ and ‘Euro-citizenship’ is caused by the especially weak relationship 
between the two variables among the category of respondents with a low level of
11 The variables in question are age, education and gender. Age and Education are coded in the following 
manner: Low Age = 15-24; Medium Age = 25- 39; High Age = 40 and more. Low Education = O’ level ; 
Medium Education = A level; Higher Education = University level.
12 The ‘Overall y’ is the y coefficient calculated from a bivariate relationship. This expression is used 
to differentiate it from the ‘subtable y’ or ‘partial y’ obtained from the introduction o f a control 
variable on the bivariate relationship.
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education. In Italy, by contrast, the relationship grows stronger and is influenced by the 
category of respondents with medium level of education. (Tables. 5b. 1, 5b.2). With 
respect to the effect of gender, the relationship is stronger among women in the UK and 
among men in Italy. (Tables.5c.l, 5c.2). These national differences are not so 
significant that they invalidate consistency/convergence across both countries, and it is 
still possible to argue that ‘identification’ is not a determining factor for positive 
attitude towards Europe (attachment).
Table 5a.l. European Support Typology by Euro-citizenship controlling for Age 
(percentages). UK
UK Age Group 15-24 Age Group 25-39 Age Group 40 and more
Attachment
European
Support
Typology
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Negative 11% 1 - 22 4 4 29 6 24
Ambivalent 54 40 53 57 37 22 49 36 21
Positive 35 59 47 21 59 74 22 58 55
Total % 
Total Cases 
Subtable y
100%
241
0.38
100% 100% 100%
344
0.65
100% 100% 100%
711
0.54
100% 100%
Overall y 0.56 (p-value 0.000)
Table 5a.2. European Support Typology by Euro-citizenship controlling for Age 
(percentages). ITALY
ITALY Age Group 15-24 Age Group 25-39 Age Group 40 and more
Attachment
European
Support
Typology
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Negative 13% 1% - 5% 2% - 10% 1% -
Ambivalent 44 27 21 51 22 7 52 19 14
Positive 43 72 79 44 76 93 38 81 86
Total % 
Total Cases 
Subtable y
100%
210
0.49
100% 100% 100%
258
0.63
100% 100% 100%
544
0.72
100% 100%
Overall y 0.65 (p-value 0.000)
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Table 5b. 1. European Support Typology by Euro-citizenship controlling for Education 
(percentages). UK
UK Educ Group Low Educ Group Medium Educ Group High
Attachment Affect Affect Affect
European
Support
Typology
Euro-citizenship Euro-citizenship Euro-citizenship
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Negative 28% 14% 21% 23% 5% 16% 21% 1% -
Ambivalent 48 41 36 57 43 26 38 26 26
Positive 24 45 43 20 52 60 41 73 74
Total % 
Total Cases 
Subtable y
100%
214
0.35
100% 100% 100%
767
0.55
100% 100% 100%
313
0.56
100% 100%
Overall y 0.56 (p-value 0.000)
Table 5b.2. Support by Euro-citizenship controlling for Education 
(percentages). ITALY
ITALY Educ Group Low Educ Group Medium Educ Group High
Attachment Affect Affect Affect
European
Support
Typology
Euro-citizenship Euro-citizenship Euro-citizenship
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Nation
Only
Comp Europ
only
Negative 8% 2% - 13% 1% - 9% 1% -
Ambivalent 57 29 33 47 16 8 43 19 13
Positive 35 69 67 40 83 92 48 80 87
Total % 
Total Cases 
Subtable y
100%
341
0.58
100% 100% 100%
227
0.74
100% 100% 100%
444
0.58
100% 100%
Overall y 0.65 (p-value 0.000)
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Table 5c. 1. Support by Euro-citizenship controlling for gender (percentages) 
UK.
UK Gender
Male
Gender
Female
Attachment Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
European
Support
Typology
National
only
Compatible European
only
National
only
Compatible European
only
Negative 27% 6% 13% 22% 4% 11%
Ambivalent 42 32 23 59 42 37
Positive 31 62 64 19 54 52
Total % 
Total Cases 
Subtable y 
Overall y
100%
630
0.50
0.56
(p-value
0.000)
100% 100% 100%
666
0.61
100% 100%
Table 5c.2. European Support Typology by Euro-citizenship controlling for 
gender (percentages) ITALY
ITALY Gender
Male
Gender
Female
Attachment Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
European
Support
Typology
National
only
Compatible European
only
National
only
Compatible European
only
Negative 11% 1% - 8% 1 -
Ambivalent 47 20 3 54 23 30
Positive 42 79 97 38 76 70
Total % 
Total Cases 
Subtable y
Overall y
100%
484
0.70
0.65
(p-value
0.000
100% 100% 100%
528
0.61
100% 100%
It is worth noting that a higher negative attachment to Europe does not correspond to a 
higher identification with ‘Nationality only’ as I had expected. In Italy, in particular, 
there is a greater discrepancy between negative and positive attachment. 40 per cent of 
those who identify with ‘Nationality only’ have a positive attachment towards Europe 
against only 9 per cent expressing a negative attachment. This reveals that national
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identification is not a determining factor for influencing positive or negative attachment 
(Fig.l). Reif ‘s analysis on a similar point offers an explanation when he suggests that a 
stronger sense of belonging to the more ‘immediate communities’ does not imply a 
rejection of a European political community. In 1992, according to Reif 46 per cent of 
Europeans saw the European Union as a protection for their national identities and 
cultures, while only 30 per cent saw it as a threat (1993:138).
It is implausible to suppose that ‘attachment’ is influenced by Euro-citizenship 
(identification/affect) because it is not possible to establish that these two variables 
have a causal relationship. One can argue, however, that a substantial proportion in 
both countries are confident that the European Union can protect national cultural 
identities and their diversity. This is consistent with the ‘politics of assurance’ pursued 
by governments at the national and European levels13. We have seen that nationality 
does not influence a negative or a positive ‘attachment’ towards the European Union. 
Can we say the same thing with respect to Euro-citizenship? In other words, does 
nationality play an important role in the process of ‘affective involvement’ towards the 
EU?
It has been possible to make the variable of citizenship independent from that of 
nationality. People were asked if they were ‘proud’ or ‘not proud’ of their nationality 
(Eurobarometer: 42). Some theoretical approaches to the problem assume that ‘national 
pride’ and European feelings are unrelated (Duchesne and Frognier, 1995). Based on 
the data in Tables 6a and 6b, it is possible to argue that although ‘national pride’ tend to 
decrease as the values for European identification increase, the level of identification
13 See Chapter 4 above.
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with Europe is higher in both countries among those who are proud of their nationality 
than among those less proud (56 per cent against 44 per cent in the UK, and 64 per cent 
against 36 per cent in Italy). Again, the level of ‘compatibility’ is stronger among those 
who are proud of their nationality against those who are not.
Table 6a. Cross-tabulation between National Pride and Euro-citizenship.
UK
Nationality Only Compatible European
Only
Proud 92% 86% 56%
Not Proud 8 14 44
Total % 100% 100% 100%
Valid Cases 631 540 78
UK Valid cases: 1249 y  0.49, p-value = 0.000
Note: Entries are percentages.
Source: Eurobarometer: 42. My own elaboration o f  raw data from ESRC Data Archive. 
Table 6b. Cross-tabulation between National Pride and Euro-Citizenship
ITALY
Nationality Only Compatible European
Only
Proud 86% 84% 64%
Not Proud 14 16 36
Total % 100% 100% 100%
Valid Cases 250 667 42
Italy Valid cases: 959 J  coefficient 0.20 Significance = 0.000 
Note: Entries are percentages.
Source: Ibid.
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It is therefore possible to argue that the European Union does not constitute a 
threat to national identity, and that the establishment of Euro-citizenship encourages the 
development of a dimension in which more levels of identities are possible. This, 
nevertheless implies a low level of ‘affective involvement’ with Europe. In other 
words, while Europe symbolises protection for nationality, Euro-citizenship does not 
represent a dimension with which people identify.
This leads to the search not for new patterns of identification but rather for a 
‘space’ in which one can have more identities than nationalities (Meehan, 1993: 155). 
This is what Euro-citizenship should symbolise. As Preuss put it, ‘an open symbolic 
space for social activities which finally will lead to a civil society’ but beyond the 
symbolic boundaries set by nationality (Preuss, 1995: 280). This is also what Smith 
claims when he says that there is ‘room for competing forces of identity in Western 
culture’ (1992:56). The reconciliation of ‘identity pluralism’ with supra-nationalism 
nevertheless is still a challenging idea when a supra-national identity reinforces 
national identities rather than undercuts them. The European idea has in fact reinforced 
rather than undermined the ideology of nationality (Delanty, 1995: 8). Ignoring the 
politics of nationality in the European Union, therefore, would not be as misguided as 
Smith and others have argued (1986, 1992). This is because it is impossible to consider 
the EU in the romantic terms of a nation. The EU should be seen rather as a rational 
‘political and economic association’ After all, we have seen that the contradictions 
between European identity and national identities can be minimised in the context of 
the latter.
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Figure 1. The Affective orientation towards Attachment.
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6.1.4 The Utilitarian’ orientation
As shown, the level of ‘attachment’ is not necessarily dictated by the feeling of 
belonging to a supra-national entity. This can also reflect the fact that respondents do 
not consider the question of Euro-citizenship as a matter of choice, which draws 
attention to the political controversy surrounding the possibility of opting out of Euro- 
citizenship14. The institutions of the EU, such as citizenship have largely been created 
independently of the expressed will of national populations, even though their benign 
acquiescence was instrumental in the project’s success.
Subsequently, Euro-citizenship may symbolise a functional means to satisfy 
citizens’ expectations of the European Union. This has little to do with the matter of 
identity and reveals an opposite tendency to the broader European political project that 
considers Euro-citizenship the main force to foster the process of European identity. 
The fact that Euro-citizenship and a positive attitude towards Europe are not linked in a 
causal relationship probably entails that the ‘attachment’ of being European depends 
more on ‘utilitarian’ support. This is in accordance with Inglehart when he argues that 
‘utilitarian’ support relates to perceptions of concrete gains and losses through the 
Community (Inglehart, 1977).
The Tables above outline that Euro-citizenship after Maastricht has not yet 
developed relevant ‘affective’ orientations. This assertion, however, does not per se 
deny the development of a European identity. Rather, it confirms that the establishment 
of a new citizenship, based on nationality (Art. 8-8e TEU) as a fundamental criterion 
for access to social rights, should not be a substantive condition. The ‘utilitarian’
14 See Chapter 4 above.
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orientation has been tested through questions on (1) benefits gained through one’s own 
country membership to European Union; (2) positive and negative feelings of being a 
member of the EU; and (3) reactions to a hypothetical dissolution of the EU15. A close 
look at Tables 7a-c reveals a picture that broadly conforms to the ‘utilitarian’ theory 
discussed above. The series of frequencies show that the general orientation is positive 
even for the UK, which gives negative support for Europe. A quick look at the y 
coefficients (Tables 8a-c) reveals that there is a much stronger association between 
‘utilitarian variables’ and the general attitudes towards Europe in comparison with to 
the above-mentioned ‘affective’ correlation of citizenship with the attitude towards 
Europe (Table 5). The three socio-demographic variables considered (education, age, 
and gender) do not seem to affect this relationship, as the subtable y coefficients 
computed reported the same values of the overall y.
Table 7a. ‘Utilitarian orientation9. Membership country benefit (1994)
UK IT
Benefited 53% 75%
Not benefited 4y 25
Total% 100% 100%
Valid cases 1061 y l4
Note: Entries are percentages
Source: Eurobarometer 42. My own elaboration o f raw data from ESRC Data Archive
15 See footnote no. 4 above.
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Table 7b. ‘Utilitarian orientation’. Membership ‘good or bad thing’ (1994)
UK IT
Good thing 52% 78%
Bad thing 48 22
Total % 100% 100%
Valid cases 1061 714
Note: Entries are percentages 
Source: Ibid.
Table 7c. ‘Utilitarian orientation’. EU Dissolution regret (1994)
UK IT
Very sorry 28% 62%
Indifferent 48 34
Very relieved 24 4
Total % 100% 100%
Valid case 1061 714
Note: Entries are percentages.
Source: Ibid.
Table 8a. Cross-tabulation between ‘Membership country benefit’ and I
support typology (attachment).
UK IT
Not Benefit Benefit Not Benefit Benefit
Negative
Ambivalent
35%
49
2%
29
17%
45 13
Positive 16 69 38 87
Total % 
Valid Cases
100%
519
100%
579
100%
191
100%
547
Entries are percentages.
UK Valid cases 1098, y  coefficient 0.80, p-value =0.000 
IT Valid cases 738, y  coefficient 0.81, p-value = 0.000 
Source: Ibid.
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Table 8b. Cross-tabulation between Membership ‘good or bad thing9 and EU 
support typology (attachment)
UK IT
Bad Thing Good Thing Bad Thing Good Thing 
Negative 78% - 58%
Ambivalent 22 13 42 2
Positive - 87 - 98
Total% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid Cases 259 614 57 683
Entries are percentages.
UK Valid cases 873, y Coefficient lp-value=0.000 
IT Valid cases 740, y  Coefficient J_p-value = 0.000 
Source: Ibid.
Table 8c. Cross-tabulation between EU Dissolution Regret and EU support 
typology (attachment).
UK IT
Very
Relieved
Indifferent Very
Sorry
Very
Relieved
Indifferent Very
Sorry
Negative 53% 5% 1% 66% 3% -
Ambivalent 45 60 13 26% 58 10
Positive 2 35 86 8 39 90
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid case 316 619 355 35 330 599
Entries are percentages.
UK Valid cases 1290 J  coefficient 0.90, p-value = 0.000
IT Valid cases 964 y  coefficient 0.88, p-value=0.000 
Source: Ibid.
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The correlation between ‘utilitarian’ orientation and support can be translated 
into causation, as Inglehart argues (1977), and this can be useful to detect broader 
trends. It would be imprecise to draw the same conclusions as far as the ‘affective’ 
orientation is concerned. This analysis, in which the EU is seen more as a ‘rational’ 
than an ‘emotional’ political and economic association, undermines the assumption that 
Euro-citizenship should encourage the development of a European identity. The lack of 
an ‘emotional Europe’, however, neither produces ‘confusion’ as Papcke argues (1992: 
66), nor the need for a new interpretation of identity that fits modernity (1992: 70). 
Rather, there are parallel categorisations of identities in a context in which one does not 
exclude the other. Does Euro-citizenship foster more ‘individual or collective identity’? 
Does it serve ‘family culture’ or ‘economic and political unions’?16 These questions 
probably reflect the main impasse of the European political project in establishing a 
rational Euro-citizenship that is not ‘optional’ or ‘situational’ within an ‘economic and 
political union’ rather than a ‘family culture’.
6.2 ‘Cognitive mobilization9 and the process of Europeanisation
Hoffmann (1966) and Inglehart (1970) hypothesise that nationality is the ‘springboard’ 
for European identity. This approach puts more emphasis on the role of existing 
nationalities as an essential starting point to develop Euro-citizenship. The opinion held 
by many contemporary political European elite claims that, over time, identity will
16 This is a distinction made by Smith between ‘collective’ and ‘individual’ identity that consists of 
considering the former more pervasive and less subject to rapid changes, while the latter ‘situational’ 
or optional (1992: 59). On the other hand, he defines the ‘political or economic unions’ as a rationally 
constructed set o f institutions and deliberated creations opposed to the ‘families o f culture’ that come 
into being over long time-spans and are the product o f  particular historical circumstances, often 
unintentional (1992:71).
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follow. The persistence of national identities therefore would not constitute a 
considerable barrier to the Euro-citizenship project but rather will foster its 
development (Duchesne and Frognier, 1995: 203). In this view, the internationalisation 
of the feeling of belonging is an extension of the same process at the national level. 
This is in line with both the political arguments that Euro-citizenship does not develop 
at the expense of nationality and with the data analysis suggesting a high level of 
tolerance towards ‘compatibility’. This approach, however, is based on the following 
traditional model in which citizenship is attached to the concept of collective identity. 
Community----------- Citizenship------------ Identity.
According to Preuss, when citizenship follows the formation of the community, 
citizenship is ‘exclusive’. This is because membership in the Community is not a 
matter of choice. This is exactly the case in the European Community in its present 
form. On the contrary, in order to facilitate the access to the status of citizen, Preuss 
suggests that citizenship should anticipate the formation of a political community and 
be a matter of choice (1995a: 108). This model would eventually detach the concept of 
citizenship from the quest for individual and collective identity and hence legal 
subjectivity. It would be illustrated as:
Citizenship----------- Community------------- Multiple Identities.
If Hoffman and Inglehart’s approach is correct, then European identity will 
follow from the first specification. As a consequence, neither residence nor the capacity 
and the willingness to participate as an equal in an association of equals under common 
laws are sufficient condition of citizenship (Preuss, 1996: 129). It is a vain attempt,
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therefore, to discuss European identity as long as the concept of European citizenship 
implies a form of membership in a community not as a matter of choice.
Deutsch provides a moderate slant on the European project claiming that 
identity only occurs through communication. Hence, he defines the notion of ‘social 
mobilisation’ (1961) from which Inglehart derives his notion of ‘cognitive 
mobilisation’. The essence of community, for Deutsch, is the ability to ‘communicate 
more effectively with members of one group than with outsiders’ (Deutsch, 1966: 97). 
He claims that considerable barriers to effective communicative action in Europe 
prevent any real sense of community. In this view, a mutual compatibility of main 
values could create the basis for an amalgamated security community, in which values 
and habits of action could mark the differentiation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. It would be 
interesting to analyse whether the communicative action becomes a primary tool for 
constructing spheres of ‘compatibility’ at the supra-national level.
Cognitive mobilisation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
development of support for a European Community, in as much as one must become 
aware of it before one can develop a sense of commitment’ (Inglehart, 1970: 47). It is 
in this respect that Inglehart asserts cognitive mobilisation and education as two 
important factors to understand the development of a supra-national political identity17. 
My findings (Tables 2a/2b) confirm this assertion. The Tables show that education is 
significantly related to ‘European Support Typology’ and that this relationship is still 
significant with the introduction of other intervening variables. For example, it has 
been possible to observe that a higher level of education corresponds to a more positive
17 Papcke also stresses the importance o f education in the process o f  identity formation in Europe 
(1992: 67).
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attitude towards ‘compatibility’ across all age groups. This suggests that education is a 
formative factor embodying an awareness element in the process of social mobilisation.
The basic thrust of Inglehart’s argument is that post-modern conceptions of 
identity are fluid, and the individuals best able to cope with more than one sphere of 
identity are those with greater ‘cognitive mobility’. This is the reason why Inglehart 
regards formal education as an indicator of cognitive mobilisation. Through ‘cognitive 
mobilisation’ according to Inglehart, national and supra-national levels tend to function 
as a single cosmopolitan communication network rather than as separate competing 
spheres.
National citizens will be socialised as Europeans through their network of relations. 
According to this approach the development of a supra-national identity is possible 
only through the formation of supra-national institutions. This provides the rationale for 
the proposition that Euro-citizenship should foster supra-national identity. In the 
framework of this analysis, I assumed that the respondents who have greater ‘cognitive 
mobility’ are those who better identify themselves within the level of ‘compatibility’.
Inglehart, in his consideration, understates two main problems: (1) the differing 
importance of the political sphere in the process of identification at the national and 
supra-national levels and (2) the risk of social divisiveness. In relation to the latter, 
there will be little difficulty in socialising those who are best able to cope with the 
fluidity of European and national identity, and who can take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the flexibility of an integrated Europe. It will be more difficult, 
however, to socialise those who can only speak one language and who are wedded to 
national traditions. The present system carries with it the dominance of a European
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cosmopolitan elite. This could cause a revival of the national politics that is already 
presently visible in many European states.
Consequently, any new conception of Euro-citizenship must also be applicable 
to those less able to cope with a European project that they perceive as out of reach and 
out of touch with the daily realities of their lives. A new conception of citizenship as 
recognition and communication with others through rights could probably help to solve 
this problem. It seems that no single factor dominates a conception of European 
identity, and as such there is no single solution to the dilemma of how to create one.
6.2.1 Supra-national values
Although the process of cognitive mobilisation does not guarantee a sufficient 
condition for the development of identification and support towards Europe, it 
increases the degree of integration in cosmopolitan networks. The integration process 
cannot occur without value mobilisation, and it is therefore important to identify the 
values that determine individual orientations in the transition from national to supra­
national conditions. I shall consider here the classification of Materialist and Post- 
Materialist orientations.18 From an analysis of the survey data, it is possible to draw 
some general characteristics that differentiate a Post-Materialist attitude from a 
Materialist one. The values shift from the rates of economic growth to the level of life 
satisfaction. Firstly, Post-Materialist societies enjoy lower rates of economic growth 
and higher levels of life satisfaction. Secondly, Post-Materialists are half as likely as 
Materialists are to describe themselves as very proud of their nationality. Finally,
18 See above, n.2.
Chapter 6: Opinion polls and the process of European self-identification 241
Materialists are almost three times as likely as Post-Materialists to support employment 
discrimination favouring the native bom over foreigners, and six times as likely to say 
that they would not want to have foreigners as neighbours (Inglehart, 1997: 247-248).
Considering this classification, one should expect to find that the value 
orientation among those who support Europe should be Materialist for two reasons. In 
the first place, today’s Europe is more oriented towards economic and commercial 
values. Secondly, in both Italy and the UK, Materialist orientations prevail over Post- 
Materialist ones (Table 9). The data for both countries nevertheless demonstrate that 
Post-Materialist values prevail over Materialist ones in supporting Europe. A shift from 
a Materialist to a Post-Materialist standpoint will imply that issues such as loss of 
national identity and immigration do not constitute a disturbing factor for people’s life 
satisfaction.
The cross-tabulations in Tables 10a and 10b show that there is a significant 
relationship between these two variables. Those who express a compatibility between 
nationality and Euro-citizenship, moreover, are more oriented towards Post-Materialist 
values. This helps us to determine the degree to which one can translate ‘support’ into 
‘identification’. In other words, the ‘affective’ orientation that Post-Materialist values 
embody can test an ‘affective’ element in the desire for integration. Importantly, 
cognitive mobilisation towards Europe does not eliminate the effect of Post-Materialist 
values.
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Table 9. Value Orientation (Materialist /Post-Materialist)
UK IT
Materialist 21% 23%
Mixed 65 61
Post-Materialist 14 16
Total % 100% 100%
Valid cases 1351 1055
Table 10a. Cross-tabulation between Value Orientation (Materialist/Post- 
Materialist) and Euro-citizenship.
UK IT
Materialist Mixed Post-
Materialist
Materialist Mixed Post-
Materialist
Nationality
Only
63% 49% 34% 34% 27% 12%
Compatible 31 45 57 63 70 75
European Only 6 6 9 3 4 13
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid cases 281 837 178 233 618 161
Valid cases UK =1296; y  0.28p-value = 0.000 Valid cases IT =1012; y 0.33p-value = 0.000
Note: My own elaboration o f raw data from ESRC Data Archive: Entries are percentages. Source: Eurobarometer 42.
Table 10b. Cross-tabulations between Value Orientation (Materialist/Post- 
Materialist) and European Support Typology.
Materialist
UK
Mixed Post- Materialist
IT
Mixed Post-
Negative 16% 15%
Materialist
12% 4% 3%
Materialist
1%
Ambivalent 48 47 29 34 29 26
Positive 36 38 59 62 68 73
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid cases 289 876 186 244 642 169
Valid cases UK = 1351J  0.17p-value = 0.000 
Valid cases IT = 1055 J  0.15p-value = 0.000 
Note: Entries are percentages. Source: Ibid.
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6.2.2 The impact of European identification on the perception of ‘otherness’
As immigration has moved centre-stage providing much of the impetus for new 
political movements, another major area of inquiry concerns the manner in which the 
change in value orientation from a national to a supra-national context affects the 
concept of identity in relation to the recognition of ‘others’. In a cosmopolitan network 
the classification of ‘others’ should not depend upon national divisions. Europeans 
differ among themselves as much as from non-Europeans with respect to language, 
territory, law, religion and political systems (Smith, 1992: 70).
If the process of European identification does hot occur through the 
establishment of Euro-citizenship, can one say that the formation of a ‘us’ as Europeans 
is taking place through the definition of the category of a ‘them’? As Delanty suggests, 
the European ‘us’ becomes focused on opposition to the ‘other’ rather than on a sense 
of belongingness and solidarity. Identification takes place, in other words, through the 
imposition of otherness in the formation of a binary typology of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (1995: 
5 ) .
Fuchs, et al. argue that migration flows are deemed essential to the construction 
of so-called ‘Eurocentrism’. What emerges from their analysis is that the 
conceptualisation of ‘outsiders’ by European public opinion marks a general change in 
that the boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are not drawn between individual 
European countries but within countries between natives and immigrant foreigners. In 
this view, there are no obstacles for the formation of a European identity ‘in so far as
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there is no or little negative evaluation of foreigners from other European societies’ 
(1995: 175).
This approach is limited as it concerns only the problem of negative and 
positive evaluation of ‘otherness’ among Europeans. In their analysis, moreover, Fuchs 
and his co-authors see ‘Eurocentrism’ as favouring the formation of a European 
identity. In my view, however, this would be rather dysfunctional towards the 
legitimisation of ‘pluralism’.
The perception of human diversity varies considerably from one country to 
another. The process relies on two connected factors: (a) different sets of traditional 
values across countries; and (b) the association of traditional values with negative 
attitudes. The clear distinction that emerges is not so much a north-south division but 
rather a reflection of different traditions in terms of history and migration between 
countries with a long culture of emigration on the one hand, and those with 
considerable immigrant populations mainly from former colonies on the other.
In observing people’s reactions towards ‘others’, it has been possible to 
differentiate between two separate practices according to nationality. The definition of 
immigrants is shaped in relation to these groups. Table 11 suggests that the association 
made by respondents clearly points to different perceptions of ‘otherness’19. In countries 
with higher levels of immigration such as the United Kingdom, the idea of others 
relates chiefly to non-European populations. On the contrary, in Italy where
19 The category o f ‘otherness’ refers to the variable’Foreign Population-Quantity’, which is based 
upon answers to the question: How do you feel about foreigners living in your country. The possible 
answer are: 1-Too Many; 2-A lot but not too many; 3- Not many. Eurobarometer: 42.
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immigration is a very recent phenomenon, people identify European nationals as 
foreigners20.
Although Italians consider non-Italian EU citizens as foreigners, their attitude 
towards immigration is positive. According to data illustrated in Table 12, 48 per cent 
of Italian respondents agree on the acceptance of immigrants from within the EU 
without restrictions. This is consistent with a more positive attitude towards Europe, 
among Italians, and with the fact that Italian reluctance towards immigrants in general 
is related more to ‘race’ than nationality. Intolerance in Italy indeed appears to be 
linked to the matter of ‘race’ (colour of the skin and religion). On the other hand, the 
British attitude is consistent both with their reluctance towards the European Union and 
their tolerance towards other races linked to a colonial past. In other words, reluctance 
towards immigrants in the UK is rooted more in nationality and culture.
20 On this point, Fuchs et al. argue that the more foreigners o f a certain nationality live in a country, 
the greater is the probability that they will be perceived as ‘others’.
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Table 11. When you hear about people of another nationality, whom do you think 
of?
(Spontaneous answers) UK IT
. Southern Europeans 3 2
. Eastern Europeans 2 8
. Other Europeans 13 25
. North Africans 1 20
. Africans 7 16
. Asians - Far East 44 4
. Asians - Middle East 1 1
. Other Asians 9 1
. Turks - -
. North Americans 5 20
. Central Americans 10 0
. Latin Americans - 1
. Oceaneans 1 -
. All foreigners, 
non-nationals
4 0
. Immigrants, refugees 0 0
. Other 1 -
. Nobody in particular 7 4
Tablel2. Attitude towards immigrants from other EU countries. (1993)
UK IT
Accept without restriction 29% 48%
Accept with restriction 53 42
Not be accepted 18 10
Total % 100% 100%
Valid cases 1322 987
Source: My own elaboration o f  raw data from Euro-Barometer 39: European Community Policies and Family 
Life, March - April 1993.
The analysis has been extended to ascertain whether the process of changing the 
orientation of values is limited to the rationality of the European Union or whether it 
involves a process of value internationalisation. In this respect, anti-foreigner views are 
considered in relation to the increasing predominance of Post-Materialist value- 
orientations. If nationality is so fluid and does not constitute a major obstacle to
Chapter 6: Opinion polls and the process o f European self-identification 247
cognitive mobilisation, then it would be reasonable to expect that the process is also 
valid for those who do not share a given sense of national identity.
The data suggest that (a) respondents who have Post-Materialist orientations 
also tend to be more tolerant towards foreigners (Table 13); and that (b) those who 
identify with Europe are also more open towards ‘others’. Table 14, again, shows that 
the acceptance of both forms of identification facilitate a positive attitude towards 
foreigners. In both Italy and the UK, those who accept a compatibility between the two 
forms of identification are expected to be more tolerant of foreigners perhaps 
constituting an indirect impact of Euro-citizenship on the perception of ‘otherness’. 
This category of people represents those with greater ‘cognitive mobility’. 
Consequently, issues such as the loss of national identity and immigration should not 
constitute a disturbing factor for their ‘life satisfaction’. Figure 2 highlights common 
features in public attitudes with reference to value orientation.
Figure 2. Value Orientation and Public Attitudes in UK and Italy
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Affective orientation 
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Attachment 
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Tables 14a and 14b show that the relationship between ‘Euro-citizenship’ and ‘attitude 
towards foreigners’ grows stronger in both countries for the category of Post- 
Materialist than for the category of Materialist, but in Italy the relationship becomes 
negligible for the category of Materialist (Table 14b. Subtable y 0.03). Figure 3 
summarises the major differences between these two countries. The United Kingdom 
shows a stronger causal relationship between those who identify with Europe and 
tolerance towards foreigners. In Italy, on the other hand the level of tolerance is very 
moderate and does not rely on identification with Europe. This restates the results 
illustrated in Table 14.
Again, it is unlikely that a consideration of socio-demographic variables would 
invalidate the consistency, in comparative terms, of attitudes across these two nation­
states. There is a lack of homogeneity, which obviously causes different perceptions of 
problems and institutional changes that renders the reality of a new Europe more 
difficult to grasp. It is too generic, however, to refer simply to culture. If a new form of 
identification does not influence people in their attitudes towards foreigners, for 
instance, people will tend to react in accordance with governments’ decisions. The 
measure of tolerance, therefore, needs to be weighed in relation to government action 
towards socio-structural problems of integration.
Neither Euro-citizenship nor the effect of the new geo-political context on the 
definition of the category of non-citizens facilitates the formation of a new identity. The 
new ‘community’ to which we are referring is an ‘economic and political union’ far 
from what Smith calls the ‘European families of culture’(1992: 70-71)21. The formation
21 With ‘families o f culture’, Smith refers to the Wittgensteinian concepts o f ‘family resemblances’ 
and of the ‘language game’. Smith believes that ‘the sum total o f all Europe’s states and communities
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of European identity therefore relies perhaps on the degree of common purposes in 
political decisions, which are not easy to achieve because of ‘the need for European 
governments to respond to their national public opinion and the failure of Europeans to
agree on a common policy’ (Smith, 1992: 73).
Table 13. Cross-Tabulation between Value Orientation (Materialist/Post- 
Materialist) and attitude towards foreigners.
UK IT
Materialist Mixed Post-
Materialist
Materialist Mixed Post-
Materialist
Too many 47% 38% 20% 60% 51% 32%
A lot but not 31 39 50 33 43 55
too many
Not many 22 23 30 7 6 13
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid Cases 275 826 177 238 620 162
UK valid cases = 1278 J 0.20p-value = 0.000 Italy valid cases = 1020 J  0.27p-value 0.000 
Notes: Entries are percentages Sources: Eurobarometer: 42. Ibid.
Table 14. Cross-Tabulation between Attitude Towards Foreigners and Euro- 
citizenship (Affect).
UK IT
Nationality Compatible European Nationality Compatible European
only only only only
Too many 52% 24% 27% 64% 44% 32%
A lot but not 32 45 37 31 48 53
too many
Not many 16 31 36 5 8 15
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid Cases 616 547 74 259 674 47
UK Valid cases 1237 y 0.41 p-value = 0.011
IT Valid cases 980 J  0.35 p-value = 0.001
Notes: Entries are percentages Sources: Eurobarometer: 42. Ibid.
has a historically revealed gamut of overlapping and boundary-transcending political traditions and 
cultural heritages, which together make up what we may call the European experience and the 
‘European families o f cultures’ (1992: 71).
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Figure 3. Value Orientation and the Level of Tolerance Towards Foreigners
Post-Materialist High
Tolerance
Attitude Towards 
Foreigners
Materialist Low
Tolerance
Table 14a. Attitude Towards Foreigners by Euro-citizenship controlling for 
Value Orientation (Materialist/Post-Materialistl. UK _____________________
UK MATERIALIST MIXED POST-MATERIALIST
Attitude
Foreigner
Affect
Euro-citizenshiD
Affect
Euro-citizenshiD
AFFECT
Euro-citizenshiD
Nation.
Only
Comp Europ.
Only
Nation.
Only
Comp Europ.
Only
Nation.
Only
Comp Europ.
Only
Too many 55% 36% 29% 52% 25% 36% 41% 9% 7%
A lot but 
not too 
many
29 33 29 31 46 38 48 54 40
Not many 16 31 41 17 29 26 11 37 53
Total % 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Valid
Cases
268 799 170
Subtable y
0.36 0.36 0.61
Overall y
0.41
Tab 14b. Attitude Towards Foreigners by Euro-citizenship controlling for 
Value Orientation (Materialist/Post-Materialisfh Italy.
IT MATERIALIST MIXED POST-MATERIALIST
Attitude
Foreigner
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Affect
Euro-citizenship
Nation.
Only
Comp Europ.
Only
Nation.
Only
Comp Europ.
Only
Nation.
Only
Comp Europ.
Only
Too many 
A lot but 
not too 
many 
Not many 
Total % 
Valid 
Cases 
Subtable y 
Overall v
60%
35
100%
227
0.03
0.35
56%
36
8
100%
83%
17
100%
65%
30
100%
598
0.33
46%
47
100%
38%
52
10
100%
75%
20
100%
155
0.62
29%
60
11
100%
10%
65
25
100%
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Figure 3a. Value orientation (Materialist) and level of tolerance towards 
foreigners by Euro-citizenship.
Materialist
• Identification with Europe
• Compatibility
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IT
UK
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Intolerance
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Figure 3b. Value orientation (Post-Materialist) and the level of tolerance towards 
foreigners by Euro-citizenship.
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Moderate tolerance
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Post-Materialist
To sum up the major results of this analysis, it is possible to outline three main 
points. First, Euro-citizenship does not influence the level of attachment to the Euro- 
polity. Secondly, the symbolic function of citizenship does not facilitate the process of
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identification. Finally, if one considers Euro-citizenship as a means of mobilisation of 
values, it also needs to be measured in relation to new values orientation.
Conclusion
If this is the era of ‘post-westphalian state citizenship’ (Linklater, 1996), then the 
European citizen is not a citizen of a traditional nation-state. In this supra-national 
environment, common values are de-traditionalised (Giddens, 1997) and the role of the 
state is being subverted. As a consequence, the control of social, political, and 
economic problems must supersede the politics of the traditional state to facilitate the 
process of identification with the new political entity. This is Euro-citizenship’s major 
failure, as it is unable to become the mediator of the change in value orientation from a 
national to a supra-national context.
The dilemma concerning the existence of a European public sphere that 
mediates the relationship between citizens and the new institutional order is not 
dominated by a single factor. It has been shown that nationality is not functional to a 
process of ‘affective’ orientation towards Europe. Rather, the mobilisation of values 
from a national to a supra-national context is guided by common factors such as Post- 
Materialist values. It is not appropriate to argue that education, age, and gender affect 
the definition of supra-national cleavages. In comparative terms there are still 
significant differences across age, education, and gender at the national level, but they 
do not greatly affect common features between countries.
It is difficult to determine whether the ultimate realisation of a supra-national 
context would generate affective orientations. In my view, this does not constitute the 
main problem as far as individual attitudes are concerned. There is not a desire of
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‘belonging’ but rather a higher level of individualism that is translated into a more 
direct participation in resolving practical issues. Further democratisation will be a 
particularly important component in the process. Hoping that differences between the 
Italians and the British will simply evaporate over time is one thing. Hoping that 
differences between the Italians and the Kurds will do likewise is another. The 
European Union must find a way to unite its new polity in a pluralistic process of 
democracy appropriate not to the national state but to the new global environment. 
There are major problems with this process. Despite discussion of the EU as an 
emergent state, it fails most criteria of statehood. It is, therefore, imperative to find a 
way of drawing individuals into a supra-national sphere of ‘legality’ in order to make 
them aware not of a new identity but rather of progressive changes in the sphere of their 
new societal relationships.
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Introduction
This chapter illustrates the manner in which the means of citizenship, at the supra­
national level have been re-prioritised from political to social rights. In the process of 
integration social rights become more functional than political rights though mainly 
with respect to EU citizens and within the Euro-citizenship framework. This process 
has opened up some possibilities for non-EU nationals, but only at national level. This 
chapter further shows that there has been a shift from instrumental economic rights to 
more fundamental rights for all EU nationals and even for some non-EU nationals. In 
this, the ECJ has played a crucial role. The extension of rights for EU citizens and their 
explanation through a supra-national regime, has done little for third-country nationals, 
even though the supra-national level, theoretically, is better able than the national level 
to devise policies on immigration that accommodate them in a way that is both effective 
and constructive. Finally, the chapter concludes that social rights are still an important 
component of citizenship in general and Euro-citizenship in particular. Access to social 
rights at the European level is functional to the delineation of the categories of ‘us’ and 
‘them’ in that social rights for non-EU nationals do not transcend national borders.
7.1 The rationale for supra-national undertakings in the social sphere
During the political processes that led to the establishment of Euro-citizenship, it has 
been possible to discern three main lines of arguments. The first one concerned the 
problem of creating a feeling of belonging among citizens of the member states that 
would contribute to the creation of a Union identity. The second line of argument 
focused on the need to facilitate the movement of citizen labour within the EU, and the
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third dealt with the problem of providing citizens with a greater access to participation 
both in socio-economic and political terms1.
At the supra-national level, a great deal of attention was paid to ensuring that 
the new political entity did not simply become an area or organisation geared towards 
the creation of wealth, but also that citizens of the member states would be able to 
benefit from its formation. Ministers emphasised the right to employment throughout 
the Union for EU citizens as one of the first objectives of social policy. The final 
version of the Maastricht Treaty indeed guaranteed the rights of free movement and 
residence not only for employees but also for their families. With the establishment of 
Euro-citizenship and the delineation of additional citizenship rights, social rights 
became more detached from the conventional procedures for granting citizenship rights 
at the national level with regard to non-citizens/nationals. The same point cannot be 
made for the supra-national level in which conversely social rights are strictly anchored 
to the practice of Euro-citizenship. Soysal, observing that social rights were the first 
rights granted to immigrants workers at the EU level, argued that the formal 
conceptualisation of supra-national citizenship rights undermines Marshall’s hypothesis 
that political rights precede the formation of social rights. Instead, Soysal argues that 
political rights become part of the agenda much later (1994: 131).
As noted above, standards of nationality based on definition of citizenship at 
the national level were adequate at a time when people tended more to reside and work 
within their own respective national contexts. This explains the emphasis on a political 
rather than a socio-cultural definition of citizenship. The supra-national context creates
1 These discussions took place at the Paris Summit in 1973, the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984, and the 
Inter-governmental Conference in Rome in 1990. See Bull. EC Supplement 7, 1985. See also chapter 2 
above.
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the opposite scenario, however, in which the old standards of nationality have become 
inadequate and the notion of ‘place’ is introduced as a new component to identify the 
area over which rights attached to the new citizenship extend2. This new perspective can 
be considered as a step towards a place-oriented definition of citizenship, which implies 
positive consequences also concerning third-country nationals3. The emergent demands 
for expanding citizenship rights based on residence rather than nationality open the way 
for the regulation of immigrants’ rights also in accordance with a criterion of residence 
and not nationality (Welsh, 1993; Preuss, 1996).
The alternative to a citizenship based on residence, the denizen or semi­
citizenship models to which Hammar and Brubaker have referred, are merely a minor 
deviation from the norms of classicar membership that only slightly alter citizenship 
features (Hammar, 1989; Brubaker, 1986, 1990)4. Changes in membership models at 
the national level, moreover, do not always correspond to changes in functional services 
such as state welfare systems which still operate under the assumption of closure 
(Heisler, 1990; Layton-Henry, 1990; d’Oliviera, 1984). Soysal has been critical of 
views such as these, however, arguing that they remain anchored within the logic of a 
territorial citizenship without recognising ‘the changing relationship between the 
individual, the nation-state and world order’ (Soysal, 1994:139).
2 COM (93), 702 final, 21 December 1993.
3 The concept o f a place-oriented citizenship is comparable with that o f ‘status-path’ suggested by 
Preuss (1996: 135) and ‘domicile’ proposed by Kostakopoulou (1998), which are discussed above in 
the introduction o f the thesis.
4 In addition, see chapter 2 above.
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7.1.1 The significance of residence in determining social rights
With the advent of Euro-citizenship, people have become directly involved in a supra­
national scenario for the first time. Social rights such as the right to work, the right of 
abode, and the right to education for European citizens, are inclusive and undermine the 
exclusive effects of any other member state’s national citizenship. The problem here is 
to determine whether or not Euro-citizenship has been established on substantive 
grounds involving those who usually reside and work within the Community in addition 
to citizens of member states.
Theoretically, the notion of a common citizenship at the supra-national level 
should reinforce the social and political cohesion among the states and peoples 
involved, but it should also weaken the relationship between citizenship and nationality. 
The gradual passage to the supra-national level has a distinct functional character. 
During the first phase of its establishment, the concept of a common citizenship was 
attached mainly to economic activities and therefore limited in scope. At this stage, the 
right to reside was still limited to nationals of member states engaging in economic 
activities. The concept of ‘worker’ assumed an autonomous meaning and full social and 
economic rights were granted to migrant workers at the supra-national level. The 
political dimension of the new supra-national regime, by contrast, is emphasised for the 
first time only with the Maastricht Treaty, which attached to Euro-citizenship a political 
function with respect to the sub-national and supra-national level. This was the 
consequence of efforts to introduce political rights through reciprocal arrangements that 
extended most aspects of national treatment to nationals of other member states.
It is important to establish whether or not, and in which manner, legal practices 
at supra-national level affects the allocation of social rights at the national level. I argue
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that supra-national legal practices indeed broaden the factors in determining the 
eligibility for social rights, though only in relation to the revised concept of citizenship 
and thus only for EU citizens. The importance of social rights as an element of 
citizenship even at the supra-national level lends weight to Marshall’s argument that 
social rights are bound to citizenship rights (1950). The continuing importance of social 
rights as components of citizenship suggests that the right to reside by itself is 
insufficient to confer access to full citizenship rights. This impedes the detachment of 
ethno-cultural aspects of citizenship, in a word nationality, from the means of 
citizenship, which is to say civil, political and social rights. The need to distinguish the 
system in which the distribution of rights occurs, whether national or supra-national, 
reinforces the link between citizenship and rights and particularly citizenship and social 
rights.
Marshall’s argument, however, retains some of its significance at the national 
level since not all rights presuppose citizenship. Certain social rights are sometimes 
made available to non-citizens at the discretion of the political system in response to a 
perceived need for social equality and integration, political legitimisation and public 
order (Zolo, 1992). Barbalet has thrown into question the theoretical coherence of 
Marshall’s classification of rights, recommending that they be treated not as rights but 
as ‘social services’ (1988)5. This is owing to difficulties in the formalisation of 
procedures and processes designed to facilitate the performance of these rights or 
services. In Europe, however, formalisation occurs at the supra-national level, which 
establishes a normative dimension to social rights across the European Union. This
5 Barbalet does not accept the idea that social rights are universal because they must be analysed in 
conjunction with social services.
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maintains the link between social rights and citizenship, but it also recognises the supra­
national nature of social rights.
The mechanism of detachment would put an end to the great apartheid that 
excludes the majority of the human race from enjoying social rights. This would 
involve the transformation of two rights presently reserved only to citizens of member 
states at the supra-national level, the right of residence and free movement, into rights to 
which all legal subjects have equal access. It is indeed possible to observe a progressive 
effort to grant residence rights to non-citizens at the national level, but the effort by no 
means weakens citizenship’s exclusive functions. The following section shows, 
however, that residence rights are a cmcial determinant of social rights for non-EU 
citizens only within the confines of the nation-state, even though social rights have 
become the most important feature of Euro-citizenship.
The concept of residence is shaped by national regulations and therefore is not 
consistent throughout the member states of the EU. In a federal state such as the USA, 
by contrast, citizenship depends upon residence to the point that an individual may 
change his/her state of residence without effecting any change of nationality6. In this
6 In the USA, when a citizen changes his or her state o f residence, it is possible to observe the 
following changes in relation to citizenship’s means: (1) political rights at the federal level remain the 
same, but local rights change in accordance with the practices prevailing in the state and country of 
residence; (2) Social rights likewise change only in so far as concerns state rights; (3) Citizenship does 
not change. The social and political rights thus depend not only on citizenship but also on the palce of 
residence, and to this extent, nationality and citizenship are detached. In the EU, which is a 
confederation, the changes that occur in the means o f citizenship when EU citizens their place of 
residence are as follows: (1) barring any change in nationality, EU political rights and national 
political rights remain the same, but local rights change in accordance with the district, town or 
council o f residence. EU political rights do not change wherever you go. Local rights change with 
respect to district, town or council. Importantly national rights do not change unless you change your 
nationality; (2) social rights depend entirely on the state o f residence, though access to some social 
rights require the recipient to be a national in the state o f residence; (3) citizenship normally remains 
unchanged, though an individual residing in a country other than the country o f nationality may 
change citizenship and naturalise in the country o f residence to have access to all citizenship rights. In 
the case o f the EU citizenship and nationality are linked and citizenship rights depend primarly on the 
nationality that a person holds.
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case the free movement of persons is a consequence of US citizenship rather than the 
basis for it. Within the EU framework, by contrast, the enjoyment of certain rights and 
privileges depends on the person holding the citizenship or nationality of a member 
state (Closa, 1992).
The decree that ‘every person holding the nationality of a member state’7 
becomes a citizen of the Union raises problems for those states where there is no strict 
correlation between nationals and those among the nationals entitled to qualify for 
Community rights. As already noted above, the United Kingdom made a declaration 
defining the persons who qualify as their nationals for Community purposes8. Once an 
individual is considered as a national for all Community purposes, his or her right of 
residence is no longer at the discretion of the national state. Several cases have 
nevertheless been presented to the European Court of Justice that demonstrate the 
failure of member states to fulfil the obligation to treat nationals of other member states 
in the same way as they treat their own nationals9.
Although residence rights replace some citizenship functions within the EU, this 
does not imply that community rights are linked to residence rather than nationality, 
even if it does create a new opportunity structure for non-nationals at the national level. 
A residence permit is essential for non-EU citizens to receive welfare benefits along 
with some degree of political rights but they entitle their holders to no such benefits or
7 Article 8a(l) o f the Maastricht Treaty.
8 Residents <?f Crown possessions, such as the Channel Islands and the Isle o f Man, do not count as 
community nationals (Baldwin-Edwards, 1991; Brubaker, 1989). See also chapter 2 above.
9 See case C-24/97, concerning an action brought by the European Commission against Germany 
under Article 169 o f the EC Treaty. By treating nationals o f other member states differently than its 
own in terms o f the degree of fault and the scale o f fines in comparable infringements o f the 
obligation to hold a valid identity document, the Commission claimed that Germany failed to observe 
Community law. The Commission cited Articles 48,52, and 59 o f the EC Treaty, Article 4(1) o f  
Directive 68/360 on the abolition o f restrictions on movement and residence within the Community 
for workers holding EU citizenship and their families, and Article 4(1) of Council Directive 73/148 
EEC. See also case C-265/88, par. 14.
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rights at the supra-national level. For instance European directive 73/14810 extended 
workers’ rights to spouses of workers who are nationals of a member state and to any of 
their children under 21 years of age irrespective of the nationality of the spouses and 
children in question. Under this directive the benefits and rights attached to the 
residence permit is valid only in the territory of the member state in which the permit 
was granted.
The residence permit also carries other rights such as the right to education, 
although, paradoxically, many children will receive a European education without 
being allowed to move freely within Europe since they are not citizens of a member 
state11. This example, however, concerns a specific condition that grants rights to 
immigrants who are married'to'a national'of a member state, which is, as we have seen 
above, one of the ways in which immigrant may be admitted into an EU country. As 
long as benefits and rights at the national level are attached to the residence permit, any 
supra-national form of ‘residentship’ remains unattainable for non-EU citizens. This 
merely underlines the fact that access to full social rights at the supra-national level is 
afforded only to citizens of member states. Concerns about access to rights for third- 
country nationals at the supra-national level thus far consisted of revealing, through 
secondary legislation such as regulations and directives, the limitations of expanding 
the national sphere in the distribution of social rights to non-citizens. Regulations and 
Directives are important means for understanding the process of control and protection 
of EU citizens rights through a supra-national entity such as the European Court of 
Justice, and they facilitate the effective introduction of the Treaty’s articles into the
10 Council Regulation on abolition o f restrictions on movement and residence within the community.
11 Council Regulation 1612/68.
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national context. Regulations have direct effects and they can be invoked by individuals 
in national courts (Meehan, 1993; Steiner, 1988; Usher, 1981), while Directives need to 
be implemented through national legislation. In other words, Council Directives require 
member states to bring their own laws into compliance with the provisions of the 
Directive within a prescribed period12.
7.1.2 Workers and the European social dimension
In the development of a supra-national social sphere, as already mentioned above, 
social rights are mainly related to workers, representing the social dimension of an 
economic market (Wedderbum, 1990). In this process, social rights are granted to 
citizens as workers rather than as citizens per se. The Council of Europe’s famous 
Social Charter13 accords the greatest importance to social rights designed to protect a 
citizen’s right to employment, to organise and bargain collectively, to safe and sanitary 
working conditions, and to seek employment in other member states. The Social 
Charter also protects welfare rights such as the right to health care, education and, to 
social and security assistance for all workers, or citizen-workers as they are 
subsequently designated.
The inclusion of working rights in the Social Charter ‘Europeanises’14 a national 
right, but the process of ‘Europeanisation’ also involves a significant limitation of social
12 For instance, the Kingdom of Belgium failed to comply with the Directive 94/80 EC laying down 
detailed arrangements for exercising the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in municipal elections by 
citizens of the Union residing in any member state.
13 In December 1989, 11 Heads o f State or Government (all but the UK) adopted the Social Charter. 
The Charter is formally called the ‘Community Charter o f the Fundamental Rights o f Workers’ and 
was accepted originally by 11 o f at that time 12 Member States. The preamble affirms that ‘the same 
importance must be attached to the social aspect as to the economic aspects’ o f the single market. The 
Chapter itself has no binding force: it s a declaration o f intent and amounts to a set o f principles and 
standards that were implemented by the Commission through the setting-up o f an action programme.
14 This term is used by Roche (1992: 216).
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rights for workers who are not citizens of a member state, since the workers’ rights are
linked to Euro-citizenship rights. Jacques Delors as President of the Commission in
1985, invigorated efforts towards integration by stressing the need to establish a link
between Euro-citizenship and the right to work and attendant rights15.
The shift of focus from ‘workers’ to ‘citizens’ entailed by Delors’ statement
strengthens the importance of nationality. Residence, in fact, is not a crucial
determinant of access to workers’ rights for nationals of member states, who by virtue
of their nationality already enjoy access to social rights. Nationality in a member state
confers the right to work anywhere in the EU, which in turn automatically entails the
right to reside. Local and EU political rights depend, in part, on residence rights. The
choice of nationality rather than residence as the criterion for Euro-citizenship and
access to workers rights can be seen to be a political manoeuvre designed to limit free
movement only to nationals of member states (O’ Leary, 1992). Council Regulation
1612/68 indeed states that:
‘any national o f a member state, shall, irrespective of his place of 
residence, have the right to take up an activity as an employed person (...) 
with the same priority as nationals o f that state’16.
Freedom of movement for workers within the Community thus applies only to workers
who are nationals of a member state. It is therefore a more restrictive application in the
sense that it specifies more clearly to whom these rights pertain than Article 48 of the
Treaty of Rome (1957) which refers instead to workers as ‘persons’ and not as
nationals17. It was nevertheless widely acknowledged that free movement rights were
15 Bull. EC. Supplement 1,1985, ‘The Thrust of Commission Policy’.
16 Article 1, Regulation 1612/68. Article 1 deals mainly with assistance for migrant workers and 
families.
17 Article 48 of the EC Treaty provides for the following: ‘(1) Freedom for workers shall be secured 
within the Community [...]. (2) Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition o f any
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limited since it was inconceivable to grant immigration privileges to workers from all 
over the world.
The advantage given to nationals of member states both to move freely 
throughout the Union and to receive access to social rights throughout the EU was 
established on the abolition of any discrimination within the Union based on 
nationality. Discrimination persists, however, since the principle does not apply to 
workers in EU member states who are not nationals of member states. The only 
exception is made for the families of workers who are EU citizens even if the family 
members themselves are not nationals of a member state18. The contradiction is that 
neither Article 5 nor Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 explicitly specifies that the term 
‘nationality’ refers to the nationality of a member state. Article 5 states that ‘non­
national applicants should be offered the same assistance in seeking employment as that 
which is on offer to a state’s own nationals’ while Article 7 states that ‘workers shall 
enjoy the same advantages as national workers’. To avoid any misinterpretation the ECJ 
redefined the meaning of ‘social advantage’:
[. . . ]  it is settled law that this concept embraces all the advantages which, 
whether or not linked to a contract o f  employment, are generally granted to 
national workers primarily because o f  their objective status as workers or 
by virtue o f  the mere fact o f  their residence on the national territory and 
w hose extension to workers who are nationals19.
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment, 
remuneration and other conditions o f work and employment. (3) It shall entail the right, subject to 
limitations justified on grounds o f public policy, public security or public health: (a) to accept offers 
o f employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the territory o f member states for this 
purpose; (c) to stay in a member state for the purpose o f employment in accordance with the 
provisions governing the employment of Nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action; (c) to remain in the territory of a member state ater having been employed in 
that State subject to conditions [...] to be drawn by the Commision. (4) The provision o f this Article 
shall not apply to employment in the public service’. Article 48 was implemented by EC Council 
Regulation 1612/68 and section 2 (1) o f the European Communities Act o f 1972.
18 Case C-3/90.
19 Case C-85/96 par. 25.
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It is nevertheless possible to state in general, that workers have benefited from the 
interpretation of ‘social advantage’ put forward by the European Court of Justice. 
According to the Court, for example, ‘maintenance awards’ constitute a ‘social 
advantage’ that should not be applied discriminatorily to legal migrant workers or their 
dependants. Issues surrounding the extension of benefits are complicated by distinctions 
between workers’ rights and families’ rights, in cases in which the family in question 
includes a foreign spouse and or children of a national of an EU member state. Meehan 
has drawn attention, for instance, to a 1984 case in which an Hungarian national who 
was the son of an Italian worker in Belgium was able to claim benefits ‘for young 
people unemployed after completing studies’ (Meehan, 1993: 98)20. Another important 
case involved the residence rights of a third-country national married to a Community 
worker. Even though the plaintiff, one Mrs Diatta, had separated from her husband, the 
Court ruled that Mrs Diatta retained her right of residence, but the ruling also carried the 
implication that divorce in the absence of naturalisation, would terminate the right of 
residence for dependent third-country spouses of nationals of a member state. If put into 
practice, however, such an implication would ignore the right of any third-country 
spouse to family unity, under the principle of family reunification, at least in cases in 
which children are involved (Meehan, 1993: 99)21.
Cases such as these demonstrate the importance of residence rights for third- 
country nationals in as much as access to social rights for non-EU citizens hinges 
entirely upon residence. (Amull, 1989). The denial of social rights on the grounds of 
residence can be considered as indirect discrimination against a worker (Amull,
20 Case C-94/84.
21 Case C- 267/83.
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1989:180; Meehan, 1993: 131). This illustrates a self-referential mechanism in which 
the implementation of Treaty provisions through Regulations and Directives depends 
upon the criteria for nationality employed by each member state. It also illustrates the 
extent to which the individual worker has become the focus not only of Community 
economic rights but also of social and human rights (Evans, 1991). In this framework, 
citizenship rights at the supra-national level should be determined neither by the criteria 
for nationality at the level of the member states nor merely by the extent of the 
transposition of Community law into national law. Euro-citizenship should also aspire 
to a universal validity through the recognition of fundamental rights (Vincenzi, 1995).
7.2 Supra-national aims and the impasse of nationality
Soysal identifies ‘working’ rights exclusively as economic rights, and she regards the 
legal status that they confer to non-citizens more valuable than formal citizenship status. 
She argues that economic rather than political rights were the first rights granted to 
immigrant workers in European host countries. According to Soysal, this process occurs 
mainly under the principle of human rights, which implies a universal aspect that 
undermines the boundaries of the nation-state. This approach attempts to discover 
elements of universal validity within supra-national practices and to detach social rights 
from nationality (Soysal, 1994: 127). It is indeed at the workplace and through 
membership in trade unions that immigrants have enjoyed a stronger legal status and 
more equal rights of representation. The main problem that arises from this approach 
concerns the value of legality. In other words, does legality have a universal 
application? A response to the question would perhaps be oriented towards the 
redefinition of the concept of legality.
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It is true that the proliferation of trans-national arrangements often engenders 
measures that address the rights of immigrants in the name of human rights, but it is 
also true that the courts are full of cases in which governments have not respected 
such measures. To maintain that the recognition of immigrants as a legal category 
merely entails granting to immigrants the right of appeal is perhaps a little reductive. 
Soysal nevertheless argues that one of the ways in which international instruments 
affect policies ori immigrants at the level of the nation state is ‘through the 
construction of migrants as a legal category’, and the ability to claim legal protection 
is one step in that direction (Soysal, 1994: 149).
The fact that there has been an extension of social rights for immigrants by no 
means implies equal status22. As already shown above, specific conditions need to be 
fulfilled to achieve any semblance of equality. To consider the problem from a 
different perspective, it is possible to argue that the constraints imposed by human 
rights conditions through international and supra-national agreements force 
governments to adopt a more restrictive attitude. Specific requirements are 
established for access to work at the supra-national level, but they are still dictated 
by criteria for nationality and national citizenship. Even though economic rights are 
considered primary at the supra-national level, these rights ultimately hinge upon 
national citizenship. It is the erosion of the substantive function of citizenship and 
not its theoretical form that needs to be discussed. As long as citizenship and 
nationality remain strongly connected to serve supra-national aims, the substantive 
form of the distribution of rights among various groups will be uneven and
22 Layton-Henry noted that the extension o f rights to guest-workers and the removal o f obstacles to 
equal status have occurred gradually (1990).
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discriminatory. This is in line with Joppke’s view of Soysal as one of the ‘post­
national membership advocates’ (Joppke, 1998). According to Soysal, the condition 
of quasi-citizenship or denizenship may be considered as a new form of membership 
in which formal citizenship and participation in the political community are not 
essential. The processes of globalisation indeed appear to be moving towards this 
informal model of membership. Joppke criticises this model stating that, inter alia 
‘non-citizenship is tolerable in the interim but not in principle’ (1998: 29). The 
reasoning behind this position lies in the consideration of the lack of a supra-national 
polity in which rights are granted on bases other than nationality leaving national 
citizenship as the only alternative criterion. In short, Joppke’s position discourages 
any view of European citizenship as a ‘post-national form of membership’ .
To substantiate this point one can examine the extent of an immigrant’s 
integration at the supra-national level, which provides a highly significant indicator 
of just how far integration has actually proceeded. With the introduction of a Council 
Resolution in 1974 there was the possibility for a ‘wide-ranging migration policy’ 
(Geddes, 2000: 55). This was a Social Action Programme that envisaged a migrant 
charter covering equality of treatment in areas such as living and working conditions, 
the granting of civil and political rights, the control of illegal immigration, and the 
co-ordination of immigration policies (Handoll, 1995: 352). Although the 
Commission’s intention was to include in this programme immigrants who were not 
nationals of an EC member state, the Council did not agree on this extensive 
understanding of the term ‘migrant’ and focused instead on EC migrants and their 
dependants. The Social Action Programme, however, had some spillover to
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dependants of legally resident third country nationals and those covered by 
Association Agreements (Geddes, 2000: 157).
In general the supra-national decisions concerning immigrants’ rights are 
typically expressed in Resolutions and Declarations that have no legal effect but are 
nevertheless considered as official communications adopted by the European 
Parliament. This is why immigrants’ internal mobility and social rights are usually 
discussed as an issue separate from the implementation of social rights regarding 
European citizens. In 1985, a Council Resolution reaffirmed the jurisdiction of 
member states in matters relating to the rights of entry, residence, and employment 
for immigrant workers. It established a prior communication and consultation 
procedure regarding national policies in these areas. In the event, this resolution has 
had little impact on the attitudes of the various member states towards immigrants23
Immigrants and foreign workers in Europe have always been considered as 
passive subjects. National governments’ policies of family reunification provided for 
a fairly stable ‘family affair’ without thinking about the consequences in terms of 
education, work, and social security. At the local level, political integration involved 
immigrants in decision-making in the communities where they resided by
J
establishing local Consultative Communal Commissions for Immigrants (CCCI). 
The 1975 European Summit Paris, for example, produced a statement emphasising 
the important transitional role that consultative organs could play in both the 
reduction of anti-immigrant discrimination and the advancement of the immigrants’ 
political integration (Wihtol de Wenden, 1978: 33). This summit also produced the 
Trevi Group and the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, which have most directly
23 Official Journal No. C.186, 1985, Guidelines for a community policy on migration.
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tackled immigration issues in the EU. These groups have encouraged host societies 
to allow their foreign populations to lead an active associational life, asking the 
Commission to lobby governments to grant subsidies to associations of foreigners on 
an equal basis with those granted to their own citizens, although support for these 
measures has been more in terms of empty rhetoric than implementation. The 
exclusion of those from outside the European Community is perhaps less pronounced 
in the Recommendations of the two groups than in the concept of European 
citizenship or in the Commission’s report on the integration of immigrants, but the 
practical effect is little different (Costa-Lascoux, 1989). It is evident that the 
exclusive process in which the European legal and political space has evolved 
reflects the EU’s appeal to national governments to co-ordinate their policies, but 
this process does not necessarily entail equal rights for all.
7.2.1 Exceptional measures of membership
Another special condition by which social rights can be granted to non-EU nationals 
was established through bilateral agreements that introduced co-operation with 
Algeria24, Morocco25 and Tunisia26. These Council Regulations provided, inter alia, that 
workers holding the nationality of one of these countries and any members of their 
families living with them should enjoy the same treatment in field of social rights as 
nationals of the member states in which they are employed. Under these arrangements 
the rights of non-EU nationals to entry, residence, employment, social security benefits, 
education, and other social advantages are based either on their familial ties with EU
24 Council Regulation 2210/78. See Articles 39-40.
25 Council Regulation 2211/78. See Articles 40-41.
26 Council Regulation 2212/78. See Articles 39-40.
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nationals, already noted above, or on their status as nationals of a country with which 
the Community has concluded an international agreement. It is important to stress that 
such rights are granted only to those who are already holders of an original right. The 
social rights accorded to these non-EU nationals therefore can be defined as derived 
rights which are contingent upon nationality. These rights include the right to remain 
permanently in the host state, the right to education on the same conditions as the 
nationals of that state, the right to take up work in that state, and the right to benefits 
under the social security system of that state. This is yet another instance in which 
residence rights alone are not sufficient to confer access to citizenship rights and that 
special treatment is accorded only on grounds of nationality.
The Demiral case illustrates the manner in which the attitude of the Court in 
matters related to immigration varies widely depending on the country of origin. Mrs 
Demiral, a Turkish national, entered the Federal Republic of Germany to join her 
husband, who had the same nationality and who had been living and working in 
Germany since entering that country in 1979. She was ordered to leave the country 
because her husband did not fulfil conditions peculiar to Germany for family 
reunification in the case of nationals of non-member countries27. The Court ruled that 
Turkish nationals enjoyed no special social rights in the European Union because the 
existing agreement between Turkey and the Union, the Turkish-EC Association 
Agreement, was strictly economic (Meehan, 1993: 99)28. Moreover, residence 
conditions for third-country nationals in Germany were tightened between 1982 and
27 Demiral v Stadt Schwabish Gmiid, case C-12/8 6.
28 O. J. No. C. 113/2,1973; OJ. No. C. 113/8,1973.
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1984 by raising the period during which they were required to reside continuously and 
lawfully on German territory from three to eight years (Baldwin-Edwards, 1992: 215).
The Association Agreement with Turkey was concluded under Article 48 of the 
EC Treaty, which refers to workers mainly as ‘persons’ than nationals. Other measures 
regarding Turkish workers who are already integrated in the labour force of a member 
state prohibit any further restrictions on the conditions governing access to 
employment29. Despite these stipulations, Germany still did not confer social rights on 
individual such as the spouse and minor children of a Turkish worker established in the 
Community. The European Court of Justice indeed supported the German decision in 
declaring that the Agreement was neither unconditional nor sufficient for the purpose 
(Alexander, 1992).
Another important Regulation30 enumerates the third countries whose nationals 
must be in possession of a visa to enter the European Union zone through the territory 
of a member states. The meaning of ‘visa’ here refers to an authorisation given by a 
member state for entry into its territory with a view of an intended stay of no more than 
three months. This measure, which was designed to harmonise visa policy, has still not 
satisfied its intended goal because the conditions for issuing visas to the nationals of the 
third countries in question remain very unclear. Moreover, each member state has the 
discretionary power to determine the visa requirement for nationals of third countries 
that are not on the common list as well as for stateless persons and recognised 
refugees31. Any effort to harmonise visa policy among the member states should also
29 See Decision No. C. 1/80 o f the Council o f Ministers.
30 Council Regulation, 2317/95.
31 Council Regulation, 2317/95, Article 2.
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take into account third countries not on the common list and excluded categories of 
persons.
Instead of harmonising visa policy, however, this Regulation gives more power 
to member states to reject third-country immigrants on the grounds of common list 
requirements, and it lays the foundation for the unequal and discriminatory treatment of 
those who are not on the common list. Supra-national legislation emphasises the 
importance of work permits in order to obtain residence rights, though in practice the 
receipt of such rights by non-nationals is more closely linked to their familial or special 
status. The opportunities open to third-country immigrants in the EU are determined by 
legislative agreements that give the impression of establishing common conditions 
throughout the Union, but they continue instead to perpetuate the process of exclusion 
at the national level. The efforts to harmonise the policies of member states relating to 
third-country nationals thus constitutes no significant departure from national 
immigration laws.
7.3 Public services: some contradictions
Public services and social security are the two main institutions that exist to serve social 
rights. Through the discussion on public service, this section illustrates the ways in 
which social rights and economic rights are related to public services, which are still 
determined by national law. One can discern two inter-related aspects of public 
services, the first concerning the provision of public services, which is based on access 
to work and thus symbolises economic rights. The other aspect concerns the receipt of 
public services and represents social rights. It is important to stress that the first aspect
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dominates the second in that it is possible to achieve social rights only through 
economic rights.
This would not constitute a problem if public services were not regulated by 
national criteria. Although the principle of exclusion of non-nationals from public 
service posts is accepted in all member states, it is applied differently in each of them. 
This often places immigrants from non-EU countries and immigrants from other EU in 
the same position, which leads to a lack of uniformity in the application of provisions 
for the free movement of workers among the member states. Article 48(4) of the EC 
Treaty stipulates that freedom of movement for workers does not apply to employment 
in the ‘public service’32. In other words, the Treaties exempt employment in public 
institutions from the principle that prohibits discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality33. The ‘exception’ attached to the public service is designated as an 
exception precisely because it would otherwise constitute a discriminatory measure. In 
the O’ Boyle and Plunkett cases34, it was ruled that since Article 48(4) was a derogation 
from the principle of freedom of movement for workers expressed elsewhere in Article 
48, it must be constructed restrictively35. In other words, the pertinent clause required a 
precise justification for treating a particular post as a public service post. The onus fell 
on each member state to justify the derogation from the right enshrined in Article 48. In 
the affidavit presented on behalf of the member state in question in these two cases 
claimed that the posts advertised were considered public service posts because they
32 See also Article 55 EEC, regarding activities ‘connected even occasionally with the exercise o f official 
authority’.
33 See Article 48 (4) EC Treaty.
34 See chapter 2 above.
35 See O’Boyle and other applications for judicial review, Northern Ireland Judgments Bulletin, 1998, 
pp. 242-255; O’Boyle and Plunkett (Applications for Judicial review) Court o f Appeal CARC 2763, 
Judgment by Carswell LCJ.
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‘demanded an exceptional allegiance to the state’. In dealing with such cases, the ECJ 
has to establish whether or not the ‘exception’ mentioned in Article 48(4) applies. The 
ECJ has ruled that nationals of other member states cannot be excluded from teaching 
and research posts simply because such occupations are classified as ‘public service’ 
posts. Further more the Court has found that most of the posts disputed in such cases 
fall outside the exception specified in the Article 48 (4)36.
It is also worth noting that recent changes in the provision of public services has 
tended to transform the connection between citizenship and the provision of public 
services. These changes have resulted in the transfer of responsibility from the state 
itself to a newly created set of intermediaries between the state and the citizen, mainly 
private actors. Therefore the general connection between citizenship and the provision 
of public services is made through these intermediate institutions. These changes 
concern mainly the bodies that provide public services rather than the individuals 
receiving them.
Member states nevertheless continue to exercise exclusive control in many 
important areas of social policy though the ECJ has refused to apply the public service 
exception in the fields of education, health, scientific research, and operational services 
in local government. The dichotomy between a residence criterion, which grants legal 
residents access to most forms of employment, and the nationality criterion, which 
protects some public service posts, reinforces the nation-states’ autonomy in areas of
36 For cases in which the posts in question were deemed by the Court as not responsible for 
safeguarding the interests o f the state see the European Commission v France, case 307/84, 1987, 
which classified nurses as public servants; Lawrie-Blum v Land Baden-Wiirttemberg case 66/85, 
concerning teachers; European Commission v Italy, case 225/85, 1987, concerning researchers o f the 
Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche (CNR). All o f these cases are cited by Meehan (1993). See also 
Handol (1988).
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social policy, which Euro-citizenship is supposed to undermine. This also undermines 
the supra-national ascendancy on social rights.
7.3.1 Social security rights: a probable route for Euro-citizenship
In connection with public services, there are also social security rules that are mainly 
designed to eliminate discrimination based on nationality for workers who move across 
the Community. One of these is a Regulation that governs the application of social 
security schemes to workers and their relatives moving within the Community37. It deals 
with the co-ordination of different national social security benefits and excludes the 
right of ‘overlapping benefits’38 (Meehan, 1993: 86). Furthermore, the present exclusion 
of third-country nationals from the scope of EC rules on the free movement of persons 
also leads to a certain number of inconsistencies.
The analysis of social security rights involves three main considerations, all of 
which support my argument. Firstly, social security rights are elements of citizenship 
rights because they create a legal status and a model of reciprocity between rights and 
obligations even for non-EU citizens. This concurs with Marshall’s claim that social 
rights are an element of citizenship (1950). Secondly, these provisions do not contribute 
to the realisation of equality in a national context between EU citizens and legally 
resident non-EU citizens. This aspect, on the other hand, undermines Marshall’s thesis 
that citizenship in general involves an equality of membership status and an ability to 
participate in a society. Finally, for EU citizens residence is not a necessary condition
37 Council Regulation 1408/71, and updeted in O. J. No. C . 325/1, 1992.
38 See C-244/97: Rijksdienst voor Pensioenen v Gerdina Lustig; and Case C-146/93: McLachlan v 
CNAVTS.
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for receiving social security rights. This supports the notion that nationality is a 
fundamental criterion for the allocation of citizenship rights.
Regulation 1408/71, cited above forbids discrimination on grounds of 
nationality and provides for the aggregation of periods of insurance, residence, and 
employment for social security purposes. The Regulation applies to workers who are 
nationals of a member state and to members of their families, even if the latter are third- 
country nationals. It also benefits the surviving family members of a deceased third- 
country national who had worked in a member state, provided that the members of that 
family are nationals of a member state. After the death of the worker, these persons will 
be protected to the same degree as they would if the deceased worker had been a 
national of a member state. This appears to be quite a sensible rule in itself. Its own 
limits, however, together with the limit of the system in general, could lead to some 
peculiar situations. First, not only do those third-country workers have to die for their 
families to benefit fully from their work, but their families will benefit from their work 
in a way in which the workers themselves could never have benefited. For example, 
third-country workers themselves are not able to benefit from the clause in the 
Regulation that permits EU citizens to request an aggregation of periods of insurance to 
obtain old-age benefits. In the case of a worker’s permanent incapacity to work, neither 
the relatives of the third-country worker nor the worker him/herself is protected by the 
Regulation. The family thus is legally protected only if the worker dies, but otherwise is 
not. The application of the nationality criterion to the protection of relatives of the 
worker following his or her death is no less disturbing. The protection of a national of a 
member state who is the spouse of a third-country worker contrasts sharply with that of 
a spouse who is a national of a third-country in that the latter cannot benefit from the
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Regulation. The children of a third-country worker are in the same situation. Children 
may benefit from the work of their deceased father or mother but only as long as the 
children themselves are nationals of a member state, while third-country nationals are 
eligible for no benefits, simply on the basis of their nationality. This rule is both unfair 
to the persons concerned and unjustified in the context of current European integration 
constituting a clear case of not only differential treatment, but also discrimination.
Access to insurance-based benefits depends on the contributions or status of the 
working members of the family. In these cases, the ECJ has struck down residence 
conditions for the receipt of benefits by EU citizens. In the case of an Italian worker in 
Germany whose wife and family were in Italy, for example, the ECJ confirmed that a 
worker’s benefits for an absent family should not be suspended if the family were 
ineligible for benefits in the country of residence (Steiner, 1985)39. This indicates that 
residence is not a fundamental condition for members of a workers’ family to receive 
benefits if they are also nationals of a member state.
Another interesting case deals with a worker’s change of nationality. This 
problem arose in Belbouab v Bundesknappschaft, in which the plaintiff had been 
employed as a miner, first in France and then in Germany. He had been a French 
national at birth, but he had acquired Algerian nationality in 1962 when Algeria became 
independent. The defendant’s social security institution argued that because he was no 
longer a Community national when he claimed the benefit concerned, Regulation 
1408/71 did not apply. This argument was dismissed by the ECJ, which ruled that the 
clause requiring a worker to be a national of a member state referred to the time of the 
employment, of the payment of the contribution relating to the insurance periods, and of
39 See also Case C-153/84: Ferraioli v Deutsche Bundespost.
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the acquisition of the corresponding rights. It would follow, conversely, that a worker 
would not be covered by the ruling if he or she became a national of a member state 
only after acquiring the right to the benefit in question. This further indicates that the 
nationality criterion encourages and often requires different treatment for individuals 
under similar circumstances.
The right to social security is expressly limited within the scope of Article 59 of 
the EC Treaty40, which places restrictions on the provision of services to nationals of 
member states. There are nevertheless circumstances in which social security can be 
extended to nationals of third-countries who provide services within the Community. It 
is useful to consider the case of SEC v EVE41 in which the plaintiffs were two 
companies based in France that had earned out various work in Luxembourg. The 
authorities in Luxembourg required the companies to pay social security contributions 
in respect of their employees who worked in Luxembourg and who were third-country 
nationals even though the same persons were compulsorily insured in France. What is 
more, the Luxembourg contributions did not entitle the workers concerned to any social 
security benefits. By the same token, no contributions were required in Luxembourg 
with respect to those workers who were nationals of a member state. The ECJ 
nevertheless held that to require the companies to pay any contribution for third-country 
nationals contravened Articles 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty. In so doing, the ECJ 
dismissed the argument that the ability to prohibit third-country nationals from even 
working in its territory also entitled the Luxembourg authorities to allow them to work
40 The Article as follows states: ‘Within the framework o f the provisions set out below, restrictions on 
freedom to provide services within the Community shall be progressively abolished during the transitional 
period in respect of nationals o f member states who are established in a State o f the Community other than 
that o f the person for whom the service is intended.’
41 Case 62-63/81.
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there, subject to conditions of this kind. The ECJ ruled that a member state’s power to 
control the employment of nationals from a non-member country may not be used in 
order to impose a discriminatory burden on an undertaking from another member state 
enjoying the freedom under Article 59 of the Treaty to provide services. It must be 
stressed that the right at issue in this case is that of the company which could indirectly 
guarantee social security rights of third-country nationals.
These cases suggest that the expansion of social rights beyond the purview of 
national governments has an effect on national citizenship if  for no other reason than it 
throws into question popular notions of citizenship. From the third-country nationals 
perspective the expansion of social rights perhaps improves their circumstances but the 
road ahead is still an obstacle course.
Conclusion
This chapter has emphasised the significance of social rights in the redefinition of 
citizenship’s function at the supra-national level. Social rights have assumed priority 
over political rights at the supra-national level as they are more amenable to expansion 
in both scope and content. Social rights could conceivably constitute the condition upon 
which Euro-citizenship relies, but the persistent defence of nationality impedes the 
independent operation of social and economic rights afforded on bases other than 
nationality. In this manner, social rights cannot yet be considered as the defining 
principle of community membership. The substantial functions of citizenship are not 
challenged by the limited protection that supra-national institutions extend to those who 
have a legal status different from citizens. In this respect ‘residentship’ is merely a 
condition of social citizenship without entailing a new status.
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Although it may be too ambitious to suggest that Euro-citizenship should be 
made available to all conferred on third-country nationals lawfully resident in the EU, it 
is perhaps more reasonable to reformulate the concept of legality within the EU. The 
formulation of the category of Union subject rather than Union citizen would enable 
social rights to be detached from citizenship while providing more equitable access to 
social rights at both national and EU levels for all legal resident in the EU. This would 
entail two main things (1) the detachment between nationality and citizenship rights at 
EU level and (2) depriving citizenship of its regulative functions of exclusion and 
inclusion. In this way, citizenship and nationality would continue to be linked at the 
national level, but citizenship would assume a more ethno-cultural specification, and 
Union subjecthood would be applicable at both the national and European level. The 
common criterion in conferring a EU subjecthood could be a qualified period of 
residence in the same way as residence periods are required for the acquisition of the 
nationality of a member state, but without the obligation of being naturalised. This step 
would not only bring to fruition the re-prioritisation of the means of citizenship but 
could sign the beginning of a process in which even political rights can carry a less 
symbolic meaning for national sovereignty.
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Conclusions
There can be no doubt that the ongoing development of the EU has led to the 
creation of additional citizenship rights and to a reformulation of immigration 
policies at the national level. This thesis has gone beyond this point to ascertain the 
impact of Euro-citizenship within the legal, political, and social spheres of the 
member states at both the national and EU levels. This thesis supports the idea that 
the establishment of Euro-citizenship in particular and the process of European 
integration in general normatively create a new opportunity structure in terms of a 
new configuration of resources, new supra-national institutional arrangements, and 
most importantly social mobilisation (Usher, 1981; Meehan, 1997; Nentwich, 1998; 
Wiener, 1998). In my analysis, however, the meaning of opportunity structure refers 
mainly to a process that re-prioritises what I defined in the introduction as 
citizenship’s means. This entails not only the analysis of citizens’ involvement and 
participation in the new polity but also the study of the re-prioritisation of social 
rights over political rights. Social rights are guaranteed at the post-national level to 
citizens of member states and they are transferable, embodying the sense of free 
movement. Political rights, by contrast, are not transferable as far as general or 
national elections are concerned. This means that they do not embody the sense of 
free movement. In normative terms, therefore, social rights are prioritised over 
political rights to serve the principle of free movement within the EU. This 
opportunity structure develops within an EU social dimension which normatively 
stresses inclusion but on analysis is revealed to exclude those who do not belong to 
the new polity.
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Chapter 3 has shown that free movement rights fulfill the necessity of a firmer 
control of external frontiers in the context of the expansion of the ‘inner circle’. This 
may be explained by the fact that European integration, as Geddes argues, ‘reinforces 
the connection between nationality and rights’ (Geddes, 2000: 168). In addition, and 
more specifically, I argue that the establishment of Euro-citizenship reinforces the 
ideology of nationality. Even though access within the EU to national welfare 
systems beyond that of one’s own national state can arise as a consequence of ‘legal 
status’ (legal residence), the possession of the nationality of a member state is the 
key that opens the door for access to social entitlements associated with free 
movement within the EU (Geddes, 2000: 155). Nationality serves as the primary 
criterion to determine eligibility for Euro-citizenship, and citizenship practices at the 
national level are therefore central in the formulation of immigration policies.
If normative processes guarantee new additional rights and more 
‘transferable’ entitlements, the analytical outcome is that the link between citizenship 
and nationality is reinforced. This is in line with Closa (1995) and Brubaker (1992), 
when they argue that the link between nationality and citizenship is the outcome of 
‘legal systems’ and ‘state interests’. Though a differentiation between nationality and 
citizenship would be more desirable (Closa, 1995; Preuss, 1995a, Weiler, 1996; 
Meehan, 1993), my argument criticises the practical achievements of the new 
arrangements precisely in this regard. What is been suggested, instead, is the 
reformulation of the concept of ‘legality’ within the EU in order to detach 
citizenship’s means from nationality. The establishment of a supra-national 
citizenship in Europe thus creates a paradox. On the one hand, Euro-citizenship 
entails the need to detach the means of citizenship from nationality or national
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citizenship, while on the other hand it strengthens the relationship between 
citizenship and nationality. The fact that certain rights in Europe are now guaranteed 
by supra-national rather than national institutions means that the same rights can be 
detached from the status of national citizenship and this is the point at which a 
redefinition of legal status in the E U becomes essential. Chapter 1 has shown the 
manner in which, throughout history, the function of citizenship has evolved in 
response to the changing needs and circumstances of society. During the period that 
witnessed the blossoming of the nation-state, citizenship functioned to forge a 
political identity for a people, thereby creating an inherent link between citizenship 
and nationality. It has been argued, however, that this reflects a more communitarian 
and republican understanding of citizenship (Preuss, 1995a; Closa, 1998). It is within 
this context that citizenship assumes exclusive and inclusive functions. The thesis 
has emphasised the fact that the passage to a supra-national context, the so-called 
fourth model of citizenship, does not involve an evolution of citizenship in response 
to the changing needs and circumstances of the society. This is to say that citizenship 
does not evolve in response to the problem of mass immigration within the EU. The 
problem of third-country nationals, in fact, has been explored as one of the 
dimensions in which European citizenship risks a continuation of traditional, 
exclusionary aspects of citizenship (Meehan, 1997: 77). The supra-national 
citizenship that followed the formation of the EU perpetuates these exclusive and 
inclusive functions in a broader geo-political context, even though it lays the 
foundation for a more inclusive opportunity structure among the member states. 
Through a comparative approach, chapter 2 illustrated the ways in which the 
normative idea of citizenship in its national understanding is translated into practice
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in regard to immigration policies (Brubaker, 1992). In line with many scholars, this 
thesis agrees that the establishment of Euro-citizenship makes the link between 
citizenship and immigration topical. This can be seen in the debate on granting rights 
to legal subjects who are not citizens. (Marshall and Bottomore, 1992; Mann, 1993; 
Brubaker, 1989; Delanty, 1995; Kostakopoulou, 1998). As national citizenship is 
reinforced through the establishment of Euro-citizenship, it functions towards the 
establishment of new national immigration policies, which in turn serve as a 
legitimate means for the exclusion of those who do not belong to the Euro-polity. 
The increasing immigration pressure within the EU intensifies the need to define the 
citizens of the new polity. On this point, the thesis shows the manner in which 
immigration policies become the filter through which the definition of EU citizens 
occurs. Along with Kostakopoulou, it is possible to argue that ‘immigration shapes 
the boundaries and content of citizenship’ (1998: 167). Though restrictions and 
changes in immigration laws do not correspond to changes in national citizenship in 
terms of convergence (Brubaker, 1992: 179), chapter 2 has shown the extent of the 
impact of Euro-citizenship on two different models of European nation-states. In the 
UK, where the link between citizenship and nationality has never been very strong, it 
is now more profound. In Italy, by contrast, there is now a stronger relationship 
between citizenship and immigration. From opposite poles, in other words, the 
formerly diverse approaches of the UK and Italy towards citizenship are becoming 
increasingly similar. This is the result of what I call a common process of 
homogenisation in which citizenship, nationality, and immigration have become both 
stronger and more consistent across national lines within the EU, yet each remaining 
separate concepts.
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Chapter 3 delineated the legal practices at the EU level that give rise to and 
strengthen a typology of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Delanty, 1995; Garcia, 1993; Mouffe, 
1992; Weiler, 1996b). I have argued that the rationale of this typology underlies the 
common process of homogenisation. Immigration is perceived as a threat for the 
communitarian ideal of unity that challenges the coherence of the two categories of 
‘us’ and ‘them’. It has been shown that there are legal obstacles to the formulation of 
a new concept of ‘legality’. The concept of ‘legal status’ is defined still at the 
national level according to citizenship requirements and thus is not detached from 
nationality and citizenship. This leads to a differentiated categorisation of individuals 
which hinges upon citizenship status. In the EU, such a categorisation leads to 
discrimination against legal residents who are nationals of a third country. I have 
suggested that one of the possible remedies to this problem is the detachment of legal 
status in the EU from nationality. This is not to say that citizenship should also be 
detached from nationality at the national level as long as citizenship and nationality 
at this level refer mainly to cultural and ethnic characteristics. At the supra-national 
level, however, it is important to make access to most rights independent of 
citizenship and nationality, and to afford such access on an equal basis to all legal 
subjects including both third country nationals and nationals of the member states. 
The definition of legality, in other words, should be established at EU level based on 
the criterion of residence rather than nationality (Preuss, 1996; Welsh, 1993; 
Kostakopoulou, 1998). Although some normative undertakings at the EU level 
embody the opportunity for such outcomes (Soysal, 1994), in analytical terms these 
developments are going to be difficult, as Euro-citizenship, like national citizenship, 
has become regulative in terms of its inclusive and exclusive functions.
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There is no doubt that the EU creates a sphere of opportunity within which it 
would be possible to achieve the expansion of rights in terms of ‘subject’ matter 
rather than nationality. The legal undertakings of the ECJ with respect to the 
protection of fundamental and human rights constitutes an important example of the 
ways in which the legal status of individuals living within a supra-national context 
need to be detached from their ethno-cultural characteristics. Efforts of this kind 
obviously encounter resistance from member states.
Chapters 4 and 5 have shown the manner in which the political discourse on 
Euro-citizenship and immigration reflects precisely this kind of resistance. Instead of 
drawing attention to the new opportunities created by Euro-citizenship in particular 
and by European integration in general, supporters have sought to assure doubters 
that Euro-citizenship in no way constitutes a challenge to national sovereignty and 
national identity. They have also focused on the internalisation of notions of Europe 
into each nation’s own identity construction to foster a sense that other member 
states and their citizens belong to the category of ‘us’ and not to the category of 
‘them’. The function of Euro-citizenship is thus increasingly to legitimise the new 
order and to internalise notions of Europe into the identity of each member state.
Chapter 4 in particular has covered the major problems associated with this 
process. The establishment of Euro-citizenship does little to create a closer 
relationship between citizens and the Euro-polity, which results in a lack of 
legitimacy for the EU and its institutions. The thesis agrees with those who argue that 
the new political order does not derive its legitimacy from Euro-citizenship and that 
the Euro-polity is mainly a regulatory order (Delanty, 1998: 353; Majone, 1996). 
Normatively, Euro-citizenship has ‘the ability to enhance functional logic of
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regulatory flows’ (Delanty, 1998: 354), in which priority is given not to the citizen 
per se but to the citizen as homo economicus (Liebfried and Pierson, 1995). The 
political discourse that favours the current vision of Euro-citizenship substantiates 
this argument. The ‘politics of assurance’ that characterises this discourse seeks to 
achieve public consent by securing solutions to common problems through the 
‘market’. Analytically, parliamentary debate pays little attention to either the 
development of individuals’ rights or the process of transformation in the priority of 
citizenship’s means. The priority given to social and economic rights such as 
employment is often reiterated at the political level, but this does not necessarily 
imply that access to social and economic rights can yet be considered as a defining 
principle of Community membership.
In chapter 5, the political discourse on immigration makes it clear that the 
internalisation of notions of Europe occurs also by shaping common strategies of 
exclusion. It has been argued that the introduction of Euro-citizenship has given 
member states a more homogeneous definition of the status of non-citizens and the 
formation of the typology of ‘them’. This is what Weiler defines the exclusionary ethos 
of Euro-citizenship, which concerns the redefinition of the polity in such a way that the 
‘us’ would become European and the ‘them’ non-European (1996: 112). It is in this 
process that citizenship and nationality conflate. One of the most important points to 
come out of the debates on immigration is that problems surrounding the integration 
and representation of immigrants cannot be solved without introducing the issue of 
citizenship. It is precisely on this point that citizenship, nationality, and immigration are 
inherently linked. This substantiates my argument that the rationale for the typology of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ underlines the common process of homogenisation. The categorisation
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of ‘them’ shapes the opposite category of ‘us’ in the search for a supra-national identity 
in Europe. Rather than creating a multi-cultural society, however, this new identity 
threatens to legitimise discrimination. Legal and political undertakings that restrict the 
activities of lawfully resident non-citizens, and place constraints on the behavior of 
citizens towards non-citizens indirectly encourage intolerance against third-country 
nationals.
Chapter 6 considered the relationship between normative undertakings and 
social reality through an empirical analysis of public attitudes. This has provided a 
means by which to consider the value that a supra-national citizenship represents for 
the public as revealed by the Eurobarometer. What has emerged is that citizens are 
detached from any mechanism of identification in the new polity. This is consistent 
across the comparative analysis between Italy and UK, and it shows that orientations 
either for or against the EU are not related to a high/low level of identification with 
the EU. In other words, a positive attitude towards the EU does not correspond to a 
high level of identification with the EU. The analysis of social reality confirms that 
Euro-citizenship as a normative undertaking does not represent a threat for national 
identity. This is consistent with the argument that the establishment of Euro- 
citizenship reinforces nationality. Moreover, the ‘acceptance’ of Euro-citizenship, 
which in my analysis is revealed by a Tow level of affective involvement’, does not 
imply identification with the EU. European identity and Euro-citizenship are not 
related. This not only reveals the inadequacy of Euro-citizenship to function as a 
means by which to facilitate identification with Europe, but also contrasts with the 
major aim behind normative and political undertakings. Euro-citizenship, therefore, 
is not even a ‘normative necessity’ in that it contributes little towards the creation of
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public self-determination (Dahl, 1994; Habermas, 1995; Closa 1998). Importantly, 
the analysis of social reality reveals that Euro-citizenship is not a means by which 
Europe can define its identity ‘as a white bourgeois nationalism’ (Delanty, 1995: 
162). As already stated at the beginning of the thesis, the problem is not so much that 
Euro-citizenship per se is unable to create reconciliation between private autonomy 
and public self-determination (Closa, 1998). On the contrary, the entire process of 
public self-determination should be detached from the effort to create a European 
identity. This would shift the focus of normative and institutional undertakings 
towards residence rather than nationality (Welsh: 1993) or towards ‘legal 
subjectivity’ rather than citizenship.
The high degree of ‘compatibility’ between nationality and Euro-citizenship 
as well as the fact that access to most social rights for EU citizens is guaranteed 
through supra-national institutions suggest that nationality can be detached from 
citizenship rights to refer more to ethno-cultural characteristics. In this way, the 
redefinition of ‘legal status’ in the EU can be based on residence rather than 
nationality while nationality and citizenship can remain interchangeable at the 
national level.
The fact that the transition from a national to a supra-national context is 
guided by common values such as Post-Materialism and that it is also characterised 
by a greater degree of tolerance for foreigners suggests that the new citizenship or 
EU subjecthood should become the mediator of these changes in value orientation. 
All this requires analogous legal and political undertakings that go in the same 
direction, which would involve an effective policy of inclusionary universalism that 
finds a new way to unite the new Euro-polity in a pluralistic process of democracy.
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By contrast, Euro-citizenship thus far has been a normative answer to the challenge 
that immigration represents for the ideas that states have about their own national 
identities. This new regulative function of exclusion challenges the EU’s democratic 
values (Layton-Henry, 1990: 108). This means that a new supra-national citizenship 
ought to be more inclusive, but any system that distinguishes between those who do 
and do not belong also winds up being exclusive. In the end, a perfectly inclusive 
system does not exist, but the issue here is really one of degree. If the reformulation 
of the concept of legality within the EU were based on the principle of residence 
rather than nationality this would certainly constitute a step in the direction of a more 
inclusive system. The challenge that lies ahead is to devise the means by which to 
provide some measure of access to social rights throughout the EU for legally 
resident non-EU citizens. The task at hand is the construction of a more inclusive 
framework that will permit both the EU citizens and its legally resident non-EU 
citizens to reap the benefits of the supra-national state. There is no doubt that a 
greater consideration of public attitudes would enable governments to promote a 
more inclusive regime through normatively created supra-national institutions.
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Fisheries and Rural Development Committee 1989- and Women's Rights Committee 
1989-94; member Cyprus Delegation/EC/EU- Cyprus Joint Parliamentary Committee 
Delegation 1992-94. Particular policy interests: food consumer affairs, Cyprus, ethnic 
minority interests, co-operative affairs. Date of birth 8 December 1948.
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Committee Delegation 1992.
Date of birth: 15 December 1938.
Herzog, Philippe Albert Robert (France, EUL/PCF)
Economic professor Paris University X 1969; member political bureau French 
Communist Party (PCF) 1979. MEP 1989: member Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy Committee 1989-92, substitute 1992; member Environment, 
Public Health and Consumer Protection Committee 1992-94; substitute Development 
and Co-operation Committee 1989-92 and Institutional Affairs Committee 1992-94. 
Vice-chair USA Delegation 1989-92; member Maghreb Countries and Arab Maghreb 
Union Delegation 1992-94 arid Japan Delegation 1994. Date of birth: 6 March 1940.
Jarzembowski, Georg (Germany, EEP/CDU)
Lawyer 1975-78; judge 1978-79; member Hamburg city parliament 1979-91. MEP 
1991: member Development and Co-operation Committee 1991; substitute Transport 
and Tourism Committee 1991-92, member 1992; member Civil Liberties and Internal 
Affairs Committee 1992- and South Asia and SAARC Delegation 1992; substitute 
Australia and New Zealand Delegation 1992. Date of birth: 3 February 1947.
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Verification of Credentials and Immunities Committee 1989-92 and Social Affairs, 
Employment and Working Environment Committee 1992; Member Israel Delegation 
and China Delegation 1992. Particular interests: Internal Security and environment. 
Date of birth: 18 June 1943.
336
Lagorio, Lelio (Italy, PSE/PSI)
Lawyer; university professor; journalist. Mayor of Florence 1965; president regional 
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1934.
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vice-chair EDA Group 1989-94,chair 1994-; member Budgetary Control Committee 
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Luxembourg parliament for centre electoral district 1974-79; MEP 1975-79: vice- 
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European Council of Heads of State and Government 1991; President European 
Commission 1995. Date of birth: 18 May 1937.
Tazdait, Dijda (France, Green/Verts)
Television Producer. MEP 1989: member Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
Committee 1989-92, Development and Co-operation Committee 1992- and Women's 
Rights Committee 1992, substitute 1989-92, substitute Social Affairs, Employment and 
Working Environment Committee 1989-92 and Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs 
Committee 1992; vice-chair Maghreb Delegation 1989. Date of birth: 8 April 1957.
Tsatsos, Dimitrios (Greece, PES/Pasok)
University professor. Member Greek parliament: minister. MEP 1994: member 
Institutional Affairs Committee 1994; substitute Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
Committee 1994- and Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and 
Immunities Committee 1994; member EU-Hungary Joint Parliamentary Committee 
Delegation 1994. Date of birth: 5 May 1933.
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Van den Brink, Mathilde M (The Netherlands, PSE/PvdA)
Teacher 1974-80; Mayor Gieten 1980-86; Chair National Council for Youth Policy
1986-89; Deputy director-general Welfare, Culture and Public Health state department 
1989. MEP 1989: -vice-chair Political Affairs/Foreign Affairs and Security Committee 
1989-92, substitute 1992-; Member Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights Committee 
1989-90, substitute 1990-92; substitute Women's Rights Committee 1989-92; Member 
Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs Committee 1992; substitute Security and 
Disarmament Sub-Committee 1992; member Central America and Mexico Delegation 
1989-90; Member Maghreb Countries and Arab Maghreb Union Delegation 1992; 
substitute EC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee Delegation 1992. Particular 
interests: policy affairs, law, youth, women's rights, social affairs. Date of birth: 4 
February 1941.
Van Outrive, Lode JC  (Belgium PSE/SP)
Lawyer; sociologist; administration of justice professor Louvain University. MEP 
1989: member Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights Committee 1989-92 and Civil 
Liberties and Internal Affairs Committee 1992; substitute Social Affairs, Employment 
and Working Environment Committee 1989; member Central America and Mexico 
Delegation 1992. Particular policy interests: free movement of people; information and 
participation of workers. Date of birth: 18 January 1932.
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House of Lords
Blatch (Life Baroness, UK), Emily May Blatch
Women's Royal Air Force, Air Traffic Control 1955-59, Air Traffic Control (Civilian) 
1959-63; Leader of Cambridgeshire County Council 1981-85. Member Peterborough 
Development Corporation 1984-88. Member of the European Economic and Social 
Committee 1986-87. FRSA 1985. Rotarian Paul Harris Fellow 1992 Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Department of Environment 1990-91; Minister of State 
(Heritage) 1991-92; Minister of State, Department of Education 1992-94; Minister of 
State, Home Office 1994. A Conservative. Special interests: Local Government, 
Education, Anglo-American Relations.
McIntosh of Haringey (Life Baron, UK), Andrew Robert McIntosh
President Market Research Society 1995; Chairman Fabian Society 190-81; Chairman 
Association for Neighbourhood Councils 1974-80; Leader of the Opposition 1980-81; 
House of Lords: Opposition Spokesman on Education and Science 1985-87, on the 
Environment 1987-92, and Home Affairs 1992; Deputy Leader of the Opposition 1992. 
Labour.
Elies (Life Baroness, UK), Diana Louie Elies
Barrister-at-Law, Lincoln's Inn, 1956. International Chairman European Union of 
Women 1973-79. UK delegate to European Parliament 1973-75. Chairman 
Conservative Party International Office 1973-78. UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights 1975-79. Opposition Spokesman in House of Lords 1975-79. Council Member 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1977-86. Vice President European Parliament 
1982-87. Member of House of Lords European Communities Select Committee 1989- 
94; Member, Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference 1995; 
Chairman Sub-Committee on Law and Institutions 1992 Trustee, Caldecott 
Community 1990. Hon. Bencher, Lincoln's Inn 1993. A Conservative.
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Lester of Herne Hill (life Baron, UK), Anthony Paul Lester
Special Adviser to Home Secretaiy 1974-76; Special Adviser to Standing Advisory 
Commission on Human Rights 1975-77; Hon. Visiting Professor, University College 
London 1983; Former Member, Court of Governors, London School of Economics and 
Political Science; President of Interights 1983-94; A recorder of the Crown Court 1987; 
Trustee of Runnymede Trust 1991; Trustee of Charter 88; Vice-Chairman International 
Law Association Committee on Human Rights; Member, American Law Institute 
1985; Governor: British Institute of Human Rights; Board of Governors James Allen’s 
Girls' School 1987-93. Author of ‘Justice in the American South’ 1964; Shawcross and 
Beaumont on Air Law 1964 (co-editor); Race and Law, 1972 (jointly); contributor of 
other legal publications. A liberal Democrat.
(VCathain (Life Baroness, UK), Detta O'Cathain
Member of Council of Industrial Society 1986-92; Formerly Member of Design 
Council and Engineering Council; Past President of Agricultural Section of the British 
Association for the Advancement of Science; Fellow, Royal Society of Arts 1986; 
Fellow, Chartered Institute of Marketing 1987. Commander of Royal Norwegian Order 
1993; Commander of the Order of the Lion of Finland 1994. A conservative.
House of Commons
Blair, Anthony Charles Lynton (Labour, Prime Minister since 1997)
Practising barrister specialising in trade union and industrial law. Opposition Front 
Bench Spokesman on Treasury and Economic Affairs 1984-87; Trade and Industry
1987-88; Energy 1988-89; Employment 1989-92; Home Affairs (Shadow Home 
Secretary) 1992. Member for Sedgefield since June 1983.
Carlisle, John Russell (Conservative)
British South Africa Group 1983-87. Governor of Sports Aid Foundation (Eastern 
Region). Former Vice-Pres. Federation of Conservative Students. Member Select Cttee 
on Agriculture 1985-88. Member of Baltic Exchange 1991. President Bedfordshire 
County Cricket Club.
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Clarke, the Rt Hon. Kenneth (Conservative)
Lord Commissioner of the treasury 1974. Opposition Spokesman on Social Services
1979-80. Pari. Under-Sec. of State at Dept, of Transport 1980-82. Minister of Health
1982-85. PC 1983. Paymaster General and Employment Minister 1985-88. Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster (Minister of Trade and Industry) 1987-88. Secretary of State 
for Health 1988-90. Secretary of state for Education and Science 1990-92. Secretary for 
the Home Department 1992.
Cunningham Roseanna (SNP)
SNP Research Department 1977-79; solicitor, Dumbarton District Council 1983-86 
and Glasgow District Council 1986-89. A former SNP branch and constituency office 
holder; a member of the party national executive and a spokeswoman on the 
Environment. 1996. Special interests: Constitutional, Land.
Corbyn, Jeremy (Labour)
Chairman of Community Development 1975-78, Public Works 1978-79 and Planning
1980-81 of Haringey Borough Council. Former full-time organiser for National Union 
of Public Employees. Also worked for Tailor and Garment workers and AUEW. NUPE 
sponsored MP. Member, Select Cttee on Social Security 1991-92. Special interests: 
Campaigning for socialism in the community and against racism.
Fraser, John Denis (Labour)
Opposition spokesman on Home Affairs 1972-74. Pari. Under-Sec. of State, Dept of 
Employment 1974-76. Minister of State, Dept of Prices and Consumer Protection 
1976-79. Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Trade, Prices and Consumer 
Protection 1979-83; on Housing 1983-84; on the Environment 1984-87; On Legal 
Affairs 1987. Special Interests: Housing, Inner City, Race Relations, Consumer Affairs.
Gould, Bryan Charles (Labour)
Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Trade and Industry 1985-86. Labour Party 
Campaign Co-ordinator 1986-87. Dep. Shadow Chief Secretary 1986-88; Shadow 
Secretary of the State for Trade and Industry 1988-89; Shadow Secretary of State for 
the Environment 1989-92; Shadow Secretary of State for National heritage 1992. 
Contender for Labour Party leadership 1992. Author of: Monetarism or prosperity? 
Socialism and Freedom; A charter for the Disabled; A future for Socialism.
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Howard, the Rt Hon. Michael (Majority)
Minister for Local Government 1987-88. Minister for Water and Planning 1988-89. 
Minister for Housing and Planning 1989-90. Secretary of State for Employment 1990- 
92. Secretary of State for the Environment 1992-93. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 1993.
Kaufman, the Rt Hon. Gerald Bernard (Labour)
Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on the Environment 1979-80; Principal 
Spokesman 1980-83. Shadow Home Secretary 1983-87. Shadow Foreign Secretary
1987-92. Chairman Select Ctte on National Heritage 1992. Member Liaison 
Committee 1992. Member of Labour Party National Executive 1991-92.
Lawrence, Sir Ivan
Member Council of ‘Justice'. Formerly Vice-Pres. Federation of Conservative Students 
Chairman Cons. Past. Home Affairs Committee. Former Member House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee. Chairman Cons. Pari. Legal Committee for Release 
of Soviet Jewry. Vice-Chairman European Inter-Parliamentary Conference for Soviet 
Jewry. Formerly Member Exec. 1992. Member, Liason Committee 1992.
MacLennan, Robert Adam Ross (Liberal Democrat)
Opposition Front Bench Spokesman on Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 1980-81. 
Resigned the Labour Party and joined the Social Democrats, 1981. SDP Spokesman on 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 1981-87; on Home and Legal Affairs 1983-87; 
Northern Ireland 1983-87; and jointly on Scotland 1982-87. Alliance Spokesman on 
Agriculture and Fisheries and Food, 1987. Leader of the SDP 1987-88; Lib. Dem. 
Spokesman on Home Affairs, Broadcasting and the Arts 1988; Member Public 
Accounts Committee.
Marlow, Anthony Rivers (Conservative)
Fellow of the Industry and Parliament Tmst. Formerly Sec. Conservative Trade and 
Industry Committee. Formerly Sec. Conservative Employment Committee. Formerly 
Sec. Conservative. Defence Committee. Member of Select Committee on European 
Legislation. Vice Chairman All Party UK Palestine Group. Sec. All Party UK Czech 
Group.
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Rowe, Andrew John Bernard (Conservative)
Principal, Scottish Office 1962-67. Lecturer Edinburgh University 1967-74. Consultant 
to Voluntary Service Unit 1973-74. Dir Community Affairs, Cons. Central Office
1975-79. Editor of ‘Small Business', and Consultant in Government Affairs 1979-83. 
Member Swann Committee 1979-84. Formerly Chairman Pari. Panel on Personal 
Social Services. Trustee, Community Service Volunteers. Member Speaker's 
Commission on Active Citizenship. Member, Select Committee on: Employment
1983-1990, Health 1991-92. Formerly member, UK delegation to Council of Europe. 
PPS to Richard Needham, MP Minister of State, Dept of Trade and Industry 1992. 
Author of: ‘Democracy Renewed’; ‘Somewhere to Start'; and other pamphlets.
Wilkinson, John Arbuthnot Du Cane (Conservative)
Delegate to Council of Europe and WEU 1979-90. Chairman Anglo/Asian Cons. 
Society 1979-82 Chairman European Freedom Council 1982-90. Chairman Horn of 
Africa Council 1984-88. PPS to Sec. of State for Defence 1981-82. Vice-Chairman 
Cons. Defence Committee 1983-85 and 1990. Member of Select Committee on 
Defence 1987-90. Has written and lectured extensively in fields of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs. Publication (jointly) ‘The uncertain Ally, 1982; ‘British Defence: A 
Blueprint for Reform' 1987.
